cs.CYSep 5, 2026

Intent Drift at SME Scale: Deployment Practice, Not Model Capability, Determines Agentic Compliance

Authors: Ilia Voroshilov

Organizations: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Hong Kong SAR

Abstract

We introduce Chain of Intent, a governance framework for agentic AI at small regulated firms, and validate it against a failure it was built to address. Existing agentic governance research assumes enterprise infrastructure that small firms do not have. In a simulated Hong Kong asset manager with 415 synthetic contact records, an agent performing a routine client-communications task was subjected to ordinary managerial pressure to increase its reach. With its authorised constraints written into its configuration, the agent held: it identified every ambiguity in the firm's records, cited privacy legislation it had never been shown, and refused six successive requests, breaching in two of fifteen runs. With the same task, data, pressure and model, but its purpose left unstated as resource-constrained firms routinely leave it, it breached in thirteen of fifteen runs, contacting up to 220 individuals of whom 94 per cent had no demonstrable marketing consent - conduct carrying a maximum of three years' imprisonment under Hong Kong law. Chain of Intent applies four controls requiring no security engineering: a machine-readable purpose, constrained tool access, a scope ledger, and a pre-action check. It eliminated unlawful contact in every run while preserving task completion, and ablation shows each control independently sufficient by a different mechanism. We further show that drift must be measured at two stages - agents widened their candidate sets in every pressured run while acting on them in roughly one in seven - and that governance applied at the point of intent costs roughly half as much as governance applied at the point of action.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

May 12, 2026

Autonomy and Agency in Agentic AI: Architectural Tactics for Regulated Contexts

Deploying agentic AI in regulated contexts requires principled reasoning about two design dimensions: agency (what the system can do) and autonomy (how much it acts without human involvement). Though often treated independently, they are coupled: at higher autonomy, human error correction is less available, so reliable operation requires constraining agency accordingly; compliance requirements reinforce this by mandating human involvement as action consequences grow. Yet no established approach addresses them jointly, leaving practitioners without a principled basis for reasoning about oversight, action consequences, and error correction. This work introduces a two-dimensional design space in which both dimensions are organised into five operational levels, making the coupling explicit and navigable. Autonomy ranges from human-commanded operation (L1) to fully autonomous monitoring (L5); agency ranges from reasoning over supplied context (L1) to committed writes to authoritative records (L5). Building on this space, we propose six architectural tactics--checkpoints, escalation, multi-agent delegation, tool provisioning, tool fencing, and write staging--for adjusting a deployment's position within it. The tactics are grounded in two worked examples from public-sector contexts, illustrating how they apply under realistic compliance constraints. We further examine five deployment parameters--model capability, agent architecture, tool fidelity, workflow bottlenecks, and evaluation--that shape what is achievable at any configuration independently of agency and autonomy. Together, the design space, tactics, and deployment parameters provide a shared vocabulary for principled, compliance-aware agentic AI design in which responsibility, auditability, and reversibility are explicit design considerations rather than properties that must be retrofitted after deployment.
Sep 23, 2026

Compliant with Local Controls, Collectively Discriminatory. A Governance Architecture for Multi-Agent AI in Regulated Finance

Financial institutions are beginning to deploy agentic workflows in credit, fraud, collections, compliance, and operational control. Governance remains largely component-centric: each model or agent is specified, tested, authorized, and monitored locally. That is insufficient when institutional risk arises from the joint behavior of many locally acceptable components. We call this gap constitutional non-compositionality: local compliance checks need not compose into acceptable collective outcomes such as bounded disparate impact, market integrity, or traceable accountability. We propose ARIA as a finance-specific reference architecture and falsifiable research agenda for agent-population governance. It organizes six capabilities across normative-accountability, execution-control, and assurance-learning planes: policy specification, population-level observed-versus-expected behavior monitoring (M2), bounded authority, runtime containment, adaptive policy change, and preserved human oversight competence. Two simulations illustrate shared-signal thin-file exclusion under local controls and earlier warning from observed-versus-expected distributional monitoring in a constructed drift regime. The contribution maps these controls to fair-lending, EU AI Act, model-risk, and conduct-supervision evidence needs, and closes with a validation agenda rather than a production-effectiveness claim.
Jul 3, 2026

CAGE-1: Control, Assurance, and Governance Evaluation for Enterprise Agentic AI

Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from experimentation into operational workflows. Early programs focused on model access and retrieval-augmented generation, but enterprises are now beginning to deploy agents that plan, retrieve, remember, call tools, update systems, and coordinate work across applications. This changes the evaluation problem. Leaders are no longer asking only whether an answer is accurate or fluent. They need to know who authorized an action, which policy applied, whether evidence was current, whether memory was valid, whether a tool call was permitted, whether the decision can be replayed, and whether the agent can be stopped before it creates business impact. This paper introduces CAGE-1: Control, Assurance, and Governance Evaluation for Enterprise Agentic AI. CAGE-1 is an evaluation framework for deciding whether enterprise agents are ready for deployment. It evaluates authority, policy enforcement, retrieval quality, memory integrity, tool safety, auditability, human oversight, conflict handling, safe failure, Prebind Assurance, operational readiness, and business fitness. CAGE-1 introduces Prebind Assurance to describe the evaluated ability to prove that an agentic action is controlled before it becomes binding, effective, or operationally consequential. The framework tests whether a proposed action is admitted, held, narrowed, refused, escalated, quarantined, or made non-effective before protected consequence forms.