Do AI Scientists Know What's New?

The rigorous evaluation of the novelty of a scientific paper is, even for human scientists, a challenging task. With the increasing interest in AI scientists and AI involvement in scientific idea generation and paper writing, it also becomes increasingly important that this task be automatable and reliable, lest both human attention and compute tokens be wasted on ideas that have already been explored. Due to the challenge of quantifying ground-truth novelty, however, existing novelty metrics for scientific papers generally validate their results against noisy, confounded signals such as citation counts or peer review scores. These proxies can conflate novelty with impact, quality, or reviewer preference, which in turn makes it harder to assess how well a given metric actually evaluates novelty. We therefore propose an axiomatic benchmark for scientific novelty metrics. We first define a set of axioms that a well-behaved novelty metric should satisfy, grounded in human scientific norms and practice, then evaluate existing metrics across ten tasks spanning three domains of AI research. Our results reveal that no existing metric satisfies all axioms consistently, and that metrics fail on systematically different axioms, reflecting their underlying architectures. Additionally, we show that combining metrics of complementary architectures leads to consistent improvements on the benchmark, with per-axiom weighting achieving 90.1% versus 71.5% for the best individual metric, suggesting that developing architecturally diverse metrics is a promising direction for future work. We release the benchmark code as supplementary material to encourage the development of more robust scientific literature novelty metrics.

Automated novelty judgment can accelerate scientific discovery by enabling efficient evaluation, refinement, and comparison of research ideas. While large language models are increasingly adopted for this task, we investigate a previously overlooked limitation in their judgment capabilities: despite generating reasoning rationales that closely mirror those of human experts, their final novelty judgments often diverge substantially. We demonstrate that this miscalibration stems from a systematic bias towards judging ideas as "medium novel". To mitigate this, we propose Think-Probe-Respond (TPR), a lightweight approach that probes latent novelty judgments from hidden states during the reasoning phase and uses the probed judgments to condition the final response. Across strong baselines, TPR improves novelty judgment performance by 22.30% and successfully mitigates the prevalent "medium novelty" bias.

Bold projections that artificial intelligence will accelerate scientific discovery have raced ahead of evidence from working scientists, and the field still lacks large-scale, scientist-in-the-loop tests of these claims. Here we mount the largest such evaluation to date and map what AI cannot yet do for science. We invited authors of 121,640 recent preprints across biology, medicine, chemistry, and the social sciences to judge ideas that large language models (LLMs) generated from the context and puzzles of their own papers. 6,749 scientists returned 25,139 sets of ratings on novelty, empirical feasibility, probability of being true, and favorability of adoption. Three patterns emerge. First, non-reasoning LLMs collapse into a narrow "hivemind" of similar ideas; reasoning models roam a wider hypothesis space, yet no model class spontaneously proposes null hypotheses -- a move humans make more freely. Second, scientists reward ideas that resemble their own and prize probability over novelty, though social scientists tolerate risk more readily than life scientists. Senior social scientists are the harshest critics, and their skepticism is well-earned: LLMs falter most in pluralistic fields like the social sciences that demand context-aware interpretation and evolving theories. Third, automated evaluators on which the community currently relies -- LLM-as-a-judge, artificial metrics, and even state-of-the-art (SOTA) models -- agree only weakly with expert judgment, and retrieval augmentation and scientist persona prompting yield only marginal gains. A Qwen3-14B reward model we post-trained on human ratings captures field taste nuances, beats SOTA models by up to 27%, and closes the gap to the inter-rater consistency of independent peer reviewers. For all the hype, today's scientific AI still represents a collaborator whose imagination, outputs and judgment benefit from human grounding.