Philosophers have recently been trying to develop uniform decision rules for instances in which physicians' judgments diverge from the recommendations of medical artificial intelligence (AI) systems. I argue that this effort is fatally flawed because the performance and appropriate use of algorithmic recommendation systems by physicians are highly context-specific, empirical medical matters rather than epistemological ones. In such instances, general decision rules can be stipulated only to the extent that they abstract away from relevant, indeed determinative, contextual circumstances. The alleged problem of physician-AI disagreement, and others like it, play into longstanding disputes in technology ethics about the viability and utility of envisioning possible futures: is this useful "anticipation" or wasteful "speculation"? I suggest that the two may be distinguished. Anticipation explores plausible futures to help inform present actions under irreducible uncertainty. Speculation abstracts away uncertainty, developing formal solutions to stipulated circumstances whose relationship to the real present is often quite unclear. Efforts to develop crisp philosophical solutions to physician-AI disagreement, among other problems, fall into the latter category. Technology ethics should remember that fruitful futures thinking must both begin from and return to the messy, uncertain present.
The integration of artificial intelligence into clinical medicine creates a fundamental tension between algorithmic probabilistic reasoning and the experiential intuition of expert physicians; applying Lawrence Lessig's \enquote{Code is Law} framework, I argue that the architecture of clinical AI systems already functions as de facto medical regulation, reshaping liability and the standard of care. Reframing AI \enquote{hallucination} as structurally analogous to well-documented human cognitive failures such as confirmation bias and premature diagnostic closure, I show that both failure modes demand a unified governance response. I therefore propose a dialectical standard of care that treats the integrated AI-physician dyad as the singular responsible diagnostic entity, mandating the synthesis of algorithmic precision with human interpretive authority within robust data governance and patient privacy frameworks.
Ethical discourse on AI in healthcare has focused predominantly on back-end concerns such as bias, fairness and explainability, while the front-end interface, where patients and clinicians actually encounter AI outputs, remains under explored. This paper identifies imbalanced user-AI relationships as a distinct class of front-end ethical failure: patients are rendered highly visible to AI systems through data inference, yet cannot understand, question or influence how they are represented. Through the concept of asymmetric legibility and a chat-based telemedicine case, we show how design choices e.g., default recommendations, restricted inputs and suppressed uncertainty, undermine agency, clinician judgment and human oversight even where systems are technically accurate. We propose reciprocity as a design orientation and offer interventions for more balanced, participatory user-AI relationships in healthcare.
Maureen Mghambi Mwadime
School of Computer Science, Northumbria University, Newcastle - United Kingdom
Clinical decisions often require weighing autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Reasonable physicians may prioritize these values differently, yet the values that language models bring to medical advice remain poorly characterized. We introduce ValuePrism, an instrument for measuring value priorities from clinical decisions. ValuePrism combines a benchmark of 50 clinical dilemmas, each reviewed by two physicians, with an attribution method that estimates relative value priorities from choices between medically reasonable recommendations. Each case presents a clinical vignette and two mutually exclusive recommendations designed so that choosing one necessarily promotes certain values at the expense of others. Applying the instrument to frontier language models and a US-based physician panel, we find that models frequently acknowledge values favoring both recommendations but make highly consistent decisions across repeated queries, even on cases that sharply divide physicians. The ValuePrism attribution method shows that both physicians and language models express differentiated value priorities. Collectively, model values exhibit substantial diversity and most tend to fall within the physician-panel reference range. Nevertheless, a single model deployed unchecked would amplify its particular values to patients at scale. ValuePrism provides a common basis for measuring and comparing the clinical value priorities expressed by language models and physicians. Data and code are available at https://github.com/payalchandak/value-prism.