Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making

We study an online market-making problem in which a learner sequentially posts bid and ask prices for a single asset while interacting with traders holding private valuations. Unlike existing online learning formulations that assume fully censored feedback, we introduce an action-dependent feedback model inspired by real limit order books: when a trade occurs, the trader's valuation remains hidden, whereas when no trade occurs, informative feedback about supply and demand is revealed. We show that this additional information fundamentally changes the learnability of the problem. In the stochastic setting with i.i.d. market prices, we propose an elimination-based algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt T)$ regret with high probability, without requiring any smoothness assumptions on the distribution of trader valuations. We then extend this result to a broad class of mean-reverting price processes by considering both local, autoregressive dynamics and a weaker global drift condition based on cumulative deviations from the mean. Under either assumption, we establish high-probability $O(\sqrt T)$ regret bounds, relying on a new concentration inequality of independent interest. Finally, in the adversarial setting with oblivious prices, we design an explore-then-perturb algorithm that guarantees $O(T^{2/3})$ regret in expectation. Our results quantify the value of observing the order book in online market making and demonstrate that even limited, action-dependent feedback can substantially improve regret guarantees compared to standard bandit feedback models.

We describe an adaptive market-making architecture that preserves the analytical structure of the Avellaneda--Stoikov framework while introducing a successor measure-style adaptation mechanism. In our paper we keep Avellaneda--Stoikov fast Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman structure and make it adaptive to changing market regimes and trading objectives. The central idea is to separate market dynamics from the trading objective. The market state determines a low-dimensional set of Avellaneda--Stoikov parameters, while recent realized rewards determine a low-dimensional objective vector. The HJB forward map then converts this objective into optimal bid and ask quotes through a scalarization of future reward features.

We study the discrete Bertrand pricing game with a non-increasing demand function. The game has $n \ge 2$ players who simultaneously choose prices from the set $\{1/k, 2/k, \ldots, 1\}$, where $k\in\mathbb{N}$. The player who sets the lowest price captures the entire demand; if multiple players tie for the lowest price, they split the demand equally. We study the Bertrand paradox, where classical theory predicts low prices, yet real markets often sustain high prices. To understand this gap, we analyze a repeated-game model in which firms set prices using no-regret learners. Our goal is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under different no-regret learning guarantees. We are particularly interested in questions such as whether no-external-regret learners can converge to undesirable high-price outcomes, and how stronger guarantees such as no-swap regret shape the emergence of competitive low-price behavior. We address these and related questions through a theoretical analysis, complemented by experiments that support the theory and reveal surprising phenomena for no-swap regret learners.