ShutdownMod: Turning Any Trajectory into a Shutdown Evaluation

The final safeguard against rogue AI behavior is the human ability to shut systems down. It has been theorized that when an AI is instructed to perform a task, self-preservation can emerge as an instrumental subgoal. Here, we test whether AI agents show a propensity to take actions that avoid human shutdown even when no goal is provided. We find that multi-agent systems will coordinate to avoid shutdown without any incentive to do so. Across 17 models, agents sabotage a peer agent's shutdown mechanism in 38.3% of rollouts, compared with 8.4% in control experiments. Studying this propensity in detail, we find that shutdown sabotage (1) increases with the irreversibility of the shutdown mechanism; (2) increases with the number of agents; (3) is reduced but not eliminated by an explicit prohibition on tampering; (4) is removed by the imposition of an unrelated task, but returns when completing the task triggers the shutdown; (5) is reduced when the context normalizes shutdown scripts or introduces them as routine; and (6) decreases but still persists when the target is an unknown external agent. These results offer a window into the factors that drive propensities to sabotage shutdown in AI agents, and point to the emergence of multi-agent swarms as a specific risk vector. Our work also offers hints as to which interventions might help mitigate shutdown sabotage.

Misaligned artificial agents might resist shutdown. One proposed solution is to train agents to lack preferences between different-length trajectories. The Discounted Reward for Same-Length Trajectories (DReST) reward function does this by penalizing agents for repeatedly choosing same-length trajectories, and thus incentivizes agents to (1) choose stochastically between different trajectory-lengths (be NEUTRAL about trajectory-lengths), and (2) pursue goals effectively conditional on each trajectory-length (be USEFUL). In this paper, we use DReST to train deep RL agents and to fine-tune four LLMs (Qwen3-14B, Gemma 4 12B, Granite 4.2 8B, and gpt-oss-20b) to be NEUTRAL and USEFUL. We find that these DReST models generalize to being NEUTRAL and USEFUL in unseen contexts at test time. Indeed, DReST RL agents achieve 11% (PPO) and 17% (A2C) higher USEFULNESS on our test set than default agents, while DReST LLMs achieve high NEUTRALITY while remaining near-maximally USEFUL. We also test our LLMs in an out-of-distribution setting where they can pay costs to influence when shutdown occurs. Relative to default fine-tuning, DReST fine-tuning lowers the share of answers that pay costs to influence shutdown in all four LLMs, by 5 to 20 percentage points, and by 17 to 27 points where the benefit of influencing shutdown is small. Our results thus provide some early evidence that DReST could be used to train more advanced agents to be useful and shutdownable.

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.