Towards Human-AI Complementarity for AI Safety

Human-AI complementarity, the idea that combining human and AI judgments can outperform either alone, offers a promising pathway toward robust oversight of advanced AI systems. However, whether human-AI complementarity can be achieved on realistic tasks remains an open question. We investigate this through two approaches: hybridization and two AI assistance methods (top-2 assistance and subtask delegation), evaluated on a multi-domain dataset of 1,886 samples spanning knowledge, factuality, long-context reasoning, and deception detection. We find only modest complementarity gains. Baseline hybridization yields just +0.4 percentage points (pp) over AI alone (69.3% vs 68.9%), limited both by a small complementarity region (only 8.9% of items where AI errs but humans do not) and the inability of confidence-based routing to identify it, since the model's confidence is similarly distributed across correct and incorrect predictions. Applied when AI has low confidence, top-2 assistance increases human accuracy from 28.4% to 38.3%, surpassing AI alone (37.7%) -- but primarily because humans adopt correct AI suggestions, not because they successfully override AI errors. These findings suggest that the primary bottleneck is not human task accuracy per se, but the ability to route decisions to humans when it matters and to design assistance methods that enable humans to catch AI mistakes. Our quantitative and qualitative analyses pinpoint where and why each method succeeds or fails, offering concrete targets for future work. We will release our dataset and code upon request to support progress toward more effective human-AI collaboration for AI oversight.

Human feedback is critical for aligning AI systems to human values. As AI capabilities improve and AI is used to tackle more challenging tasks, verifying quality and safety becomes increasingly challenging. This paper explores how we can leverage AI to improve the quality of human oversight. We focus on an important safety problem that is already challenging for humans: fact-verification of AI outputs. We find that combining AI ratings and human ratings based on AI rater confidence is better than relying on either alone. Giving humans an AI fact-verification assistant further improves their accuracy, but the type of assistance matters. Displaying AI explanation, confidence, and labels leads to over-reliance, but just showing search results and evidence fosters more appropriate trust. These results have implications for Amplified Oversight -- the challenge of combining humans and AI to supervise AI systems even as they surpass human expert performance.

How can we effectively oversee AI systems that surpass human intelligence? AI Safety via Debate proposes that two AI systems argue opposing positions and a judge, either a human or a weaker model, decides which is correct. By facilitating supervisors in providing high-quality training signals, debate aims to encourage truthful and safe behavior from AI systems whose capabilities exceed our own. However, human judgment is not neutral: people often rely on biases which advanced AI systems may learn to exploit. Drawing on insights from collective intelligence and social cognition, this paper investigates whether debate can guide human and LLM supervisors toward the truth despite their prior beliefs. We evaluate several protocol configurations. We also explore setups inspired by the wisdom of the crowd such as the number and diversity of judges, as well as interaction mechanisms including deliberation and voting. Overall, we find that debate increases accuracy relative to prior beliefs for human judges, whereas the consultancy baseline, in which a single expert argues for one answer, does not. For weaker language models, however, the results are mixed: debate provides no comparable gains in most settings and can even reduce accuracy. Among multi-judge protocols, weighted voting produces the highest accuracy for human supervisors, whereas for LLMs none of them significantly improves group accuracy, even as the number of judges increases. Notably, the behavior of minority judges in non-diverse deliberation protocols suggests that, under symmetric settings, incorrect positions could be more persuasive than correct ones. These findings support debate as a viable path toward scalable human oversight, but cast doubt on its benefits for weaker AI supervisors, raising concerns about fully automated training and control pipelines in high-stakes settings.