When Is a Cheap Fairness Edit Safe? Screening Post-Hoc Edits in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Public institutions increasingly procure AI systems whose design they cannot inspect or change. In higher education, proprietary Early Warning Systems (EWS) leave colleges with few options beyond adjusting model outputs to address inequity. This raises the question of how fairness work is coordinated among vendors, institutions, advisors, and students with unequal power to change these systems? Using student records from a public college in Ontario, Canada, we evaluate six post-hoc fairness interventions on a research EWS under simulated procurement constraints. We compare fairness, accuracy, and demographic disparities, introducing error-type profiling to trace how interventions redistribute false positives and false negatives. Interventions redistributed disparities without consistently reducing them. Two implementations favored already-advantaged groups because they used group size to define disadvantage; small, marginalized groups remained poorly served. These findings show how procurement constraints and implementation choices shape the possibilities for fairness work. We call the resulting condition fairness theatre; dashboard metrics converge while groups' error burdens persist or worsen.

Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation. Existing matching models typically reduce this process to immediate sub-Gaussian feedback about fixed preferences, missing settings where payoff-relevant information is revealed gradually and changes future matching decisions. We introduce a framework with temporally extended feedback, that formulates two-sided matching as a partially observable Markov game with costly pre-match screening, noisy post-match observations, evolving latent profiles, and endogenous continuation or dissolution. We instantiate this framework in Learn2Match, a multi-agent reinforcement-learning benchmark for dynamic matching markets. Learn2Match supports decentralized decision making over whom to interview, whom to match with, and when to dissolve a match, while evaluating policies using regret, social welfare, and an information-friction loss that measures the welfare gap caused by incomplete revelation of latent preferences. We find that independent PPO achieves higher cumulative social welfare and lower cumulative regret than the bandit-style CA-ETC baseline under temporally extended feedback, demonstrating the promise of MARL for dynamic matching markets. However, PPO still incurs higher information-friction loss, revealing that end-to-end MARL does not yet provide the coordinated exploration structure of matching-bandit methods. These results position Learn2Match as a benchmark for developing the next generation of matching-market algorithms: methods that are adaptive like RL agents, statistically disciplined like bandit algorithms, and structurally aware like stable-matching mechanisms. Please refer to https://sites.google.com/view/learn-to-match/home for the official website and the code link.

Scoring functions are used to represent the relevance of individual documents. In modern information retrieval or recommendation systems, they are often learned from data and play a pivotal role in ranking sets of documents or items in a way that maximizes utility to a query or user. With the recent interest in algorithmic fairness, the success of scoring has naturally led to methods that learn scores that simultaneously trade off fairness and utility. In this work, we show that in stark contrast with utility-centric objectives, scoring is sub-optimal in achieving all utility-fairness trade-offs. We establish this with a series of counter-examples with a generic fairness formulation. We show that the issue persists whether we have a deterministic scoring function or a randomized one, or whether we measure fairness at the scope of a single query or across multiple queries. On the positive side, we empirically demonstrate that semi-greedy post-processing has the potential to achieve much better trade-offs, often approaching the ideal of exhaustive post-processing in a tractable way.