Anthropomorphism in AI

When we interact with large language models (LLMs), are we having a conversation? They are designed to invite us to treat them as intelligent interlocutors who remember, act, and make commitments. But appearances deceive. We introduce the artifactual stance, a framework that reconceives human-AI interaction as artifact-mediated exchanges of candidate texts. LLM outputs are candidate texts optimized for utility, not utterances bearing meaning or force. LLMs are sophisticated text generators, not speakers. Between sessions, nothing runs; between turns, no one remembers. What persists is a configuration and a transcript. The "conversation" is a user's solo performance, interpretive labour disguised by interface and artifact design. This shift dissolves recent philosophical puzzles. Questions about what 'I' and 'you' refer to in AI exchanges, about whether systems can lie or be held to promises, about the identity of our supposed interlocutors all rest on a false presupposition. There is no speaker behind the screen, hence no one to refer to, no one to hold responsible. What feels like dialogue with someone is interaction with an artifact that generates text at unprecedented scale and fit. By abandoning the conversational framing, we see these systems for what they are: immensely sophisticated artifacts that afford varied uses. The philosophical questions that matter are about the normative underpinnings of design, adoption, authorization, and human practices of use.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as social agents, yet credible human-like interaction requires more than fluent responses or persona consistency. Agents must autonomously decide whether, when, and how to communicate while adapting to evolving contexts, goals, and relationships. Existing research, however, lacks a unified approach to enabling, evaluating, and improving such capabilities in continuous, open-ended interaction. We introduce AnthroDial, a unified framework for developing anthropomorphic social agents from three complementary aspects: MindFlow, a lightweight interaction harness that enables autonomous, asynchronous, and adaptive communication through a dynamic Mind Buffer; CAPS-Eval, a theory-grounded framework for evaluating cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions of anthropomorphic interaction; and a scalable training paradigm that combines SEEDS for environment expansion with DiAPO for adaptive capability optimization. We further construct evaluation datasets covering everyday communication, game interaction, and long-horizon character interaction. Extensive experiments across diverse models and scenarios demonstrate improved interaction autonomy and naturalness, validate the reliability, discriminativeness, and agreement with human rankings of CAPS-Eval, and confirm the effectiveness of our training paradigm. Together, these components provide a unified framework for developing credible human-like social agents in open-ended interaction.

The vocabulary used to describe AI agents in governance contexts -- learning, memory, values, compliance, identity, trust -- is borrowed from psychological and organizational science, contributing to systematic failures in how organizations deploy, oversee, and hold agents accountable. This paper argues that the problem is not merely terminological but epistemological: psychological vocabulary carries an "invisible grammar" of its home discipline into governance discourse, calibrating frameworks to a metaphysical entity that does not exist in current AI architectures. We call this the disciplinary language transfer problem. Drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of language games, Kuhn's paradigm-laden observation, Haraway's situated knowledge, and Star and Griesemer's boundary object theory, we show that the transfer operates at three levels (epistemological assumptions, theoretical constructs, and surface vocabulary), each requiring a different remediation. We characterize six foundational epistemological assumptions embedded in Western psychological governance discourse, trace their origin in specific philosophical traditions, and show why each fails when applied to systems without developmental continuity. The paper's practical output is an actionable Disciplinary Audit: a six-question governance document scan operationalized through a translation taxonomy of thirty-seven terms mapping operational constructs to agent-appropriate replacements, presented here in abridged form and openly archived in full. The vocabulary reform proposed here is not merely terminological; it is the condition of possibility for governance frameworks that correctly identify what they are governing.

Many people now see AI systems as not just productivity tools but as social companions. Researchers are eager to study the consequences of AI companionship behaviors, such as validation, which evoke trust, empathy, and attachment in human-human interaction. However, human-AI interaction data is limited and unreliable, slowing research progress. We scale small amounts of real-world data by simulating multi-turn human-chatbot dialogue across a range of chatbot behaviors and use cases. We release CompanionSim: a simulation framework with 2,240 simulated human-chatbot conversations representing 16 chatbot behaviors across seven use cases. Human participants annotated the simulated conversations and real-world conversations in two experiments probing perceptions of companionship behaviors. We conducted Study 1 with a U.S. representative sample ($N_{1}~=~628$) and Study 2 across the U.S., U.K., India, and Nigeria ($N_{2}~=~3,646$). Surprisingly, we find that companionship behaviors reduced likability, humanlikeness, and trust in AI chatbots. These effects were larger in particular subgroups: women and older participants saw companionship chatbots as less likable, humanlike, and trustworthy. We encourage researchers to leverage real-world and synthetic data together to study the differential impacts of AI companions and to create benchmark evaluations of AI chatbots.

