Electrical Power and Energy Systems face hybrid threats that combine cyber intrusions, physical sabotage and climate-driven stress, and routinely outpace today's siloed monitoring stacks. We present RESILAGENT, a concept architecture organised around three operational pillars, Sensing & Data Intelligence, Resilience Analytics & Reporting, and Incident Response & Recovery, mediated by a Cloud-based Orchestrator and exercised through a closed Detect-Simulate-Decide-Sign loop. The framework fuses agentic artificial intelligence and multimodal large language models for cross-modal detection, real-time digital twins for what-if simulation, and a permissioned blockchain anchor for tamper-evident threat intelligence and CER/NIS2-aligned evidence. We instantiate it on two scenarios, a transmission operator under coordinated cyber compromise, sabotage and heatwave, and a distribution operator under a supply-chain compromise during a storm, and report an IEEE-bus micro-benchmark that quantifies each pillar through false-data-injection attack detection, cyber-physical fusion lift, N-1 contingency screening and anchor cost.
Fig. 1: RESILAGENT three-pillar architecture: P1 Sensing, P2 Analytics, P3 Response, mediated by a Cloud-based Orchestrator. Solid arrows trace one workflow cycle; the dashed arrow closes the loop.
Fig. 2: End-to-end experimental pipeline. Eight stages grouped into three pillar containers: P1 prepares the grid model and runs detection plus cyber–physical fusion; P2 screens N−1 contingencies on the DT; P3 generates the LLM SOAR playbook, anchors artefacts and emits the CER/NIS2 evidence package. Badges R1–R6 mark the results in Section V (R6 ties the chain end-to-end).
Fig. 3: RESILAGENT deployment view. Tier A (edge, distributed) keeps raw telemetry on-premise; Tier B (operator cloud / SOC, centralised) hosts orchestration, fusion, DTaaS, SOAR and the single human-in-the-loop checkpoint; Tier C (cross-operator data space, federated) shares only model updates and signed CTI. Arrows mark the inter-tier communication paths and protocols.
Fig. 5: Quantitative results. (a) P2 N−1 contingency screen on IEEE 14-bus at 1.25× peak load (15 contingencies, audit ∼250 ms); (b) P3 anchor cost over 20 000 events, sub-microsecond per event and three orders of magnitude below detector latency; (c) Result 6 end-to-end pipeline, six tools in sequence on commodity hardware. The Detector bar is inflated because the benchmark retrains from scratch; in deployment that step is sub-millisecond.
In embodied cyber-physical systems, active cyberattacks pose an immediate threat not just to data, but to physical integrity and human safety. While existing security approaches excel at detection, they lack the runtime mechanisms to determine whether a disruption is tolerable or if performance degradation remains within safe operational bounds. This gap leaves autonomous systems vulnerable to graceful failure paralysis, where they cannot distinguish between a safe, degraded state and a catastrophic hazard during an ongoing attack. This paper presents RobResilience, an implementation of a formal resilience framework for embodied cyber-physical systems in a Webots simulation environment, using a PR2 robot and ROS2. The framework evaluates three predicates at runtime: tolerable disruption (δ), tolerable degradation (γ), and mitigation feasibility (μ), over a compromised device set derived from IDS confidence scores. When resilience is lost, the framework triggers available mitigation strategies. We evaluate our implementation through eight attack scenarios that systematically cover all possible combinations of the predicate state space, varying attack targets, degradation rates, and mitigation availability. Results confirm that the runtime behaviour of the implementation is consistent with the theoretical definitions.
Understanding the security posture of cyber physical systems (CPS) requires reasoning across both information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT). However, a security analyst often holds an incomplete, role-specific view of the underlying system which has most likely resulted from their knowledge limited by a need-to-know framework. Such an incomplete view can potentially lead them to incorrectly assess if a cyber attack produces an untoward physical consequence resulting in making uninformed decisions about system resilience. In this work, we present AWARE-RG (Abstraction Aware Explanation of Resiliency Graphs), a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop framework that provides an analyst with a role-bounded, need-to-know explanations of resiliency paths in a CPS. The AWARE-RG abstraction structure is derived using Formal Concept Analysis over MITRE ATT&CK for ICS tactics, ordered by the ICS Cyber Kill Chain. For valid attack-fault queries, plan repair and backward means-end analysis identify the missing dependencies, explain why the physical hazard is reachable, and suggest defensive strategies. For invalid attack-fault queries, AWARE-RG localizes the first abstraction level at which the path fails, and reports confirmed blocking conditions as hardening pointers.
Shadaab Kawnain Bashir, Rakesh Podder, Philip D. Hopkins +3
Computer Science Department, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA
Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) face growing threats from cyber-attacks that exploit sensor and control vulnerabilities. Digital Twin (DT) technology can detect anomalies via predictive modelling, but current methods cannot distinguish attack types and often rely on costly full-system shutdowns. This paper presents i-SDT (intelligent Self-Defending DT), combining hydraulically-regularized predictive modelling, multi-class attack discrimination, and adaptive resilient control. Temporal Convolutional Networks (TCNs) with differentiable conservation constraints capture nominal dynamics and improve robustness to adversarial manipulations. A recurrent residual encoder with Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) separates normal operation from single- and multi-stage attacks in latent space. When attacks are confirmed, Model Predictive Control (MPC) uses uncertainty-aware DT predictions to keep operations safe without shutdown. Evaluation on SWaT and WADI datasets shows major gains in detection accuracy, 44.1% fewer false alarms, and 56.3% lower operational costs in simulation-in-the-loop evaluation. with sub-second inference latency confirming real-time feasibility on plant-level workstations, i-SDT advances autonomous cyber-physical defense while maintaining operational resilience.
Mohammadhossein Homaei, Iman Khazrak, Rubén Molano +2
Departamento de Ingeniería de Sistemas Informáticos y Telemáticos, Universidad de Extremadura, Av. Universidad S/N, Escuela Politécnica, Cáceres, 10003, Extremadura, Spain · Department of Computer Science, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, 43403, OH, USA