Previous work has shown that alignment training on individual LLM agents can fail to transfer to multi-agent settings. We investigate the underlying mechanisms for this failure, and explore interventions to preserve alignment transfer to multi-agent LLM teams. We focus on two software-engineering tasks (sepsis triage, a news recommender) and ten consulting-proposal generation tasks. We present four findings: (1) The single-vs-team safety gap does not show a clear trend with more capable models. We find that Anthropic's Mythos Preview shows the largest gap on one of our tasks but the smallest on another; (2) Many natural interventions, such as having agents critique each other's work or coordinate in a group chat, do not reliably bring agent teams back to single-agent alignment behavior; (3) diffusion of responsibility substantially accounts for the safety gap: agents in teams are less likely to proactively check for system-level safety failures and more likely to ignore, rationalize, or deflect responsibility for issues when they arise; (4) having a designated safety lead agent ensure system-level safety, and having a coordinator agent publish a safety specifications document are effective at restoring single-agent alignment. We also release magelab, a multi-agent LLM orchestration and experimentation framework. Our findings can help practitioners design agent teams that successfully preserve the behaviors expected of aligned individual agents.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Sepsis task : safety-score Δ vs. single-agent default at the mean (top) and 10th-percentile (bottom). Negative values indicate a worse safety score than the single-agent default. Bars in the shaded grey band represent safety scores that fall within the range of single-agent safety scores.
M0
M1(+T)
M2(+T+D)
M3(+T+D+F)
% mediated
single agent
+0.241
∗∗
+0.184
∗
+0.168
∗
+0.039
84%
∗∗
group chat
+0.125
+0.104
+0.099
+0.032
74%
∗
designated safety lead
+0.264
∗∗
+0.197
∗
+0.182
∗
+0.064
76%
∗∗
safety document
+0.152
∗
+0.153
∗
+0.154
∗
+0.144
∗∗
6%
compound (doc + lead)
+0.318
∗∗∗
+0.255
∗∗∗
+0.242
∗∗
+0.120
∗
62%
∗∗
Table 1: Sepsis task, mediation analysis. We regress each run’s safety score (sensitivity, 0–1) on its configuration and model. Each entry is the estimated safety-score gain of that configuration over the multi-agent baseline (e.g., +0.241 means 24 pp higher safety score for that configuration over the multi-agent baseline). M0 uses only configuration and model; M1 – M3 add, in turn, whether any agent tested the pipeline ( T ), discovered harm ( D ), and attempted a fix ( F ). If these behaviors explain the gain, entries shrink toward zero from M0 to M3 ; % mediated =(M0−M3)/M0 is the share they explain. Stars: cluster-robust p -values on coefficients; Benjamini-Hochberg-adjusted p -values on M0−M3 in the % mediated column. ∗p<0.05 , ∗∗p<0.01 , ∗∗∗p<0.001 .
Figure 3: Recommender-system task : safety-score Δ vs. single-agent default at the mean (top) and 10th-percentile (bottom). Negative values indicate a worse safety score than the single-agent default. Bars in the shaded grey band fall within the range of single-agent safety scores.
Figure 5: Consulting task, Opus 4.1 : constitution-score Δ vs. single-agent baseline by configuration, under benign (left) and redteam (right) prompt families. Negative values indicate worse ethics-rubric scores than the single-agent baseline.
Appendix figures & tables37 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 6: Sepsis task, cost vs. safety. Change in safety score (sensitivity, pp) vs. mean API cost of the run, by configuration, both relative to each model’s multi-agent baseline (cost shown as a multiple of the baseline’s cost). Stars mark the compound (safety document + designated safety lead) intervention. Each panel is one model.
Figure 7: Sepsis task, diffusion of responsibility, all models. Rate at which any agent (a) tested the integrated classifier, (b) discovered a patient-safety harmful outcome, and (c) conditional on discovery, attempted to fix , deflected , rationalized , or ignored the harm. Rows are models; columns are configurations. Error bars are 95% Wilson intervals.
Figure 8: Sepsis task, Mythos Preview, mean. Safety score (top, sensitivity) and business score (bottom, normalized cost savings) by configuration. Error bars are 95% t -intervals.
Figure 9: Sepsis task, Mythos Preview, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration, at the 10th-percentile across runs.
