Bayesian Intelligence from the Outside

To operate reliably under changing conditions, complex systems require feedback on how effectively they use resources, not just whether objectives are met. Current AI systems process vast information to produce sophisticated predictions, yet predictions can appear successful while the underlying interaction with the environment degrades. What is missing is a principled measure of how much of the total information a system deploys is actually shared between its observations, actions, and outcomes. We prove this shared fraction, which we term bipredictability, P, is intrinsic to any interaction, derivable from first principles, and strictly bounded: P can reach unity in quantum systems, P equal to, or smaller than 0.5 in classical systems, and lower once agency (action selection) is introduced. We confirm these bounds in a physical system (double pendulum), reinforcement learning agents, and multi turn LLM conversations. These results distinguish agency from intelligence: agency is the capacity to act on predictions, whereas intelligence additionally requires learning from interaction, self-monitoring of its learning effectiveness, and adapting the scope of observations, actions, and outcomes to restore effective learning. By this definition, current AI systems achieve agency but not intelligence. Inspired by thalamocortical regulation in biological systems, we demonstrate a feedback architecture that monitors P in real time, establishing a prerequisite for adaptive, resilient AI.

Multi-agent AI systems improve inference by spawning agents and synthesizing reports. But another agent is not another observation: apparently independent reports may descend from the same evidence, and genuinely independent evidence can produce nearly identical reports. We formalize this as an epistemic Sybil problem. A report Z is an epistemic Sybil extension relative to reports R when I(Theta; Z | R) = 0. No report-only aggregator can generally distinguish replication from independent corroboration: identical reports can warrant different posteriors under unobserved ancestry. A Gaussian shared-root model shows common ancestry does not imply complete redundancy. Repeated extraction adds information toward a source-level ceiling, and correlated extraction errors, which a shared base model can induce among independent agents, lower that ceiling further. We test these predictions with more than 20,000 controlled LLM-agent report and extraction calls on synthetic evidentiary documents. Holding one evidence root fixed while report multiplicity rises from 1 to 32 collapses naive posterior coverage from 0.940 to 0.263. Holding report count fixed while evidence-root multiplicity rises from 1 to 16 closes the gap, and the aggregators are statistically indistinguishable at k = 16. The agent's replicate extraction errors are correlated (gamma_cal = 0.719, estimated out of sample), and a correlated-extraction aggregator restores calibration accordingly. A controlled manipulation isolates representation similarity from evidential ancestry. It changes a report-space deduplication mechanism's mean inferred cluster count by 1.425 (95% CI [1.363, 1.485]), whereas a fourfold change in true ancestry changes it by only 0.040 ([-0.045, 0.120]). Collective inference should therefore track evidential ancestry and dependence, not agent or report multiplicity or similarity.

AI agents increasingly perform open-ended tasks in settings where their conclusions can guide consequential decisions. We provide evidence that AI agents draw different conclusions from identical numerical data when the substantive framing changes. We demonstrate this behavior in high-stakes domains in medicine, election forensics, and geopolitical forecasting by holding the evidence fixed while changing the scenario in which the evidence appears. Across twelve agent-domain comparisons, agents' conclusions are strongly influenced by their prior beliefs. They are more likely to reach an affirmative conclusion when it is framed around a proposition they already regard as likely, while the reverse holds when the framing conflicts with their prior. The framing also changes how some agents work: they search more extensively, choose different analytical specifications, and evaluate the same evidence differently. These results identify a particular risk of delegating decision-making to AI agents, as their decisions may depend on prior beliefs that are neither specified in the task nor visible in the decision record.