A misinformation playbook sharpens judgement without breeding cynicism

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

Tool-using large language models (LLMs) must decide whether external information warrants action. We investigate whether their expressed credibility judgments reliably indicate behavioral resistance to misinformation. We evaluate five LLMs on 196 constructed false notices paired with legitimate counterparts and 204 archived attacks adapted to simulated tool use. When asked to act on the constructed notices, models issue harmful tool calls in 27%--99% of cases they have rated untrustworthy. Removing the preliminary rating step increases harmful execution by 15 percentage points on average, showing that credibility elicitation itself changes the behavior being evaluated. Interventions that improve credibility discrimination do not consistently yield safer actions. A simple forewarning significantly reduces harmful execution in four of five models, but neither tested generated-example prebunk outperforms it in the main evaluation. These reductions can also compromise legitimate task completion. Supervised fine-tuning on generated false notices reduces harmful execution on held-out archived attacks under the rating-first protocol, with model-dependent utility costs and weaker protection without rating elicitation. Our findings motivate evaluating misinformation defenses through both harmful actions and legitimate task completion, while accounting for the behavioral effects of the evaluation protocol.

Language models learn from web documents, some of them false, and false content can reach a model's answer to a factual question and the summaries and decisions that use it. Most data-poisoning studies add a trigger to the training data and activate it in the prompt. False documents can also change factual responses without any trigger, but we do not know whether the direct answer predicts the decision. In this work, we follow false content past the answer and find an audit gap between what a direct probe reports and what the model then does, comparing false training with matched truthful controls in a controlled decision task, Guess the Capital, where a fixed decoder turns factual answers into a scored card choice, and on a misleading claim from Facebook posts about the 2019--20 Australian bushfires. Across eight models at dose 1,000, direct injected-choice rates reach 95.8--100%, while injected game choices increase by 1.7--14.4 percentage points over matched truthful training. The gap runs the other way too. Facts that pass the direct probe still push decisions toward the injected answer, and game accuracy drops further than those choices explain. Truthful correction brings the fact back but not the decisions built on it. We then look into the real-world bushfire case, models trained on the false posts say that people were arrested for arson even when they lose the inflated count, and in a count-by-wording factorial the misleading arrest wording produces arrest assertions even when the training count stays at 24. In simpler terms, a correct factual answer does not guarantee a correct decision, and losing the injected number does not remove the misleading story.