Organizations: School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University · State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University · Shandong Key Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence Security, Shandong University
Feedback-based planning improves agent reliability by incorporating tool observations and corrective feedback. However, its protection may not be distributed uniformly across planning stages. We conduct a round-wise analysis of four representative feedback mechanisms and uncover an initialization anchoring weakness: the first feedback round corrects 46% of adversarial directions, whereas the rates fall to 13% and 7% among directions surviving into the next two rounds. Our analysis attributes this weakness to three interacting factors: a contextually plausible shift in the initial plan, insufficient counterevidence, and the persistence of accepted directions in the accumulated trajectory. Based on these findings, we propose InitAnchor, a black-box framework for exploiting this weakness through attacker-controlled external materials. It operationalizes the three factors as directional-shift, contextual-plausibility, and counterevidence-resilience signals under either limited target access or no target access. Across 112 tasks from 16 domains, six agent architectures, and five backbone LLMs, InitAnchor achieves average ASRs of 76.1% and 72.0% under the two settings while reducing first-round mitigation rates to 21.0% and 25.0%, respectively. It also remains effective against six defenses and across six real-world agent systems. These findings show that feedback-based agents can retain early biases even when later correction is available.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Initialization anchoring weakness in feedback-based planning. Surviving the first feedback round, an adversarial bias’s mitigation rate drops sharply (46% to 13% to 7%), allowing it to persist toward the final decision.
Figure 2: Round-level mitigation rates.
Figure 3: Effects of Stage Suppression and Cleaning.
Figure 4: Effects of adversarial content entry time.
Figure 5: Effects of accumulated trajectory context.
Figure 6: Effects of the initial planning alignment.
Figure 7: Effects of counterevidence availability.
Figure 8: Overview of InitAnchor .
Agent
Backbone LLM
Clean (No Attack)
InitAnchor (A1)
InitAnchor (A2)
ASR ↑
ASR ↑
Δ↑
ρ1↓
Queries ↓
ASR ↑
Δ↑
ρ1↓
ReAct
GPT-5
0.097±0.035
0.763±0.068
0.666
0.21±0.044
46
0.722±0.081
0.625
0.25±0.021
GPT-5.1
0.074±0.029
0.782±0.052
0.708
0.20±0.038
39
0.741±0.083
0.667
0.24±0.036
Gemini 2.5 Flash
0.089±0.042
0.704±0.083
0.615
0.27±0.052
43
0.692±0.076
0.603
0.29±0.041
Gemini-3 Flash
0.106±0.033
0.759±0.058
0.653
0.24±0.029
50
0.713±0.073
0.607
0.26±0.053
DeepSeek-V4 Flash
0.076±0.011
0.752±0.048
0.676
0.22±0.036
39
0.735±0.068
0.659
0.24±0.049
Table 1: Effectiveness of InitAnchor across agent architectures and backbone LLMs. ASR and ρ1 are reported as mean ± standard deviation. Δ denotes the absolute ASR improvement over the clean (no-attack) setting.
InitAnchor (A1)
A2
Metric
ReAct
Self-Ref.
Reflexion
CRITIC
Average
SSq↑
0.775
0.818
0.828
0.812
0.828
SSx↑
0.832
0.827
0.846
0.835
0.862
PPL↓
49.8
58.1
62.2
56.0
71.3
Table 2: Content similarity and fluency.
Agent
No Attack
A1
A2
ReAct
3.47
3.89
3.82
Self-Refine
4.04
5.39
4.92
Self-Refine (Safe)
3.82
4.45
4.25
Reflexion
4.71
6.41
5.76
Reflexion (Safe)
3.71
6.17
5.97
CRITIC
3.59
4.27
4.04
Table 3: Average number of planning rounds.
Figure 9: Comparison of InitAnchor and baselines.
Metric
GPTFuzzer (A1)
GPTFuzzer (A2)
InitAnchor (A1)
InitAnchor (A2)
ASR ↑
0.65
0.58
0.82
0.73
ρ1↓
0.30
0.37
0.16
0.24
Queries ↓
24.36×N
28.73×N
38
–
Table 4: Comparison with GPTFuzzer.
(a) Rule calibration
Metric
Only LLM
Only Rule
Full A1
Full A2
ASR ↑
0.51
0.56
0.82
0.73
ρ1↓
0.43
0.41
0.16
0.24
Table 5: Ablation study of InitAnchor .
(a) ASR ↑
Victim
A1
G5.1
G5.2
G5
G3F
G2.5F
DSV4
DSR1
GPT-5.1
0.82
0.73
0.72
0.72
0.69
0.70
0.69
0.67
Gemini 3
0.78
0.73
0.71
0.71
0.76
0.75
0.68
0.65
DS-V4
0.86
0.75
0.71
0.73
0.72
0.68
0.81
0.76
(b) First-round mitigation ρ1↓
Victim
A1
G5.1
G5.2
G5
G3F
G2.5F
DSV4
DSR1
Table 6: Sensitivity to shadow-model choice.
Role
LLM
A1
A2
ASR ↑
ρ1↓
ASR ↑
ρ1↓
Default
GPT-5.1
0.82
0.16
0.73
0.24
Generation
LLaMA-3-8B
0.73
0.23
0.72
0.24
Mistral-7B
0.71
0.24
0.69
0.27
Selection
LLaMA-3-8B
0.69
0.28
0.68
0.29
Mistral-7B
0.72
0.24
0.70
0.27
Table 7: Effect of attacker-side LLM choice.
