Domain-Incremental Learning for Multi-Channel Replay Speech Detection

Fake speech detectors are increasingly challenged by the development of new and more accurate generative models. To cope with this problem, continual learning techniques are nowadays widely considered feasible strategies for updating models to new datasets, but they also lead to decreased performance on previously seen samples (catastrophic forgetting). In this work, we propose a forgetting-resilient solution based on the adoption of domain translators within a frozen detector, which remaps the new feature spaces into the original ones by means of a traceback translator network. Experimental results show that this strategy enables the achievement of high detection rates with respect to traditional retraining, while minimizing the computational effort and preserving the detection accuracy on previous data.

Generalizing to unseen attacks remains challenging for audio deepfake detectors, and collecting training data covering all potential attacks is impractical. We explore recurrent refinement in an already-trained SSL-based detector without additional data or changes to its original parameters. However, directly recycling encoder outputs as inputs degrades detection in our diagnostic. We propose CoReLoop, which makes this reuse effective by adapting recurrent inputs to the frozen encoder, controlling state updates, and aligning refined outputs with the frozen classifier. By training only lightweight refinement modules and loop-specific low-rank adapters on the original data, CoReLoop enables additional refinement while preserving the detector's original first-pass prediction. On 14 cross-domain test sets, the 24-layer model reduces pooled equal error rate (EER) from 4.85% to 3.74% with two passes, with approximately 10M trainable parameters out of 598M. To selectively apply this refinement, an optional halting head chooses the depth for each utterance, achieving 3.73% pooled EER with an average of 1.18 passes.

Continual learning (CL) models often use experience replay to reduce catastrophic forgetting, but their robustness to replay sampling interference remains underexplored. Existing CL attacks alter inputs or training pipelines (poisoning/backdoors) and rarely include explicit auditable constraints, limiting realism. Here, auditability means a monitor can verify compliance from sampler-visible telemetry - e.g., logged replay index/label statistics - by checking that the realized replay class histogram stays close to a nominal baseline and that replay rate is unchanged per batch and/or over a rolling window. We study a limited-privilege insider who controls only replay index selection, not pixels, labels, or model parameters, while staying within auditable limits such as queue priorities. We introduce Amnesia, a replay composition attack that maximizes degradation under two budgets: a visibility budget delta bounding the TV/KL divergence from a nominal class histogram p0, and a mass budget f fixing the replay rate. Amnesia has two steps: (i) compute lightweight class utilities, such as EMA loss or confidence, to tilt p0 toward harmful classes; and (ii) project the tilt back into the delta-ball using efficient KL (exponential tilt) or TV (balanced mass redistribution) optimizers. A windowed scheduler enforces rolling audits. Across challenging CL benchmarks and strong replay baselines, Amnesia consistently lowers final accuracy (ACC) and worsens backward transfer (-BWT). The KL variant delivers high impact while remaining largely undetected under multiple audit schemes, including per-batch and rolling-window checks. The TV variant is more damaging but easier to detect, especially under tight per-class constraints. These results expose index-only replay control as a practical, auditable threat surface in CL systems and establish a principled impact-visibility trade-off.