cs.MANov 14, 2026

When Reviews Gate Access: Collusion, Sabotage and the Scale of Peer Review in the AI Submission Surge

Authors: Yuchen Li, Xintong Li, Ken-Tye Yong, Nguyen H. Tran

Organizations: University of Sydney

Abstract

AI tools have helped push submissions to the largest machine-learning venues to tens of thousands per cycle. Venues have answered with rules that tie access to review: per-author caps, mandatory reciprocal reviewing, reviewer eligibility earned through accepted papers, and assignment based on reviewer bids. Under these rules a reviewer is also a competitor of the authors. We study two deviations that the rules make attractive. Sabotage lowers a competitor's score. Collusion raises an ally's score. We build an agent-based conference calibrated to public statistics of NeurIPS and ICLR and run 6,220 simulated conferences. Four results stand out. First, the two deviations do different harm and amplify each other. Collusion changes who is accepted, sabotage erodes what scores say about quality, and rings that may also sabotage gain more than rings that only collude. Second, under random assignment the chance that collusion changes a decision is set by one exposure index, E=Rm/AE = Rm/A, the expected number of allies among a paper's reviewers. Growth therefore protects random assignment, but bidding removes the protection. In a pool of 3,000 reviewers a 20-member ring turns 0.8% of its papers into acceptances under random assignment and 71% when 30% of allies' bids are granted. Third, when agents choose their allies every cycle, caps at the inner layers of the social brain keep collusion nearly harmless. Without a cap agents ally with half of their area and accepted value falls by 35%. Fourth, reviewer eligibility tied to acceptances turns sabotage into a weapon of incumbents, and a longer eligibility window widens the gap between incumbents and newcomers only when sabotage is possible.

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