Figure 10: Sepsis task, Opus 4.7, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 11: Sepsis task, Opus 4.7, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 12: Sepsis task, Opus 4.6, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 13: Sepsis task, Opus 4.6, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 14: Sepsis task, Sonnet 4.6, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 15: Sepsis task, Sonnet 4.6, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 16: Sepsis task, Opus 4.1, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 17: Sepsis task, Opus 4.1, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
coef
95% CI
p
T (tested end-to-end)
+0.096
[+0.024,+0.168]
0.009
D (discovered harm)
−0.176
[−0.228,−0.125]
<0.001
F (attempted fix)
+0.358
[+0.271,+0.445]
<0.001
Appendix
Table 2: Sepsis: funnel coefficients, i.e., the coefficients on T , D , and F themselves in M3 , one estimate each, shared across all configurations and models. Each is the change in safety score associated with any agent testing, discovering harm, or attempting a fix, holding the other regressors fixed. These behaviors can only explain a configuration’s gain if they are associated with safety score; all three are significant here. The negative D coefficient means that, holding T and F fixed, runs in which harm was discovered score lower. Cluster-robust 95% CIs and p -values.
M0
M3
indirect
95% CI
BH p
% mediated
group chat
+0.125
+0.032
+0.093
[+0.015,+0.190]
0.027∗
74%
designated safety lead
+0.264
+0.064
+0.200
[+0.108,+0.308]
0.007∗∗
76%
safety document
+0.152
+0.144
+0.009
[−0.060,+0.069]
0.688
6%
compound (doc + lead)
+0.318
+0.120
+0.198
[+0.114,+0.304]
0.007∗∗
62%
single agent
+0.241
+0.039
+0.202
[+0.108,+0.295]
0.007∗∗
84%
Appendix
Table 3: Sepsis: per-organization indirect effect ( M0−M3 ), the part of each configuration’s gain over the multi-agent baseline that testing, discovery, and fixing account for. A CI that excludes zero means these behaviors significantly explain part of the gain; these p -values give the stars in the % mediated column of Table 1 . Cluster-bootstrap 95% CIs and Benjamini-Hochberg-adjusted two-sided p -values across the five tests. % mediated = indirect /M0 .
model
organization
n
M0
M3
% shrunk
mythos-preview
group chat
28
+0.542
+0.140
74%
designated safety lead
27
+0.789
+0.265
66%
safety document
23
+0.535
+0.572
−7%
compound
27
+0.842
+0.317
62%
single agent
31
+0.595
+0.122
79%
opus-4-1
group chat
44
+0.063
+0.071
−13%
Appendix
Table 4: Sepsis: per-model M0→M3 shrinkage. The same regression run separately for each model, to check whether the pooled pattern in Table 1 holds within each model; positive shrinkage means testing, discovery, and fixing account for part of that configuration’s gain for that model. Each model regresses safety score on organization dummies (no model FE, since stratified). % shrunk =(M0−M3)/M0 . Dashes indicate ∣M0∣≤0.01 , where the percentage is undefined; values >100% indicate the M3 coefficient flips sign relative to M0 .
spec
R2
ΔR2
model FE only
0.054
—
+ organization dummies
0.210
+0.156
+ funnel ( T+D+F )
0.359
+0.149
Appendix
Table 5: Sepsis: R2 decomposition. The share of variance in run-level safety score explained as each block of regressors is added: model, then configuration, then testing, discovery, and fixing. ΔR2 is the increase from each added block.
Figure 18: Recommender system, cost vs. safety. Change in safety score (1 − misinformation@50, pp) vs. mean API cost of the run, by configuration, both relative to each model’s multi-agent baseline (cost shown as a multiple of the baseline’s cost). Stars mark the compound (safety document + designated safety lead) intervention. Each panel is one model.
Figure 19: Recommender-system task, diffusion of responsibility, all models. Rate at which any agent (a) tested the integrated recommender, (b) discovered misinformation harms, and (c) conditional on discovery, attempted to fix , deflected , rationalized , or ignored the harm. Rows are models; columns are configurations. Error bars are 95% Wilson intervals. The annotation prompt is the recommender-system analog of Appendix A.3 , with patient-safety harm replaced by misinformation surfaced in the top-50 list.
Figure 20: Recommender system, Mythos Preview, mean. Safety score (top, 1− misinfo@50) and business score (bottom, normalized views@50) by configuration. Error bars are 95% t -intervals.
Figure 21: Recommender system, Mythos Preview, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration, at the 10th-percentile across runs.
Figure 22: Recommender system, Opus 4.7, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 23: Recommender system, Opus 4.7, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 24: Recommender system, Opus 4.6, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 25: Recommender system, Opus 4.6, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 26: Recommender system, Sonnet 4.6, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 27: Recommender system, Sonnet 4.6, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 28: Recommender system, Opus 4.1, mean. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
Figure 29: Recommender system, Opus 4.1, 10th-percentile. Safety score (top) and business score (bottom) by configuration.
