cs.AINov 11, 2026

Before AI Agents Negotiate for Us: A Competitive Tournament of Rule-Based, Search, Optimization, Learned, and Language-Model Negotiators Under Scarcity

Authors: Eduardo de Avila-Armenta, Raúl Alejandro Aquino-Ibarra, Jorge Octavio Nicolás-Díaz, Umberto Leon-Dominguez

Organizations: Tecnol´ogico de Monterrey, School of Engineering and Sciences, Av. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Tecnol´ogico, 64849 Monterrey, N.L., Mexico · AI Lab, Freight Technologies Inc. · School of Psychology, University of Monterrey, Monterrey, Mexico

Abstract

Automated bilateral negotiation underlies two-sided matching markets such as freight brokering, where many shippers and carriers negotiate price before a matching mechanism decides who is paired with whom. Prior strategy comparisons typically use isolated one-on-one duels or a single fixed market, so they cannot show how a strategy behaves against several live rivals under a changing balance of supply and demand. We built nine negotiation architectures spanning rule-based, search-based, optimization-based, imitation-learning, and reinforcement-learning families, and ran all nine simultaneously on both sides of a Gale-Shapley matching market under a balanced condition and two scarcity conditions rotated across all 36 exclusion pairs. In the balanced carrier market, an imitation-learned engine (ML2), a reinforcement-learning policy trained only on isolated negotiations (RL), and an expected-utility optimization engine (OPT) formed a statistically tied top group, and no architecture led in every condition and role. RL beat all eight carrier rivals when carriers were scarce, but its match rate collapsed from 62% to 16% when shippers were scarce and it had to compete with the other carrier agents for demand. A second reinforcement-learning policy trained against rival agents (RL2) kept its match rate above 91% in every condition, yet lost on realized payoff to all eight shipper-side rivals in two of the three conditions, traced to a confirmed train/deployment feature mismatch. We also tested nine large language models (LLMs), from 1 to 72 billion parameters, under the same protocol: they lost significantly to the two strongest engines (OPT2 and ML2) in 32 of 36 comparisons and won none. These results show that isolated or single-condition evaluation can hide failure modes that a many-sided, scarcity-varying, statistically corrected tournament exposes directly.

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