Agent Policy-Value Audit: Separating Transition Composition from Event Selection in Financial LLM Agents

What controls are needed to interpret execution performance and audit scores in LLM agent evaluations? We study two limits on these interpretations in a financial agent harness. In StudyA, comparing independent runs under idealized and stressed execution on three synthetic settings that share one 24-day upward phase mixes the execution rule with fresh model responses and portfolio feedback: the parsed decision paths agree in only $19.8\%$ of $450$ pairs. Replaying each stored response tape through both execution destinations gives a narrower result. Conditional on those responses, stressed execution changes total return by $-0.0170$ (95% interval $[-0.0230,-0.0117]$), or $10.4\%$ of the idealized baseline, and ten seed clusters do not resolve the model ranking. StudyB corrects an incomplete answer key and replaces legacy tasks with matched zero-, one-, and two-defect tasks under an explicit multi-label prompt. The drop in target violation recall from one to two defects is positive in five of six combinations of auditor and source (median $0.267$), with three surviving Holm correction. Yet the auditor that includes both target labels most often has micro-precision $0.149$, emits findings on $98/100$ zero-defect tasks, and returns the exact dual-defect set in only $21/100$ cases. Target recall by itself therefore gives a poor account of audit quality on this construction. The studies address different limits: what an execution comparison estimates, and what target recall captures. Together, they show how fixed conditions and diagnostic controls bound the claims a score can support.

Evaluating whether large language model (LLM) agents can profit in capital markets is increasingly framed as end-to-end trading: place an agent in a historical market, let it trade, and measure portfolio returns. This setup is vulnerable to two evaluation failures. First, long backtests often overlap with the knowledge cutoffs of frontier LLMs, allowing memorized tickers, dates, prices, and market narratives to substitute for investment reasoning. Second, raw returns are a noisy proxy for stock-selection ability, since positive performance may come from market beta, style exposure, or favorable regimes rather than genuine alpha. We introduce KTD-Fin (Knowing-To-Doing Financial Benchmark), an end-to-end stock-market trading benchmark that addresses both issues. KTD-Fin uses a data-side masking protocol to anonymize key identifiers and calendar information consistently across prompts and tools, separating historical market memory from investment decision-making. It also incorporates a Barra-style performance attribution framework that decomposes portfolio returns into market, style, and stock-selection alpha components. Across ten frontier LLM agents evaluated on the Chinese CSI300 over a 2024--2026 window, masking substantially changes agent rationales, pushing them towards anonymized factor-based reasoning. Attribution analysis further shows that LLM agents' cumulative returns under leakage-controlled evaluation are largely explained by passive market and style exposure, with limited evidence of persistent stock-selection alpha. These findings suggest that financial LLM benchmarks should evaluate not only whether an agent makes money, but also whether the source of returns reflects transferable investment skill. We release KTD-Fin as a reproducible template for leakage-controlled and attribution-aware evaluation of LLM trading agents.

LLM-based financial agents increasingly produce investment rationales before the outcomes needed to evaluate them are observable. This creates a delayed-ground-truth evaluation problem: realized returns remain the eventual arbiter of investment quality, but they arrive too late and are too noisy to guide many model-development and governance decisions. LLM judges offer a tempting shortcut for pre-deployment evaluation of AI-finance systems, but unvalidated judges may reward verbosity, confidence, or rubric mimicry rather than financial judgment. This paper introduces ValueBlindBench, a preregistered agreement-gated stress-test protocol for deciding when LLM-judged investment-rationale claims are publishable, qualified, or invalid. In a controlled market-state capital-allocation prototype with 1,000 honest decision cycles and 100 preregistered adversarial controls (1,100 trajectories, 5,500 judge calls), ValueBlindBench clears the aggregate agreement gate at $\barκ_w = 0.7168$ but prevents several overclaims. Lower-rank systems collapse into a tie-class, one rubric dimension fails the per-dimension gate (constraint\_awareness, $\barκ_w = 0.2022$), single-judge rankings are family-dependent, and terse-correct rationales receive a $Δ= -2.81$ rubric-point penalty relative to honest rationales. A targeted anchor-specificity probe further shows that financial constructs such as constraint awareness are operationally load-bearing. The scientific object is therefore not a leaderboard and not a claim to measure true investment skill. ValueBlindBench is a pre-calibration metrology layer for AI-finance evaluation: it governs whether a proposed LLM-judge-based investment-rationale claim is stable enough, agreed enough, and uncontaminated enough to be reported at all.