LLMs Learn Better In-Context from Rules than from Examples

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly handle in-context learning (ICL) tasks where a long, novel context defines the rules, knowledge, and output schema for a series of questions. On benchmarks that grade against every detail of the context, even strong open-weights models pass only 12-16% of tasks: a single overlooked rule fails the whole response. We argue this brittleness is structural: the dominant "read-and-reason" paradigm asks the model to extract, plan, generate, and self-verify in one forward pass. We therefore ask whether explicit context compilation can fix it, how it compares to existing long-context strategies (gist retrieval, multi-agent self-play), and where the resulting harness benefit holds across task structure and model scale. We propose the Context Compilation Architecture (CCA), whose central novelty is a typed intermediate representation (IR) with fixed slots (rules.{must_do, must_not, conditional}, output_spec, available_tools, data_profile) into which any prose context is compiled once; executable verifiers and a violation-gated correction loop follow as downstream consequences. On CL-bench (1,899 tasks across 4 open base models), CCA outperforms vanilla prompting and two long-context baselines (ReadAgent-P, Ctx2Skill) on every base model, lifting Kimi K2.5 from 15.4% to 21.4% with gains concentrated on rule-dense sub-categories. Code and cached completions are available at https://github.com/TonyQJH/cca-emnlp2026.

Modern language models (LMs) can learn to perform new tasks in different ways: in instruction following, the target task is described explicitly in natural language; in few-shot prompting, the task is specified implicitly with a small number of examples; in instruction inference, LMs are presented with in-context examples and are then prompted to generate a natural language task description before making predictions. Each of these procedures may be thought of as invoking a different form of reasoning: instruction following involves deductive reasoning, few-shot prompting involves inductive reasoning, and instruction inference involves abductive reasoning. How do these different capabilities relate? Across four LMs (from the gpt and llama families) and two learning problems (involving arithmetic functions and machine translation) we find a strong dissociation between the different types of reasoning: LMs can sometimes learn effectively from few-shot prompts even when they are unable to explain their own prediction rules; conversely, they sometimes infer useful task descriptions while completely failing to learn from human-generated descriptions of the same task. Our results highlight the non-systematic nature of reasoning even in some of today's largest LMs, and underscore the fact that very different learning mechanisms may be invoked by seemingly similar prompting procedures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can propose rules in natural language, sidestepping the need for a predefined predicate space in traditional rule learning. Yet many LLM-based approaches ignore interactions among rules, and the opportunity to couple LLMs with probabilistic rule learning for robust inference remains underexplored. We present RLIE, a unified framework that integrates LLMs with probabilistic modeling to learn a set of weighted rules. RLIE has four stages: (1) Rule generation, where an LLM proposes and filters candidates; (2) Logistic regression, which learns probabilistic weights for global selection and calibration; (3) Iterative refinement, which updates the rule set using prediction errors; and (4) Evaluation, which compares the weighted rule set as a direct classifier with methods that inject rules into an LLM. We evaluate multiple inference strategies on real-world datasets. Applying rules directly with their learned weights yields superior performance, whereas prompting LLMs with the rules, weights, and logistic-model outputs surprisingly degrades accuracy. This supports the view that LLMs excel at semantic generation and interpretation but are less reliable for precise probabilistic integration. RLIE clarifies the potential and limitations of LLMs for inductive reasoning and couples them with classic probabilistic rule combination methods to enable more reliable neuro-symbolic reasoning.