LLMs are not stochastic parrots: Evidence for meaning-mediated abstraction from conlang-like tasks

Modern language models (LMs) can learn to perform new tasks in different ways: in instruction following, the target task is described explicitly in natural language; in few-shot prompting, the task is specified implicitly with a small number of examples; in instruction inference, LMs are presented with in-context examples and are then prompted to generate a natural language task description before making predictions. Each of these procedures may be thought of as invoking a different form of reasoning: instruction following involves deductive reasoning, few-shot prompting involves inductive reasoning, and instruction inference involves abductive reasoning. How do these different capabilities relate? Across four LMs (from the gpt and llama families) and two learning problems (involving arithmetic functions and machine translation) we find a strong dissociation between the different types of reasoning: LMs can sometimes learn effectively from few-shot prompts even when they are unable to explain their own prediction rules; conversely, they sometimes infer useful task descriptions while completely failing to learn from human-generated descriptions of the same task. Our results highlight the non-systematic nature of reasoning even in some of today's largest LMs, and underscore the fact that very different learning mechanisms may be invoked by seemingly similar prompting procedures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are frequently portrayed as general-purpose solvers capable of solving arbitrary tasks. We argue that this view overlooks a fundamental constraint: language is a compressed and capacity-limited interface for conveying task information. Modelling User--System interaction as a bilevel \emph{cheap-talk} game, we analyse how latent tasks are encoded into prompts and reinterpreted under alignment and safety constraints. We introduce a conceptual decomposition separating task inference from execution and derive PAC-Bayes bounds that distinguish finite-sample estimation error from irreducible structural limitations. Our first main result establishes an \emph{expressivity floor}: language acts as a capacity-limited communication channel, and whenever the informational complexity of a task family exceeds the capacity of that channel, distinct tasks become unavoidably indistinguishable to the Solver, inducing a strictly positive error floor that cannot be eliminated by additional data, optimisation, or model scaling alone. We then establish an \emph{objective-misalignment floor}: when alignment constraints restrict the admissible output set, the User-ideal distribution may lie outside the feasible class, inducing an irreducible distortion. Together, these results yield a formal negative conclusion: prompt-conditioned LLMs are not universal problem solvers through prompting alone, as there exist task families for which correct behaviour is provably unattainable even in the infinite-data regime. More broadly, our analysis shows the limits of prompt-based generalisation arise from information-constrained communication and alignment-constrained objectives. This suggests that interfaces beyond natural language, including multimodal observations and, external memory, may reduce the inherent LLM limitations by increasing the task-relevant information available to the System.

Abductive reasoning requires forming hypotheses that explain observed evidence and revising them as new evidence becomes available. While large language models (LLMs) are often evaluated on whether they solve abductive reasoning tasks correctly, less is known about how they acquire evidence, update their hypotheses, and decide when to stop. We introduce Alien Abduction game, an interactive probe for studying these behaviours under different interaction modes. The modes vary in whether evidence is provided upfront or across turns, and whether queries are selected by the model or examples are provided by the oracle. Across models, providing evidence upfront leads to higher success rates than distributing it across turns. In multi-turn settings, some models commit before using the available evidence, while others exhaust the turn budget without converging. Models also achieve higher success rates when examples are provided by the oracle than when they select their own queries, although their final hypotheses are more consistent with the evidence they selected. These findings suggest that models may form hypotheses that fit self-selected evidence without sufficiently distinguishing them from alternatives, and may struggle to validate and refine their hypotheses or determine when to stop.