The Handover Problem: Governing Autonomy Transitions in Human-AI Collaboration

Deciding how to distribute work between humans and AI systems is a central challenge in organisational design. Most approaches treat this as a binary choice, yet the operational reality is richer: humans and AI routinely share tasks or take complementary roles depending on context, fatigue, and the stakes involved. Governing that distribution -- balancing efficiency, oversight, and human capability -- remains an open problem. This paper presents Human-AI Adaptive Symbiosis (HAAS), an implemented framework for adaptive task allocation in software engineering and manufacturing. HAAS combines two coupled components: a rule-based expert system that enforces governance constraints before any learning occurs, and a contextual-bandit learner that selects among feasible collaboration modes from outcome feedback. Task-agent fit is represented through five auditable cognitive dimensions and a five-mode autonomy spectrum -- from human-only to fully autonomous -- embedded in a reproducible benchmark spanning both domains. Three empirical findings emerge. First, governance is not a binary switch but a tunable design variable: tighter constraints predictably convert autonomous AI assignments into supervised collaborations, with domain-specific costs and benefits. Second, in manufacturing, stronger governance can improve operational performance and reduce fatigue simultaneously -- a workload-buffering effect that contradicts the usual framing of governance as pure overhead. Third, no single governance setting dominates across all contexts; moderate governance becomes increasingly competitive as the learner accumulates experience within the governed action space. Together, these findings position HAAS as a pre-deployment workbench for comparing and inspecting human--AI allocation policies before organisational commitment.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming ubiquitous, and across domains, increasingly autonomous systems are carrying out tasks which raise significant ethical and legal challenges which demonstrate a need for strong human-machine teams rooted in trust. In this article, I argue that within highly impactful areas (such as medicine or warfighting) there are grounds for us initially treating autonomous and opaque systems as relevantly analogous to dogs (or other animals with which we have close relationships). Under this analogy, humans making use of these systems are not to be viewed as "users" or "deployers" of these systems, but instead take the role of "handlers". This recasting of roles shifts the way we view humans, AI-enabled and autonomous systems, and the relations between them, and moreover clarifies the clear and traceable lines of responsibility humans have for the outcomes brought about when using these systems. In developing this point, I clarify that the machine-animal analogy does admit disanalogous elements, but that its touch-points ground it as a starting point. I then explore how we can divest the humans-as-handlers approach of those aspects of our relationships with animals which are unfitting for how we engage with and make use of autonomous and AI-enabled systems. I conclude by arguing that the trajectory of human-machine teamings for autonomous and AI-enabled systems should be a state where we authentically view these not as artifacts which we simply make use of, but as collaborators with which we pursue complex goals and carry out complex tasks.

AI agents pose significant risks as they are granted increasing autonomy. A commonly proposed solution is human oversight and keeping a ''human in the loop'', but this is not a simple solution: Not only do current approaches to AI agent design impede effective human oversight, but the cognitive capacities required for it are also themselves degraded by extended use of AI systems. This position paper argues that current approaches to the development and deployment of AI agent systems do not support effective human oversight -- they contribute to its degradation. To address this, a top priority in the advancement of AI agents should be supporting the situated goals and cognitive requirements of effective human oversight, treating the human needs of overseers at the same level of importance as AI agent capability. To put this idea into practice, we connect work on automation and human-computer interaction to AI agent processes, outlining design-level affordances and organizational protocols that (1) support overseers in exercising critical judgement and (2) counteract the skill atrophy that arises from extended use of automation. We urge developers and deployers to adopt these or similar approaches. Without explicit support for the cognitive demands of effective human-agent interaction, AI agent systems will continue to passively incentivize the degradation of the very human skills they rely on.