Can AI agents make law? Evaluating AI legal relevance and creativity

As people increasingly rely on artificial intelligence (AI) for guidance in their own lives, scholars, lawyers, and even judges have begun to consider the role of AI in legal decision-making. As "silicon sampling" -- the use of generative AI models in social science research -- is now impacting academia, "silicon jurors" could make an appearance in courtrooms. This study joins an emerging line of research on generative AI models' ability to simulate human legal judgments. In particular, we study how large language model (LLM)-powered chatbots respond to series of questions about legal reasonableness. When the law needs to judge the appropriateness of a behavior, it most often asks whether the behavior was "reasonable." Yet despite the ubiquity of reasonableness judgments, they are the site of constant vexation for lawyers, judges, and lay people. Reasonableness seems inherently vague and unpredictable, since it relies on variable context and implicit conceptual schemas. Moreover, many scholars caution that reasonableness judgments may vary along demographic lines. We compare the answers of human participants to those of twenty-six LLMs across twenty-five different legally relevant reasonableness judgments. Overall, our findings suggest that chatbot responses generally track those of human participants. Nonetheless, we find some suggestive -- and potentially concerning -- results. Compared to humans, LLMs generate more homogeneous responses and occasionally treat a variable standard as an invariant rule. And, compared to humans, LLMs tend to generate answers that are more favorable to the government and to corporations. Finally, our results indicate that LLMs' responses tend to align more closely with those of respondents who are white, male, older, and more educated. More systematic research is needed to confirm or reject these initial findings.

Artificial Intelligence is increasingly applied to the field of law, and has the potential to increase access to justice. One particular movement that is gaining traction is that of agentic AI, wherein AI agents, based on Large Language Models (LLMs) can take autonomous actions. In particular, multi-agent approaches in the legal domain remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we investigate multi-agent deliberation methods for legal reasoning tasks using LLMs. We explore multi-agent deliberation (MAD) and introduce two novel multi-agent frameworks inspired by courtroom procedures and legal argumentation. Our experiments on both legal and non-legal benchmarks reveal that multi-agent frameworks achieve comparable overall performance to baseline large language models, but produce significantly distinct answers. Notably, these approaches can successfully solve cases that the baseline fails to address, and vice versa. We conduct a qualitative evaluation and highlight scenarios where multi-agent frameworks outperform monolithic approaches. For example, multi-agent approaches appear better suited for answering questions that require critical thinking from multiple perspectives. Our work positions multi-agent systems as a promising direction for AI in the legal domain, while demonstrating the potential of law-inspired multi-agent approaches for deliberation.

Given the enormous number of claims to be checked, verifiable legal AI requires scalable, cost-effective models that answer the practical needs of law. System One decision models are built on large language models but, instead of generating text, return a calibrated probability for each option. This suits the verification of legal authority, where the question is closed: a given holding, or none of them. We test whether such models abstain when the correct authority is missing. We extend CaseHOLD with an abstention condition in which the correct holding is replaced in 1,670 of 5,314 items, and compare four decision models with six generative LLMs. When no option is correct, generative LLMs still pick one in 38-86% of items; the most cautious decision model does so in 30%. On standard CaseHOLD, a decision model matches the best generative LLM (88.1% vs. 88.2%) at 1/55 of the cost. Accepting that LLM's answer only when a decision model agrees halves its wrong citations, and distilling a decision model's probabilities into Qwen3-8B, without labels, yields a well-calibrated local model. Legal AI should be judged by its wrong citations, not by accuracy alone.