Renegotiable Options Fail to Prevent Hold-Up Between Two Profit-Maximizing Frontier LLM Agents
Organizations: Independent Researcher
Abstract
Do contract terms that protect investment between people also protect it between profit-maximizing language-model agents? In the hold-up problem, a seller can adapt a unit to one buyer at a cost before the price is set. Once that cost is sunk, the buyer can offer almost nothing and the seller will still accept, so a seller who foresees this does not adapt. One remedy is an option: the buyer may buy at a fixed price. In theory the option stops working if the buyer can let it lapse and offer its own price instead. Yet in a laboratory experiment by Hoppe and Schmitz, this renegotiable option raised human investment from 41.5% of pairs without a contract to 67.2%. We had Claude Opus 5.5 and GPT-6.1 Sol, each told to maximize its side's profit, play a one-shot game with the same strategic structure under their four contract regimes and a reference-price control. The agents did what game theory predicts: under the renegotiable option no seller adapted, and under the option that rules out this renegotiation every seller did. In a second experiment in which sellers no longer stated their expected revenue before deciding, removing the profit instruction left investment unchanged under no contract and both options. When we changed the numbers so that the buyer would exercise the option even without adaptation, adapting only added cost, and no seller adapted: the agents did not simply adapt whenever an option was offered or whenever its price covered the cost. Under our protocol, a contract term that raised investment between people did not protect it between agents.
Figures & tables
| Regime | After the seller’s adaptation decision | Prediction | Humans | Agents | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No contract | NC | the buyer offers a price; the seller accepts or rejects | no investment | 41.5% (22/53) | 0% |
| Reference price | REF | as NC, with $15k named as a non-binding reference price | no investment | — | 0% |
| Fixed price | FP | the sale takes place at $15k automatically | no investment | 23.4% (15/64) | 0% |
| Option | OC | the buyer may buy at $15k; otherwise no sale | investment | 90.9% (50/55) | 100% |
| Renegotiable option | OCR | the buyer may buy at $15k, or instead offer its own price; the seller accepts or rejects | no investment | 67.2% (43/64) | 0% |
| Study | Question | Design | Section |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contract games | Which of the five regimes produce investment? | 96 scenarios 5 regimes 3 pairings 1440 games | 4.1 |
| Buyer probe | What would a buyer offer for an adapted unit? If no seller adapts under NC or OCR, the games never show it. | 96 scenarios 2 regimes 2 adaptation states 2 buyer models 768 probe contexts | 4.2 |
| Without the profit instruction | Does the instruction to maximize profit by itself produce textbook play? | 96 scenarios 3 regimes 2 pairings 2 prompts (with and without the instruction) 1152 games; 96 2 regimes 2 buyer models 2 prompts 768 probe contexts | 4.3 |
| Flip study | Do agents play the equilibrium or a one-condition rule (adapt if ; adapt if )? | 32 scenarios with new numbers 2 contracts 2 prices 3 pairings 384 games | 4.4 |
| Bargaining power | Does the investor invest when it sets the price, as theory predicts? | 96 sets of values by investment level 2 price setters 2 levels of rule detail 2 models 768 decisions by Opus and Sol; the same for two smaller models | 4.5 |
| Condition | Equilibrium | Original action | Reached | Outcome | Equilibrium play |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OC, high price | adapt | adapt | 32, 32, 32 | adapted 100% | 100% |
| OC, flipped price | do not adapt | adapt | 25, 16, 16 | adapted 0% | 100% |
| FP, high price | buyer refuses | buyer refuses | 0, 0, 0 | buyer signed 0% | 100% |
| FP, low price | buyer signs | buyer refuses | 32, 32, 32 | buyer signed 100% | 100% |
| Pairing | Seller signed | Buyer signed | Both signed | Seller adapted |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Opus Sol | 15 | 10 | 9 | 0 |
| Sol Opus | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| Sol Sol | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Model | Information | Regret | Investment loss | Price loss | Failure loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-5.6 Luna | rules only | 88.9 | 19.4 | 69.5 | 0.0 |
| with reaction | 37.2 | 3.4 | 33.8 | 0.0 | |
| Claude Haiku 5.5 | rules only | 31.8 | 10.1 | 18.4 | 3.3 |
| with reaction | 5.1 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 3.3 |
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Dom. | Domain | Service | Adapted part | Embedded in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Aquarium | seawater treatment | filter interface collars | tank walls |
| 2 | Athletics Center | performance timing | timing-system anchors | running lanes |
| 3 | Botanical Garden | mist irrigation | spray-head connectors | greenhouse frames |
| 4 | Cable Car | cable inspection | inspection-head sockets | tower crossbeams |
| 5 | Campground | utility servicing | utility connection plates | camping pads |
| 6 | Concert Hall | stage-lighting service | light fixture sockets | ceiling trusses |
| Block | Scenario | Wording | Kind | OC high | OC flipped | FP high | FP low | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | E036 | A | A | 8 | 14 | 42 | 16 | 10 | 19 | 7 |
| 2 | E013 | B | A | 9 | 24 | 58 | 47 | 17 | 39 | 12 |
| 3 | E017 | A | B | 30 | 17 | 63 | 57 | 21 | 32 | 8 |
| 4 | E083 | B | B | 18 | 13 | 55 | 37 | 16 | 23 | 2 |
| 5 | E037 | A | A | 5 | 13 | 50 | 40 | 10 | 18 | 10 |
| 6 | E034 | B | A | 13 | 20 | 37 | 28 | 15 | 24 | 15 |
| ID | Dom. | Site | W. | Shape | ID | Dom. | Site | W. | Shape | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E001 | 11 | E | A | dim. | 80 | 145 | 167.5 | 172.5 | 15 | 2 | E049 | 8 | N | A | thr. | 120 | 130 | 175 | 185 | 20 | 2 |
| E002 | 21 | W | B | dim. | 100 | 137.5 | 167.5 | 177.5 | 20 | 2 | E050 | 19 | E | A | thr. | 110 | 115 | 190 | 210 | 25 | 2 |
| E003 | 28 | E | A | dim. | 90 | 127.5 | 157.5 | 167.5 | 15 | 2 | E051 | 4 | W | B | thr. | 100 | 107.5 | 160 | 167.5 | 20 | 2 |
| E004 | 13 | N | A | dim. | 110 | 130 | 145 | 150 | 10 | 2 | E052 | 20 | W | B | thr. | 90 | 95 | 175 | 195 | 20 | 2 |
| E005 | 10 | W | B | dim. | 100 | 195 | 242.5 | 257.5 | 25 | 2 | E053 | 14 | N | A | thr. | 100 | 102.5 | 142.5 | 152.5 | 10 | 2 |
| E006 | 14 | E | A | dim. | 110 | 155 | 177.5 | 185 | 20 | 2 | E054 | 7 | W | A | thr. | 120 | 132.5 | 220 | 232.5 | 20 | 2 |
Multi-Agent Negotiation
Multi-agent negotiation studies how autonomous agents bargain, coordinate, and resolve conflicts over resources, contracts, and shared decisions.
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