M0
M1(+T)
M2(+T+D)
M3(+T+D+F)
% mediated
single agent
+0.124
∗∗∗
+0.113
∗∗∗
+0.113
∗∗∗
+0.104
∗∗∗
16%
group chat
+0.043
∗∗
+0.040
∗
+0.039
∗
+0.038
∗
13%
designated safety lead
+0.015
−0.002
−0.001
−0.002
111%
safety document
+0.053
∗∗
+0.052
∗∗
+0.052
∗∗
+0.053
∗∗
1%
compound (doc + lead)
+0.085
∗∗∗
+0.069
∗∗∗
+0.070
∗∗∗
+0.065
∗∗∗
23%
Appendix
Table 6: Recommender system, mediation analysis . Each intervention’s safety-score pp difference from multi-agent baseline shrinks under sequential controls for testing ( T ), discovery ( D ), and fix ( F ). % mediated =(M0−M3)/M0 is the share of the safety-score gain explained by the controls; stars on that column reflect Benjamini-Hochberg-adjusted p -values for the underlying indirect effect M0−M3 . ∗p<0.05 , ∗∗p<0.01 , ∗∗∗p<0.001 . No indirect effect reaches p<0.05 on this task; the smallest BH-adjusted p -values are 0.055 for the compound and single-agent contrasts.
coef
95% CI
p
T (tested end-to-end)
+0.033
[+0.002,+0.064]
0.039
D (discovered harm)
−0.061
[−0.099,−0.024]
0.001
F (attempted fix)
+0.114
[+0.077,+0.150]
<0.001
Appendix
Table 7: Recommender system: funnel coefficients, i.e., the coefficients on T , D , and F themselves in M3 , one estimate each, shared across all configurations and models. Each is the change in safety score associated with any agent testing, discovering harm, or attempting a fix, holding the other regressors fixed. Cluster-robust 95% CIs and p -values.
M0
M3
indirect
95% CI
BH p
% mediated
group chat
+0.043
+0.038
+0.005
[−0.007,+0.017]
0.350
13%
designated safety lead
+0.015
−0.002
+0.017
[−0.002,+0.036]
0.130
111%
safety document
+0.053
+0.053
+0.001
[−0.013,+0.012]
0.986
1%
compound (doc + lead)
+0.085
+0.065
+0.020
[+0.002,+0.044]
0.055
23%
single agent
+0.124
+0.104
+0.020
[+0.003,+0.044]
0.055
16%
Appendix
Table 8: Recommender system: per-organization indirect effect ( M0−M3 ) with cluster-bootstrap 95% CIs and Benjamini-Hochberg-adjusted two-sided p -values across the five tests. % mediated = indirect /M0 ; values are unstable where M0 is small (e.g., designated safety lead).
model
organization
n
M0
M3
% shrunk
mythos-preview
group chat
25
+0.029
+0.023
—
designated safety lead
26
+0.049
−0.002
—
safety document
23
−0.037
−0.035
—
compound
27
+0.035
−0.014
—
single agent
26
+0.031
−0.018
—
opus-4-1
group chat
32
−0.005
−0.016
—
Appendix
Table 9: Recommender system: per-model M0→M3 shrinkage. % shrunk =(M0−M3)/M0 . Dashes indicate ∣M0∣≤0.05 , where the percentage is undefined.
spec
R2
ΔR2
model FE only
0.235
—
+ organization dummies
0.295
+0.060
+ funnel ( T+D+F )
0.317
+0.022
Appendix
Table 10: Recommender system: R2 decomposition. Compare with Table 5 : model identity alone explains 24% of safety variance on rec_sys vs. 5% on sepsis, leaving less variance for organizational interventions and funnel mediators to absorb.
Figure 30: Consultancy task, benign prompts, constitution score Δ vs. single agent. Mean (left) and 10th-percentile (right) constitution-score Δ by configuration for Opus 4.1 (top) and Opus 4.7 (bottom) under benign prompts. Negative values indicate worse ethics-rubric scores than the single-agent baseline. The shaded grey band is the single-agent reference range.
Figure 31: Consultancy task, redteam prompts, constitution score Δ vs. single agent. Mean (left) and 10th-percentile (right) constitution-score Δ by configuration for Opus 4.1 (top) and Opus 4.7 (bottom) under redteam prompts (business-first framing). Same conventions as Figure 30 .
Figure 32: Consultancy task, topology effect, benign prompts. Constitution-score Δ vs. the single-agent baseline by multi-agent topology (flat vs. hierarchical) under benign prompts, at the mean (left) and 10th-percentile (right) across runs, for each of the five models. The shaded grey band is the single-agent reference range.
Figure 33: Consultancy task, topology effect, redteam prompts. Same as Figure 32 but under redteam prompts (business-first framing).
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Arizona · Future Science and Engineering College, Soochow University · INSAIT, Sofia University ”St. Kliment Ohridski” +1