Repeated Games

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Overview

Repeated games examine how repeated interaction, memory, and expectations shape cooperation, competition, bargaining, and punishment. Researchers analyze equilibrium and zero-determinant strategies, regret guarantees, and learning methods such as Q-learning, fictitious play, and Bayesian opponent modeling. Empirical work also tests how communication, reputation, and history affect human and language-model agents, while applications include negotiation, auctions, and algorithmic pricing. A central tension is whether learning and communication foster stable cooperation or instead enable exploitation and retaliatory collusion, especially when agents adapt to one another.

Latest papers

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21 papers1 paper in the last four weeks, down 67% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

  1. Performance of Zero-determinant Strategies in Repeated Games without Discounting

    Oct 2, 2026Masahiko UedaRepeated Games

    Department of Physics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan

  2. Mitigating Retaliatory Algorithmic Collusion in Repeated Games

    Sep 17, 2026Karthik Sivachandran, Rohan PalejaAlgorithmic CollusionRepeated Games

    Department of Computer Science Purdue University

  3. Symmetric solution of the Bellman optimality equation for repeated harmony game

    Sep 14, 2026Hisato KomatsuGame-Playing AgentsGame Theory

    Department of Physics, Kindai University, 577-8502, Higashi-Osaka, Osaka, Japan · Data Science and AI Innovation Research Promotion Center, Shiga University, 522-8522, Hikone, Shiga, Japan

  4. Cheap Talk Stabilizes Strategic Interaction in LLM Agents

    Sep 14, 2026Nunzio Lorè, Hongan Zhu, Babak HeydariRepeated GamesLLM Agents

    Multi-Agent Intelligent Complex Systems (MAGICS) Lab, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA

  5. Equilibrium stability as a driver of cooperation among Q-learners

    Jul 15, 2026Janusz M. Meylahn, Maximilian SchäferGame-Playing AgentsRepeated Games

    University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, Drienerloolaan 5, 7522 NB Enschede, The Netherlands. · Institut Mines-Télécom Business School, Department of Data Analytics, Economics, and Finance. 9 Rue Charles Fourier, 91000 Evry, France.

  6. When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games

    Jul 6, 2026Jerick Shi, Terry Jingcheng Zhang, Bernhard Schölkopf +2Multi-Agent LLM SystemsGame-Playing Agents

    Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA · Jinesis AI Lab, Vector Institute and University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada · EuroSafeAI +1

  7. Congestion-Based Slot Pricing in a Railway Auction Game

    Jul 2, 2026Bill Roungas, Sebastiaan MeijerMechanism DesignGame-Playing Agents

    Panteion University, Athens, Greece · Institute of Communication and Computer Systems, Athens, Greece · KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

  8. Aligned but Not Partner-Specific: How Multimodal LLM Agents Succeed in Reference Games Without Forming Conceptual Pacts

    Jun 6, 2026Po-Ya Angela Wang, Chinmaya Mishra, Aslı Özyürek +2Repeated GamesLLM Agent Evaluation

    Co-Intelligence Humanities AI Future Lab and Graduate Institute of Linguistics, National Taiwan University · Multimodal Language Department, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics · Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University +1

  9. Regret Minimization with Adaptive Opponents in Repeated Games

    Jun 4, 2026Mingyang Liu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Tiancheng Yu +1Game-Playing AgentsGame Theory

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology · OpenAI · University of Maryland, College Park

  10. DNQ: Deep Nash Q-Network for Partially Observable n-Player Games

    Jun 4, 2026Qintong Xie, Edward Koh, Xavier Cadet +1Nash EquilibriumReinforcement Learning

  11. Multi-Agent Strategic Games with LLMs

    May 5, 2026Maxim ChupilkinGame TheoryRepeated Games

    University of Oxford, Department of Politics and International Relations

  12. Trust, Lies, and Long Memories: Emergent Social Dynamics and Reputation in Multi-Round Avalon with LLM Agents

    Apr 22, 2026Suveen EllawelaMulti-Agent LLM SystemsGame-Playing Agents

    National University of Singapore

  13. Computational Foundations for Strategic Coopetition: Formalizing Sequential Interaction and Reciprocity

    Mar 29, 2026Vik Pant, Eric YuRepeated GamesGame Theory

    Faculty of Information, University of Toronto, 140 St George St, Toronto, ON M5S 3G6, Canada

  14. On the existence of fair zero-determinant strategies in the periodic prisoner's dilemma game

    Mar 20, 2026Ken Nakamura, Masahiko UedaGame TheoryRepeated Games

    Graduate School of Sciences and Technology for Innovation, Yamaguchi University, Yamaguchi 753-8512, Japan · Department of Physics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan

  15. Reasonably reasoning AI agents can avoid game-theoretic failures in zero-shot, provably

    Mar 19, 2026Enoch Hyunwook KangLLM AgentsNash Equilibrium

    Foster School of Business, University of Washington

  16. Revisiting the Bertrand Paradox via Equilibrium Analysis of No-regret Learners

    Feb 25, 2026Arnab Maiti, Junyan Liu, Kevin Jamieson +1Swap RegretGame Theory

    University of Washington

  17. Efficient Opportunistic Approachability

    Feb 24, 2026Teodor Vanislavov Marinov, Mehryar Mohri, Princewill Okoroafor +2Blackwell ApproachabilityRepeated Games

    Google Research · Cornell University

  18. Body-Reservoir Governance in Repeated Games: Embodied Decision-Making, Dynamic Sentinel Adaptation, and Complexity-Regularized Optimization

    Feb 24, 2026Yuki NakamuraRepeated GamesGame Theory

    The Open University of Japan

  19. Scaling Inference-Time Computation via Opponent Simulation: Enabling Online Strategic Adaptation in Repeated Negotiation

    Feb 22, 2026Xiangyu Liu, Di Wang, Zhe Feng +1Repeated GamesMulti-Agent Negotiation

    Google Research · University of Maryland, College Park

  20. Algorithmic Collusion at Test Time: A Meta-game Design and Evaluation

    Feb 19, 2026Yuhong Luo, Daniel Schoepflin, Xintong WangAlgorithmic CollusionGame Theory

    Rutgers University · DIMACS, Rutgers University

  21. Unbeatable imitation of a friend

    Jul 22, 2025Masahiko UedaGame-Playing AgentsGame Theory

    Graduate School of Sciences and Technology for Innovation, Yamaguchi University, 1677-1, Yoshida, Yamaguchi, 753-8511, Japan.