Technohybridism: Recursive Semantic Normalization in AI-Mediated Societies

The rapid growth of large language models (LLMs) has resurrected age-old questions in sociolinguistics and world Englishes, such as who decides what counts as legitimate English, whose English is suspect etc. This paper examines how AI systems, their uses and discourse on them reflect, reinforce, and occasionally challenge (standard) language ideologies, which privilege Inner Circle norms and marginalize non-dominant Englishes. Drawing on evidence from empirical studies, media commentary, social media debates, and examples from AI outputs, the paper shows that AI technologies reproduce dominant language ideologies at different levels: training data, design protocols, evaluation benchmarks, user feedback and public commentary. The analysis uses the public controversy over AI-sounding language, especially the fixation on the word delve, to illustrate how speakers of English from the Global North police the English language norms of Global South English users. The paper also identifies what Christian Mair has called a "standardisation paradox": AI may homogenize English by privileging standard forms and at the same time pluralize Englishes through exposure to wide-ranging corpora and annotation work carried out by Global South users. In doing so, the paper argues that generative AI is reigniting long-standing debates in World Englishes about standardization, legitimacy, and the ownership of English, now playing out in algorithmic systems, model training, evaluation practices, and public discourse, where non-dominant Englishes are increasingly conflated with AI-generated speech. Discussing AI systems as a site where language ideologies are (re)produced, the paper argues for more inclusive design approaches that recognize the plurality of Englishes in order to address the real-world negative consequences of treating some as more legitimate than others.

The evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) has rendered the boundary between humanity and computational machinery increasingly ambiguous. In the presence of more interwoven relationships within human-machine symbiosis, the very notion of AI-generated information becomes difficult to define, as such information arises not from either humans or machines in isolation, but from their mutual shaping. Therefore, a more pertinent question lies not merely in whether AI has participated, but in how it has participated. In general, the role assumed by AI is often specified, either implicitly or explicitly, in the input prompt, yet becomes less apparent or altogether unobservable when the generated content alone is available. Once detached from the dialogue context, the functional role may no longer be traceable. This study considers the problem of tracing the functional role played by AI in natural language generation. A methodology is proposed to infer the latent role specified by the prompt, embed this role into the content during the probabilistic generation process and subsequently recover the nature of AI participation from the resulting text. Experimentation is conducted under a representative scenario in which AI acts either as an assistive agent that edits human-written content or as a creative agent that generates new content from a brief concept. The experimental results support the validity of the proposed methodology in terms of discrimination between roles, robustness against perturbations and preservation of linguistic quality. We envision that this study may contribute to future research on the ethics of AI with regard to whether AI has been used fairly, transparently and appropriately.

Quattrociocchi and colleagues warn that the fluent outputs of large language models may allow linguistic plausibility to substitute for epistemic evaluation, producing the condition they call Epistemia: the experience of possessing knowledge without undertaking the practices through which judgment would ordinarily be warranted. This article accepts that diagnosis but challenges its explanatory framework, which compares an embodied, socially situated human knower with an isolated generative model thereby locating epistemic legitimacy in capacities internal to autonomous agents. Drawing on Carlo Sini's philosophy of practices, writing, signs, and technics, we propose instead to understand a large language model (LLM) as a techno-semiotic machine that automates a phase of written semiosis by producing plausible linguistic configurations from the sedimented archive of human writing. From this perspective, Epistemia is one consequence of a broader phenomenon that we call epistemic schizologia: the socio-technical cleavage between signs as linguistically accomplished expressions and signs as moments within socially embedded circuits of interpretation, evidence, criticism, verification, and responsibility. This cleavage is reinforced by eikotic closure, through which a plausible continuation is presented with the finality of an epistemic result, and by algorithmic authority and epistemic self-misrecognition. The relevant unit is therefore not the model alone but the complete practice in which generated inscriptions are prompted, interpreted, verified, contested, used, and made consequential. This reframing preserves the distinction between linguistic production and responsible understanding while grounding a design programme centred on inspectable genealogy, contestability, distributed responsibility, epistemic agency, and the evaluation of hybrid human--AIpractices.