National and State-Level Approaches to Automated Vehicle Certification: A Comparative Framework for State Operational Governance

Simulation is increasingly used to support safety-related decision-making in road transport, particularly for the assessment and approval of automated driving systems (ADS). The complexity of ADS behavior and size of their operational design domains make exclusive reliance on physical testing impractical, leading to extensive use of virtual testing (VT) during the approval phase. This shift raises critical questions regarding the credibility of modelling and simulation (M&S) results used to support road safety decisions. Current VT accreditation approaches in the ADS domain typically rely on validation-only practices, which have been shown to scale poorly when applied to complex, multi-tool simulation environments. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a risk-based framework for assessing the credibility of simulation toolchains used in ADS safety evaluation, drawing inspiration from established practices in other safety-critical domains, notably NASA's STD-7009 for models and simulations. The framework extends traditional verification and validation (V&V) by explicitly linking credibility requirements to the intended use of simulation outputs and to the safety criticality of the decisions they support within the approval process. It provides a lifecycle-oriented assessment scheme integrating toolchain management, modelling assumptions and limitations, verification, validation, and sensitivity analysis. Credibility acceptance thresholds are defined proportionally, allowing differentiated requirements depending on whether simulation is used for exploratory safety analysis, partial decision support, or as a substitute for physical testing. While demonstrated for ADS, the proposed approach is directly applicable to road safety and simulation studies where VT plays a central role in safety assessment and regulatory decision-making.

Deep learning models are increasingly central to autonomous vehicle (AV) pipelines, yet their integration has traditionally followed a monolithic design where perception, planning, and control execute on a single onboard computer. This design overlooks the emerging paradigm of cooperative autonomy, where vehicles interact with roadside units (RSUs), edge servers, and cloud-hosted intelligence through vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity. Cooperative perception and control improve safety and efficiency, but also introduce systems-level challenges: network latency, compute heterogeneity, and multi-tenant contention, all critically affect real-time decision-making. These challenges are further amplified by the increasing reliance on large foundation models, whose scale necessitates cloud deployment. We present CADET (Cooperative Autonomy through Distributed Experimentation Toolkit), a modular platform for systematic and reproducible evaluation of distributed cooperative autonomy systems under realistic deployment conditions. CADET decouples the AV stack into composable modules that can be flexibly deployed across vehicles, infrastructure, and edge/cloud tiers. The framework integrates state-of-the-art models, incorporates trace-driven network and workload emulation, and provides synchronized model-, system-, and task-level instrumentation. Through V2V and V2I experiments, we show that distributed deployment choices fundamentally shape safety, with V2V intent packets outperforming cloud-based perception and RSU-assisted perception sustaining safety until overloaded by concurrent requests. Although designed for AV pipelines, CADET also supports dataset-driven experimentation, enabling systems and ML researchers to benchmark distributed inference workloads independently of full vehicle simulation. CADET is open source, with code and demo available at https://nesl.github.io/cadet-web.

Artificial intelligence now decides who receives a loan, who is flagged for criminal investigation, and whether an autonomous vehicle brakes in time. Governments have responded: the EU AI Act, the NIST Risk Management Framework, and the Council of Europe Convention all demand that high-risk systems demonstrate safety before deployment. Yet beneath this regulatory consensus lies a critical vacuum: none specifies what ``acceptable risk'' means in quantitative terms, and none provides a technical method for verifying that a deployed system actually meets such a threshold. The regulatory architecture is in place; the verification instrument is not. This gap is not theoretical. As the EU AI Act moves into full enforcement, developers face mandatory conformity assessments without established methodologies for producing quantitative safety evidence - and the systems most in need of oversight are opaque statistical inference engines that resist white-box scrutiny. This paper provides the missing instrument. Drawing on the aviation certification paradigm, we propose a two-stage framework that transforms AI risk regulation into engineering practice. In Stage One, a competent authority formally fixes an acceptable failure probability $δ$ and an operational input domain $\varepsilon$ - a normative act with direct civil liability implications. In Stage Two, the RoMA and gRoMA statistical verification tools compute a definitive, auditable upper bound on the system's true failure rate, requiring no access to model internals and scaling to arbitrary architectures. We demonstrate how this certificate satisfies existing regulatory obligations, shifts accountability upstream to developers, and integrates with the legal frameworks that exist today.