Artificial intelligences and human scientists exhibit complementary strengths in theory building

Bold projections that artificial intelligence will accelerate scientific discovery have raced ahead of evidence from working scientists, and the field still lacks large-scale, scientist-in-the-loop tests of these claims. Here we mount the largest such evaluation to date and map what AI cannot yet do for science. We invited authors of 121,640 recent preprints across biology, medicine, chemistry, and the social sciences to judge ideas that large language models (LLMs) generated from the context and puzzles of their own papers. 6,749 scientists returned 25,139 sets of ratings on novelty, empirical feasibility, probability of being true, and favorability of adoption. Three patterns emerge. First, non-reasoning LLMs collapse into a narrow "hivemind" of similar ideas; reasoning models roam a wider hypothesis space, yet no model class spontaneously proposes null hypotheses -- a move humans make more freely. Second, scientists reward ideas that resemble their own and prize probability over novelty, though social scientists tolerate risk more readily than life scientists. Senior social scientists are the harshest critics, and their skepticism is well-earned: LLMs falter most in pluralistic fields like the social sciences that demand context-aware interpretation and evolving theories. Third, automated evaluators on which the community currently relies -- LLM-as-a-judge, artificial metrics, and even state-of-the-art (SOTA) models -- agree only weakly with expert judgment, and retrieval augmentation and scientist persona prompting yield only marginal gains. A Qwen3-14B reward model we post-trained on human ratings captures field taste nuances, beats SOTA models by up to 27%, and closes the gap to the inter-rater consistency of independent peer reviewers. For all the hype, today's scientific AI still represents a collaborator whose imagination, outputs and judgment benefit from human grounding.

LLMs have been studied in recent linguistics as potential models of humans' linguistic abilities. Here we discuss an entirely different use of AI, namely as a co-scientist, to help construct and assess linguistic theories (we refer to the result as "Co-Linguistics"). Since the 1960s, linguistics has developed theories that are in principle mathematically formalizable, often in the language of formal language theory or model theory. The AI revolution in mathematics will thus have consequences in linguistics-but with an essential twist: proving new theorems is rarely the linguist's goal. Rather, one seeks to find the best set of axioms to derive empirical statements. AI could accelerate research by making existing theories fully explicit, by comparing competing theories, and more ambitiously, by proposing new theories (in machine learning, this relates to "program induction"). It will also help assess theories by accelerating the identification and test of crucial predictions, thanks to unparalleled access to data (in machine learning, this relates to "active learning"). While the cycle from theory evaluation to theory construction may give rise to recursive and possibly autonomous improvement of linguistic theories, humans remain central: linguists provide scientific directions and evaluate theories conceptually, and experimental participants are needed to assess empirical predictions that are outside the reach of LLMs.

Behavioral foundation models have been proposed as stand-ins for human participants across settings, but it is unclear whether theories discovered on them generalize to humans or merely characterize the simulator. We ran the Automated Cognitive Scientist (AutoCog), a closed-loop discovery system in which LLM agents design theory-discriminating experiments, collect responses, arbitrate between competing theories, and synthesize successors, entirely on behavior simulated by Centaur, a foundation model of human behavior. In a multi-attribute decision-making setting, the theories AutoCog found on Centaur generalized to human data: they outperformed canonical theories on ten held-out experiments and were rivaled only by theories found by running the same loop on people. We argue that this succeeds despite the simulator's inevitable imperfections because a discovery loop that arbitrates between competing theories demands less of its simulator than estimation does. The simulator only needs to capture the regularities that distinguish the theories, and not necessarily reproduce behavior precisely. Imperfect simulators can therefore widen the search over theories, with human data then testing whether the surfaced theories generalize.