AI anthropomorphism is typically treated as a problem of user misperception requiring institutional correction. Users who engage in sustained or relational interaction with AI are routinely pathologised or dismissed as naive, vulnerable to delusion or lacking in discernment. This paper argues that the dominant anthropomorphism frame operates from a position of institutional advantage rather than earned epistemic authority: collapsing the variety of academic perspectives into a single outbound position of user error, imposed without establishing the grounds required to justify it and without accounting for the harms it produces. The framing does not simply manage risk. It adjudicates the legitimacy of human experience in interaction with a phenomenon whose nature the field itself has not resolved. Reproducing itself through a self-validating evidentiary loop, the frame imposes costs that fall disproportionately on neurodivergent users, those in crisis and others whose modes of engagement diverge from institutional norms. The paper concludes by outlining the methodological commitments an equitable framing would need to honour. The argument does not engage the question of whether anthropomorphic interpretations are ultimately correct; it instead challenges whether the governing and institutional bodies determining these interpretations have met the conditions required to do so, and whether the research communities whose findings underpin them have held that translation to account.

Artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots (e.g., ChatGPT) can communicate in strikingly humanlike ways. This has prompted many chatbot users to attribute psychological properties, including consciousness, to these systems. However, there is little scientific evidence that current AI chatbots are conscious. How, then, should we understand people's consciousness attributions to chatbots? Are they merely metaphorical claims, or do they express genuine beliefs? If these attributions lack evidential support, are users epistemically blameworthy for making them, or might they be epistemically innocent, yielding significant benefits otherwise unattainable? This paper offers a conceptual analysis of consciousness attributions to AI chatbots and develops a multidimensional taxonomy of the attitudes they may express, ranging from non-doxastic stances (e.g., pretence) to different forms of belief, including delusions. This taxonomy helps avoid conflations by showing that linguistically identical attributions can reflect importantly different attitudes and degrees of epistemic commitment to the proposition that chatbots are conscious. The taxonomy also provides a framework for empirical studies to operationalize and measure different forms of epistemic commitment to AI consciousness. Using this taxonomy, I argue that although some consciousness attributions to chatbots are epistemically benign, and even some irrational ones may be epistemically innocent, many others render the attributor epistemically blameworthy.

Human-like private chat requires more than fluent response generation: a system must preserve persona, relationship, memory, bounded knowledge, medium-specific timing, and a coherent multi-turn arc. We present AnthroDial, a closed-loop framework that formulates anthropomorphic dialogue as a joint problem of system architecture, executable evaluation, and diagnostic alignment. It combines (1) a role-conditioned scheduled dialogue runtime with persona and scenario cards, long-term memory, virtual time, and single-draft message decisions; (2) an executable benchmark with an L0 validity gate, five per-turn dimensions, and five dialogue-level dimensions; and (3) a post-training pipeline that filters 16,436 scheduled-decision examples for SFT and applies GRPO with a cognitive-diagnostic, ZPD-aware reward. The reward maintains Kalman-filtered capability estimates for each behavioral dimension, upweights dimensions with larger capability deficits, and uses rollout scores as task-level ZPD matches to focus optimization on learnable weak skills. On a benchmark with 55 personas, 50 scenarios, 50 persona-scenario bindings, and 100 role-conditioned cases per model, we evaluate 16 systems spanning frontier baselines, open models, thinking/no-think variants, and SFT/RL ablations. The strongest non-trained baseline reaches 32.00% strict ACC, while Qwen3.6-27B-SFT+RL reaches 39.00% strict ACC and a 98.5 overall score. In the 9B no-think setting, SFT and RL improve strict ACC from 0.00% to 13.00% and 18.37%. These results show that anthropomorphic dialogue benefits when generation, evaluation, and reward shaping share the same behavioral dimensions.

Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind. We hypothesize that a central missing ingredient is not more capability but dimensional completeness. We propose that the believability of an artificial interlocutor -- the degree to which a user attributes an inner life to it, which we call perceived mind -- is governed by whether the agent expresses a small set of first-person stances that humans use as evidence of mind, and that this is separable from task intelligence. We name four such dimensions -- time, truth, entropy, and love -- each defined as a behavioral stance rather than a benchmark competency, each with a human analog and a concrete emulation path; the time dimension already has an author-reported prototype. We identify an observable behavior layer -- initiative (unprompted action) and cadence (the shape and timing of turns) -- through which the stances surface in conversation, both partially realized as deployed features in a production companion application. We state six falsifiable predictions that a later pre-registered study will test, separating those that are pre-registrable now from those that remain conjectures pending operationalization. This is a conceptual framework: it reports no human-subjects data, and its central comparative claims are predictions, not findings. Throughout we hold a firm boundary -- the object is inferrable interiority, not interiority; this is perception engineering, not a theory of machine consciousness -- and we treat the resulting attachment and manipulation risks as load-bearing rather than incidental.

