cs.LGNov 4, 2026

Structured Machine Theory of Mind from Agent Trajectories

Authors: Nigel F. Doering, Rahath Malladi, Arshia Sangwan, M Tanjid Hasan Tonmoy, Jacob Doan, David Danks, Tauhidur Rahman

Organizations: Halıcıoğlu School of Data Science and Computing, University of California San Diego · New York University · Department of Philosophy and School of Data Science, University of Virginia

Abstract

Predictive models of human behavior trained on large-scale trajectory data optimize for statistical accuracy without representing the mental states that causally generate behavior. Such models support prediction but not principled intervention: they cannot answer how an agent's behavior would change if its beliefs or preferences were different. We introduce Structured Machine Theory of Mind (SMToM), a framework that attributes explicit, independently supervised belief and desire representations from observed trajectories within a Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) causal structure. The central architectural element is a goal head that consumes only the predicted mental-state channels and a current-trajectory embedding; counterfactual intervention on beliefs and desires is a direct operation. We instantiate SMToM on a controlled pedestrian navigation domain where ground-truth mental states are known by construction, enabling evaluation of attribution accuracy, local channel interventions, and trajectory-level counterfactual diagnostics. The resulting model, BDIBottleneck, improves over trajectory-only and unsupervised-context neural baselines. It is also competitive with a matched auxiliary-supervised context baseline while providing an editable mental-state interface that the unbottlenecked baseline lacks. Counterfactual experiments on desires confirm that substituting an agent's inferred preferences with a different activity type coherently shifts predicted destinations toward relevant locations. Counterfactual experiments on beliefs confirm that marking a location as unavailable in the agent's belief state reduces its predicted probability as a destination, though in a complex way. These results demonstrate, in a controlled navigation setting, that explicit BDI-structured supervision is a viable foundation for interpretable and counterfactual analysis of longitudinal trajectory data.

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