Gossip Agents: Reputation through Opinion Dynamics over Evolving Networks

Several works have investigated the influence of graph topology on cooperation among artificial agents, while the majority of the literature has focused on modelling agents' adaptation through strategy imitation, which relies solely on the cumulative payoffs of others. This paper investigates scenarios in which each agent learns to play the two-player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) using deep reinforcement learning. Each agent is represented as a node in a graph, where its neighbours constitute the pool of opponents with whom it can interact. During each IPD episode, agents are provided with different types of information about their opponent, consisting of action history and opponent identity. Experimental results across different graph topologies show that the number of neighbours per node and the average path length are the main factors affecting the emergence of cooperation. We also show that, while partner selection fosters mutual cooperation by limiting the diversity of the opponent pool, providing agents with the identity of their opponent hinders the proliferation of cooperative strategies.

Modelling opinion dynamics typically relies on hand-crafted local interaction rules to study emergent macroscopic phenomena such as consensus and polarisation. In contrast, multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) enables agents to learn such behaviours directly by optimising simple rewards. To explore the potential of MARL for opinion dynamics, we introduce a GPU-accelerated consensus and truth-finding game that scales to populations of up to 1000 agents, comparable to many real-world social sub-networks. To prevent unrealistic conventions, we extend other-play to general-sum social interactions. We next validate our model on a subset of the Bluesky network by recovering agent importance structures from graph topology alone via a learned attention layer, finding that highly conforming populations most closely match human data. In large social media networks such high levels of conformity significantly reduce collective accuracy and promote dishonest agents that lie to fit in. By contrast, small, dynamic hunter-gatherer networks are less affected; here, conformity can even improve collective agreement. This suggests a mismatch between evolved human conformity heuristics and modern social media environments as a potential contributor to misinformation.

Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their private reward signals. We introduce self-referenced social preferences, in which each agent learns a model of its own reward, applies it to other agents' observed transitions to assess their outcomes from its own perspective, and feeds these self-referenced assessments into standard social preferences. We study two ways to incorporate these assessments: modifying the learning reward, or using them to weight policy updates. We evaluate the approach on three sequential social dilemmas, Escape Room, Clean Up, and Commons Harvest, which require volunteering, public-good contribution, and resource restraint, respectively. Across all three environments, agents learn cooperative behavior without observing others' rewards, including in settings where independent learners fail to cooperate, and frequently achieve more equitable divisions of jointly produced returns than agents with access to true rewards. The effective integration point depends on the social preference: inequity aversion works best in the reward together with a value look-ahead, whereas a purely benevolent preference benefits from policy-update weighting. Under partial observability, the policy-update approach continues to support cooperation. These results show that explicit access to other agents' reward signals is not necessary for learning cooperative behavior: social preferences can instead be grounded in self-referenced assessments of others' outcomes derived from their observed behavior.