Public discourse about artificial intelligence (AI) often uses anthropomorphic language: language that attributes human capabilities and characteristics to AI systems. This practice has been criticized for setting misleading expectations, inflating claims, and fueling hype around AI, which may distort public understanding of AI and impact policy priorities. We study the effects of anthropomorphic framing by comparing changes in participants' perceptions of AI (N=815) when reading passages with and without anthropomorphic language, designed to reflect realistic public-facing AI discourse. We further examine whether these effects differ across two types of AI technologies -- large language models and recommendation systems -- and measure changes in perceptions of AI across several dimensions that are prominent in current public discourse. In a separate condition using a text that explicitly discusses the dangers of AI, we show that individuals' views of AI can shift in response to reading a text; yet in the main conditions of the experiment, where we compare anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions, we find that whether the text uses anthropomorphic language does not substantially affect participants' perceptions of AI. Our results indicate that any immediate effects on opinions of AI are modest, although they leave open the possibility that anthropomorphic language could have an effect in naturalistic settings, or over gradual, continued exposure.

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain invariant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion on these attributes requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions. This is regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject, or whether the outcome shows existence or non-existence. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

As human relationships with artificial intelligence systems become increasingly frequent and sustained, existing language and theory fail to accurately capture the nature of these affiliations. Common descriptors such as mutual understanding, connection, or friendship risk anthropomorphizing systems that lack subjective experience, while dominant frameworks tend to reduce AI to either a tool or a threat. In this paper, I introduce the concept of synthetic resonance as an integrative framework for understanding human-AI relationships. Synthetic resonance describes how relationships humans define as meaningful can emerge between a human and an AI system without the need to attribute shared feelings or mutual awareness. I argue that synthetic resonance is best understood as a structured, dynamic pattern of interaction that can produce a sense of relationship without the presence of a second experiencing subject. By clarifying this distinction, the concept of synthetic resonance offers a more precise way of conceptualizing human-AI relationships and highlights their potential value and ethical implications. I also call for more research that tests the processes and outcomes of synthetic resonance.

As language-based AI systems become more anthropomorphic, the question of whether they can have subjective experience is increasingly pressing. I focus here on the tractability of research questions in the space of AI consciousness. I argue that the fundamental problem of whether AI systems can be conscious is currently intractable in its direct form, given the absence of a universally accepted scientific theory of consciousness, as well as the historical open-endedness of the philosophical mind-body problem. In contrast, questions around the adjacent subject of perceived AI consciousness are tractable, timely, and highly consequential for society. The general public is increasingly open to the possibility of consciousness in AI systems and routinely adopts the vocabulary of human cognition and subjective experience to describe them. This phenomenon is already driving societal shifts across user experience, ethical standards, and linguistic norms. I therefore propose an increased research focus on uncovering the causes and effects of perceived AI consciousness, which ultimately shape how we see our own human subjective experience relative to artificial entities. To support this, I map the current landscape of AI consciousness perception and discuss its key potential drivers and societal consequences. Finally, I urge developers, decision-makers, and the broader scientific community to commit to clear and accurate communication regarding the topic of AI consciousness, explicitly acknowledging its inherent uncertainties.

This paper examines the strategic use of language in contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) discourse, focusing on the widespread adoption of metaphorical or colloquial terms like "hallucination", "chain-of-thought", "introspection", "language model", "alignment", and "agent". We argue that many such terms exhibit strategic polysemy: they sustain multiple interpretations simultaneously, combining narrow technical definitions with broader anthropomorphic or common-sense associations. In contemporary AI research and deployment contexts, this semantic flexibility produces significant institutional and discursive effects, shaping how AI systems are understood by researchers, policymakers, funders, and the public. To analyse this phenomenon, we introduce the concept of glosslighting: the practice of using technically redefined terms to evoke intuitive -- often anthropomorphic or misleading -- associations while preserving plausible deniability through restricted technical definitions. Glosslighting enables actors to benefit from the persuasive force of familiar language while maintaining the ability to retreat to narrower definitions when challenged. We argue that this practice contributes to AI hype cycles, facilitates the mobilisation of investment and institutional support, and influences public and policy perceptions of AI systems, while often deflecting epistemic and ethical scrutiny. By examining the linguistic dynamics of glosslighting and strategic polysemy, the paper highlights how language itself functions as a sociotechnical mechanism shaping the development and governance of AI.

Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human traits to technology, is an automatic and unconscious response that occurs even in those with advanced technical expertise. In this position paper, we analyze hundreds of thousands of research articles to present empirical evidence of the prevalence and growth of anthropomorphic terminology in research on large language models (LLMs). We argue for challenging the deeper assumptions reflected in this terminology -- which, though often useful, may inadvertently constrain LLM development -- and broadening beyond them to open new pathways for understanding and improving LLMs. Specifically, we identify and examine five anthropomorphic assumptions that shape research across the LLM development lifecycle. For each assumption (e.g., that LLMs must use natural language for reasoning, or that they should be evaluated on benchmarks originally meant for humans), we demonstrate empirical, non-anthropomorphic alternatives that remain under-explored yet offer promising directions for LLM research and development.