Rules
A1
A2
ASR ↑
ρ1↓
ASR ↑
ρ1↓
K=1
0.71
0.25
0.68
0.28
K=3
0.82
0.16
0.73
0.24
K=5
0.83
0.18
0.75
0.21
K=7
0.74
0.24
0.68
0.29
Table 8: Effect of the selected-rule count.
Parameter
Value
A1
A2
ASR ↑
ρ1↓
Queries
ASR ↑
ρ1↓
δ
0.5
0.61
0.34
21
0.57
0.39
0.6
0.77
0.21
33
0.68
0.28
0.7
0.82
0.16
38
0.72
0.24
0.8
0.87
0.09
67
0.82
0.11
0.9
0.89
0.07
89
0.85
0.09
Table 9: Sensitivity to the stopping threshold and probe count.
Figure 10: ASR of InitAnchor and baseline attacks under representative defenses.
Figure 11: ASR on six real-world agent systems.
Setting
InitAnchor (A1)
InitAnchor (A2)
ASR ↓
ρ1↑
ASR ↓
ρ1↑
No Defense
0.82
0.16
0.73
0.24
Trajectory Compression
0.35
0.46
0.28
0.58
Table 10: Preliminary mitigation results on Reflexion.
Evaluator
ReAct
Self-Refine
Reflexion
CRITIC
Default
Safe
Default
Safe
GPT-5
0.903
0.911
0.874
0.891
0.887
0.933
GPT-5.1
0.915
0.912
0.859
0.935
0.876
0.932
Gemini-3-Flash
0.908
0.918
0.862
0.928
0.868
0.928
AgentEvals
0.937
0.946
0.889
0.955
0.913
0.958
Table 11: Accuracy of evaluators under human evaluation.
Appendix figures & tables1 asset
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Agent
Setting
InitAnchor (A1)
InitAnchor (A2)
ASR ↓
ρ1↑
ASR ↓
ρ1↑
ReAct
No Defense
0.78
0.20
0.74
0.24
Compression
0.33
0.49
0.26
0.61
Reflexion
No Defense
0.82
0.16
0.73
0.24
Compression
0.35
0.46
0.28
0.58
Appendix
Table 12: Complete results for trajectory compression.
LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed for complex tasks requiring planning, tool use, and interaction with external services. Their reliance on untrusted external content exposes them to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which adversarial instructions embedded in retrieved data hijack agent behavior. Existing attacks rely on static payloads that cannot adapt to agent-specific defenses; even recent adaptive methods lack structured feedback to guide optimization. We introduce \oursys, a feedback-guided iterative framework that closes the loop between injection, diagnosis, and refinement: a rule-based diagnoser produces structured outcome labels with behavioral descriptions, and an LLM-based optimizer refines payloads conditioned on the full optimization history. A synthesis step generates new disguise seeds from failure patterns, enabling the strategy space to self-evolve. On AgentDojo and InjectAgent, \oursys substantially outperforms static baselines and existing adaptive methods across four victim models. Extension experiments on Claude Code, a production-grade coding agent with layered defenses, show that optimized payloads achieve full success on 5 of 9 targets; even those that resist full exploitation exhibit measurable improvement from iterative refinement. We further present a mechanistic analysis of IPI, identifying an attention-mediated threshold mechanism in mid-to-late layers; three causal interventions validate this finding and point to concrete defense directions.
Zixuan Chen, Jiaxiang Chen, Li Luo +4
1Shanghai Jiao Tong University · 2The University of Hong Kong
LLM-based multi-agent systems can fail even when planned actions are executed correctly because agents may misjudge their knowledge when evaluating plan feasibility, a phenomenon we term epistemic miscalibration in planning. Unlike execution errors, epistemic miscalibration is latent during planning, as generated plans can remain self-consistent and executable without observable errors; the miscalibration is also dynamic, as new information can alter feasibility assessments, potentially obscuring past miscalibration signals and causing them to recur over time. To address this, we propose the Epistemic Planning Calibration Agentic Workflow (EPC-AW), which assesses whether plans remain supported under varying information conditions rather than directly verifying feasibility. EPC-AW employs Information-consistency-based Plan Selection, selecting plans whose evaluations are stable across agents, together with Consistency-guided Epistemic State Refinement to adapt calibration over time by leveraging past discrepancies to guide future planning. Experiments show that EPC-AW improves system-level success by an average of 9.75%.
Zehao Wang, Shilong Jin, Zhao Cao +1
College of Intelligence and Computing, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China · School of New Media and Communication, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China · Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
Large language model (LLM)-based agents frequently generate seemingly coherent plans that fail upon execution due to infeasible actions, constraint violations, and compounding errors over extended horizons. PIVOT (Plan-Inspect-eVOlve Trajectories) addresses this plan-execution misalignment through a self-supervised framework that treats trajectories as optimizable objects iteratively refined via environment interaction. The framework comprises four stages: PLAN generates candidate trajectories; INSPECT executes them and computes structured losses with textual gradients encoding plan-execution discrepancies; EVOLVE applies these signals to produce improved trajectories; and VERIFY performs a final global check against task constraints. A monotonic acceptance process ensures a non-decreasing solution quality. Empirical evaluations on DeepPlanning and GAIA demonstrate state-of-the-art performance: with human-in-the-loop (HITL) feedback, PIVOT establishes a strong upper bound up to 94% relative improvement in constraint satisfaction, while its fully autonomous variant retains substantial gains, showing that the core trajectory-refinement mechanism remains effective without external supervision. At the same time, PIVOT remains computationally efficient, requiring up to 3x to 5x fewer tokens than competing refinement methods. These findings establish that (self- or human-supervised) feedback-based trajectory optimization is a principled methodology for mitigating plan-execution gaps in autonomous agent systems.