Organizations increasingly use oversight loops where one large language model (LLM) audits another's outputs alongside procedural traces of claimed steps. A common concern about such LLM-as-a-judge pipelines is that detailed traces make overseers gullible. Using signal detection theory, we audit five LLM overseers on 19 compliance tasks (4,551 analyzed judgments), varying only trace detail and evidence labeling. With disconfirming evidence always visible, error detection remains near ceiling. Instead, elaborate traces shift the decision criterion toward rejection, increasing false alarms in susceptible overseers. Without option labels, human-validated reason coding shows about 60% of false alarms cite an inability to tie evidence to its option. Labels eliminate this stated reason, yet residual rejection of correct work persists in those overseers and rises with trace detail. Procedural traces thus act as governance artifacts that shape oversight decisions. AI auditors should be evaluated by their decision criterion and false-alarm behavior, alongside accuracy.
A single human must audit N LLM agents under a budget of B≪N audits per round, guided by self-reported confidence that may be adversarially miscalibrated and by correlated errors. We model this as budgeted noisy inspection over a two-level Gaussian copula and locate the miscalibration threshold δ∗ past which confidence-ranked auditing is \emph{worse} than random. Two a-priori expectations reverse: δ∗ \emph{rises} as the budget shrinks, and cross-family correlation is not low---shared difficulty dominates lineage. Five open-weight LLMs show operationally useless (near-constant) confidence, point estimates at or beyond the flip though CIs straddle it; a proprietary model is informative and lands below it. We give a quantitative criterion for \emph{vacuous} oversight, and replaying policies on recorded traces confirms the ordering.
Cesare Zavattari, Alessandro Tommasi, Giuseppe Prencipe
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in organizational work, yet their errors often pass human review. Prior research locates such failures in users' capability to review LLM output or their engagement in doing so. We develop an alternative, retrieval-based account of human oversight and posit that error detection is more effective when oversight-relevant information is accessible to users at the moment of review. Across two randomized lab-in-the-field experiments with 640 customer-facing employees, we show that self-generated explanations improve error detection and strengthen recall of verification-relevant reasoning, while cues that reactivate such reasoning help sustain detection under repeated LLM use. Theoretically, we identify information retrievability as a distinct precondition for effective oversight and specify generative encoding and cue-supported reactivation as mechanisms that build and sustain it. Practically, lightweight onboarding self-explanations and daily retrieval cues can make human oversight more resilient as LLM use becomes routine.
Multi-agent LLM pipelines increasingly span organisational boundaries; when a fault surfaces, someone must determine where it entered. The artifact available is rarely a full execution trace: it is the reports each agent filed, and a filed report can state a conclusion alongside its observations. Using a pre-registered, institutionally partitioned pipeline of six agents with process-level information boundaries, balanced defect injection and matched clean twins (345,600 requests per chain model, two models), we first report that our pre-registered hypothesis -- that collective responsibility framing degrades escalation with chain length -- is not supported. The layer nevertheless fails asymmetrically. It originates almost nothing: zero allegations across 7,996 clean episodes where every agent stayed silent. It filters upstream error poorly, naming an innocent party in 34.4% and 62.6% of clean episodes where an agent raised a false alarm. Conditional on no agent proposing the true origin (59.5% of episodes on one chain model), an auditor reading the reports recovers it in 4.1% of cases -- below a uniform guess (20%) and the best fixed-link accuser (31.0%) -- while reaching 60.3% from the raw documentation of the same episodes. Deleting one clause, the field carrying the agents' own conclusion, isolates the cause at constant observations: accuracy rises to 45.2% (+41.2 pp, 95% CI +35.3 to +46.9) and adherence collapses from 94.4% to 3.4%; where the suggestion was correct the same deletion instead costs accuracy, 70.5% to 55.7%. The harm replicates on two frontier auditors in four conditions out of four (+8.5 to +39.0 pp) and in a second domain (+47.7 and +61.1 pp), where the cost disappears. The net effect is governed by upstream reliability together with both conditional magnitudes. An accountability layer needs evidence sufficiently independent of the conclusions it verifies.