Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) reachability analysis offers formal safety guarantees for control systems, but training accurate neural certificates remains difficult, particularly when unsafe regions are hard to characterize. We propose a verification-guided training framework that addresses this by using probabilistic enumeration of safety constraints to detect forward-invariance violations, i.e., states where the learned certificate incorrectly classifies unsafe behavior. This produces a compact, targeted set of counterexamples that more precisely captures the failure boundary than inputs generated by standard adversarial attack methods. Crucially, using this representation to fine-tune a pretrained HJ value function yields larger certified regions and reduces certification time across all tested benchmarks. We further introduce a shielding mechanism based on the refined certificates to enforce safety constraints at deployment time. We evaluate the proposed safety filter in a realistic, physics-based Isaac Sim environment and through real-world autonomous racing experiments, achieving zero safety constraint violations compared to a nominal controller and a backup policy based on Linear Quadratic Regulation (LQR). These results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed shielding mechanism in ensuring safe operation under high-speed, safety-critical conditions.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of the proposed enumeration-guided training and online safety filter pipeline.
Figure 2: Comparison between PGD attack and approximate enumeration of unsafe regions (coverage c=95% ) for a pretrained V(x) on a toy example.
Figure 3: Block diagram of the safety filter via neural HJ certificates.
Task
State dimension
Control dimension
Dynamics
Constraint
Pendulum
2
1
Nonlinear
Linear
Unicycle
3
2
Nonlinear
Nonlinear
RoboRacer
4
1
Linear
Linear
Cart Pole
4
1
Nonlinear
Linear
Robot Arm
6
3
Linear
Nonlinear
Table 1: Overview of the considered benchmarks.
Figure 4: Comparison of best-seed certified regions for PGD+MILP and Enum+MILP on the CartPole task.
PGD+MILP [ 7 ]
Enum+MILP (Ours)
Task
TFR
#MILP Calls – Time (s)
Wall-clock time (s)
TFR
#MILP Calls – Time (s)
Wall-clock time (s)
Pendulum
96.94±0.15
1.0±0.0−4.2±0.1
219±39
97.39±0.35
1.0±0.0−2.6±0.5
108±32
Unicycle
94.26±1.15
1.3±0.6−77.0±18.8
5793±6569
94.59±0.73
1.0±0.0−52.1±3.5
1287±823
RoboRacer
N/A
–
Timeout
61.62±10.47
6.33±1.15−8.99±1.70
1729±21.34
Cart Pole
45.94±4.70
4.67±2.52−22.33±26.07
8326±1897
45.02±4.81
2.00±0.00−5.08±1.26
1970±1058
Robot Arm
49.02±8.29
9.0±10.4−47.0±14.2
7955±10340
69.87±2.21
7.0±2.6−69.5±17.4
1732±404
Table 2: PGD+MILP vs. Enum+MILP on Cersyve [ 7 ] and RobotRacer benchmarks. Results are averaged over three random seeds.
Random Sampling+MILP
Enum+MILP (Ours)
Task
TFR
Iterations
TFR
Iterations
Pendulum
96.75±0.30
1934±506
97.29±0.19
1563±111
Robot Arm
N/A
Timeout
69.14±0.60
2129±81
Table 3: Ablation on the source of counterexamples.
MILP
α,β -CROWN
Method
TFR
Iters.
TFR
Iters.
PGD
96.94±0.15
2014±141
97.04±0.21
1866±384
Enum
97.29±0.19
1563±111
97.25±0.58
1704±457
PGD
96.78±0.21
965±277
96.82±0.23
906±195
Enum
97.90±0.12
496±50
97.45±0.29
609±139
Table 4: Verification scalability on Pendulum Task with increasing value-network size 2x32 (first row), 2x64 (second row).
Collisions
Interventions (%)
Min. Clear. (m)
Nominal
5/5
0.0±0.0
−0.067±0.037
Backup
4/5
100±0.0
−0.041±0.056
Shield (Our)
0/5
58.2 ± 26.0
+0.679 ± 0.677
Table 5: RoboRacer simulation over 5 randomized obstacle placements (mean ± std). Min. Clear.: minimum distance kept to obstacle, negative on collision.
Figure 5: RoboRacer deployment of the proposed safety filter. (a) Trajectories showing an obstacle-free reference run and a run with six obstacles. The blue dashed curve denotes the planned path, while blue and green segments indicate nominal and safety-filter control, respectively. (b) Left- and right-passing maneuvers with camera views and corresponding local trajectories. The planner selects the passing side based on available room, while the safety filter checks steering commands. Negative room annotations indicate unavailable sides. Max V(x) denotes the maximum value Vθ(f(xt,ut)) of the nominal successors rejected by the filter.
Safety-critical control designs controllers that keep physical systems within hard safety constraints despite uncertainty, disturbances, and limited actuation.