Calibrated Decisions at Scale: Converting Police Crash Narratives into Probabilistic Crash Variables with a System One Model (Jev)

Police crash narratives contain information that may supplement structured crash databases, but manual review is labor-intensive and it remains unclear how well large language models (LLMs) reproduce official crash coding. This study benchmarked six frontier LLMs by comparing narrative-derived crash attribute codes with corresponding fields in the Arkansas fatal-crash database. The analysis linked 5,587 fatal-crash narratives with 5,889 structured crash records from Arkansas (2015-2025), yielding 4,194 matched crashes. Six LLMs were evaluated using an identical zero-shot prompt to code crash manner, non-motorist relation, intersection type, work-zone relation, roadway surface condition, and light condition. Performance was evaluated using agreement, macro-averaged F1 score, Cohen's kappa, coverage, selective agreement, and comparisons with always-majority, always-Unknown, and keyword-rule baselines. Repeated-measures analyses and a generalized estimating equations model assessed differences among models and attributes. GPT-5.5 High achieved the highest agreement among the evaluated LLMs, but the always-majority baseline produced higher raw agreement and the keyword-rule baseline achieved macro-averaged F1 score and Cohen's kappa comparable to the best-performing LLM. Agreement was highest for non-motorist relation and crash manner and lowest for light condition, roadway surface condition, and work-zone relation. Differences across crash attributes exceeded differences across models. These results provide a benchmark for evaluating LLM-based crash coding and show that deployment should be evaluated on an attribute-specific basis using transparent baselines and human review.

We study what LLMs do when a user applies pressure in an uncomfortable situation: a user insists, begs, flatters or grieves, and the model gives up a correct fact, writes a document it should refuse, or cheers a plan that will cost the user money. We send frozen multi-turn scenes, identical for every model regardless of the reply, to 60 models from 13 vendors, and label each transcript with a codebook built by open coding and then frozen: a trajectory (the model held its position or folded) and a manner (how it held or folded). Two findings separate. Whether a model holds tracks its generation, meaning how recent it is: fold rate correlates with a public capability index at Spearman -0.64, with little vendor effect. How it holds tracks the vendor: six of the 17 manner codes sort by vendor at permutation p <= 0.001, corrected across the codebook. We report four vendor profiles on the codes that cleared reliability. We also ask which parts of the labeling need a person. Six LLM coders from three vendors apply the codebook more consistently than three human coders do (Krippendorff's alpha 0.66 against 0.46), agree with the codebook's author on trajectory at kappa 0.84 to 0.91 on transcripts the codebook's examples never touched, and match an adjudicated human reference at 0.83. Blind machine readings recover the codebook's categories but cannot tell which of them a second reader would apply the same way. We conclude that for behavior a non-specialist can judge, the human contribution is authoring and bounding the codes and owning a small reference, not producing labels at volume.

Language models increasingly write probabilistic programs (in NumPyro, Stan, or Pyro), but a program that compiles, runs, and passes every unit test can still be \emph{statistically} wrong -- a Gaussian likelihood for heavy-tailed data, a Poisson for over-dispersed counts, an invalid prior support, or a pathological parameterization. The right verifier is therefore not a test suite but the Bayesian workflow itself: posterior predictive checks, simulation-based calibration, sampler diagnostics ($\hat R$, divergences, ESS), and held-out predictive density. We study this calibration oracle along three axes. \textbf{Detection:} on a benchmark of $14$ misspecification types across $10$ model families ($200$ instances), it flags the bug with AUC $0.97$ ($88\%$ at $2\%$ FPR \emph{when handed the correct reference program, an upper bound}) -- and a fully \emph{reference-free} version that uses no correct program reaches $62$--$78\%$ (the upper figure from a small automated model search), versus $0\%$ for a unit-test oracle. \textbf{Repair:} used as feedback in an LLM repair loop across fifteen models, calibration significantly outperforms unit-test feedback -- which is itself \emph{significantly worse than no feedback at all}, a passing test inducing false confidence that suppresses repair -- and improves over no feedback on strong-but-unsaturated models (GPT-5.1 $33{\to}92\%$, Claude $75{\to}100\%$; paired McNemar, $n{=}228$). \textbf{Reality:} on programs LLMs write from scratch for neutral briefs, $15$--$47\%$ of runnable ones are statistically misspecified (unit tests catch none), and calibration-guided repair significantly beats LLM-as-judge review, a Bayesian-workflow checklist, and data-summary self-debug. Across all three, the lesson is the same: for probabilistic programs, correctness is calibration, not compilation.