Bipartite Perfect Matchings

End-to-end Supervised Graph Prediction (SGP) requires a permutation-invariant loss to compare predicted and target graphs with arbitrary node orderings. Such losses typically involve a costly graph-matching problem. We first study three Optimal Transport relaxations of this problem and show, theoretically and empirically, that the Gromov-Wasserstein (GW) objective is the most suitable for SGP. Then, to avoid solving the resulting inner optimization for every training example, we propose to amortize the graph matching (node alignment) problem. For each training sample, the loss function leverages a transport plan provided by a parametric matcher based on the differentiable Sinkhorn algorithm applied on empirical node distributions. The graph prediction module and the matcher are jointly learned. We showcase the efficiency of this approach on toy and real world SGP problems of increasing complexity including a novel Mass-spectra to Scaffold task that we introduce.

We introduce Potential Matching Optimal Transport (PMOT), a potential-flow framework for general $p$-cost optimal transport with $c_p(x,y)=\|x-y\|^p$. PMOT parameterizes the CNF velocity field with a scalar potential in the generalized Benamou--Brenier form for the chosen exponent $p$. It trains the potential gradient with a self-induced matching loss along straight bridges determined by the model's own endpoints, while allowing flexible terminal distribution matching. Our main result establishes zero-loss exactness: under the stated regularity, exact terminal matching, and uniqueness assumptions, any zero-loss solution satisfies the generalized Benamou--Brenier optimality system and recovers the corresponding $p$-optimal transport map and dynamics. On synthetic benchmarks, PMOT learns $p$-specific maps that agree with the corresponding $p$-matched OT references. It also remains competitive as a likelihood-based density model on high-dimensional tabular data, and an MMD-based color transformation experiment demonstrates flexible sample-based terminal matching.

Dynamic matching markets require decisions about whom to match and when: matching now yields value but removes participants who may create better future opportunities. We develop a value-based reinforcement-learning framework for this problem on finite, evolving weighted graphs. We study an infinite-horizon continuous-time model with stochastic arrivals, node-type transitions, edge realizations, and exogenous exits. We prove an event-time reduction: without loss of optimality, the planner acts immediately after each exogenous event and then waits for the next one. We further show that the optimal edge-wise $Q$-function is characterized by a single continuation-value function on post-decision residual graphs, reducing the learned object from state-action values to graph values. Exact action selection still requires combinatorial matching optimization; we approximate the value with a graph neural network, train it by temporal-difference learning, and use it in a forward-greedy matching heuristic. In a binary-type benchmark, the learned policy substantially outperforms immediate and threshold-greedy rules by preserving common nodes for rare arrivals of valuable matches while forming lower-value matches only in thick pools. In a kidney paired donation benchmark, it performs similarly to immediate greedy when exits are unpredictable, recovers the logic of patient matching when warnings are reliable, and outperforms the better of Immediate Greedy and Patient Greedy across intermediate warning probabilities. These results show that residual-graph value learning yields state-dependent dynamic matching policies that adapt to realized connectivity and exit information.

Over-parameterized linear regression has been widely studied over the last decade. However, most existing works assume that the covariates are independent and that their covariance matrices are non-degenerate. In this paper, we relax both assumptions and derive deterministic equivalents for the prediction risk in a vanishing-ridge regime. We show that degeneracy of the covariance matrices and dependence can lead to multiple descent, and characterize where the corresponding peaks can occur. Our proofs use a novel graph representation of the variance profile. We show that maximum matchings and the Dulmage--Mendelsohn decomposition of the associated bipartite graph identify the configurations at which the variance becomes singular.

Multi-object tracking in dense crowds requires solving a bipartite assignment problem between detections and trajectories at every video frame. The classical Hungarian algorithm solves this in $O(N^3)$ time, which becomes a bottleneck for large scenes with hundreds of people. We propose an \emph{incremental} assignment algorithm that exploits the block-sparse structure of crowd tracking cost matrices --- dense within each crowd cluster, near-zero between clusters. We compute the exact same optimal $N \times N$ assignment as the Hungarian algorithm, but via an incremental strategy: we add one person at a time, exploiting the fact that after step $n-1$ the dual potentials are \emph{exactly optimal} for the $(n-1)\times(n-1)$ subproblem --- a strictly stronger condition than the intermediate feasibility maintained by the Hungarian algorithm during its $N$ outer iterations. Each new step therefore requires only a single augmenting path search from a certified optimal starting point. This avoids repeated full-matrix scans while guaranteeing an identical globally optimal result. A diagonal-reordering invariant keeps the data structure compact and cache-friendly. On realistic crowd benchmarks with $N \in [200, 5000]$ people organised into dense clusters, our algorithm achieves \textbf{3.7--6.5$\times$ speedup} over the Hungarian baseline while producing provably optimal matchings identical to those of Hungarian. The speedup grows with $N$ and remains stable beyond $N=3000$, making the method especially attractive for large-scale crowd scenes such as stadium exits and mass public events.

The stable marriage problem appears in many privacy-sensitive domains, for example in the National Resident Matching Program in the US. In such applications, preserving the privacy of users' preference lists is essential to prevent strategic manipulation, discourage misreporting, and comply with data protection regulations. In this work, we investigate privacy attacks on stable marriage algorithms. Assuming that the attacker (e.g., the hospitals) can repeatedly interact with the stable marriage algorithm, we demonstrate how such interactions can reveal private preferences of the non-malicious side (e.g., the residents). We show that the widely applied Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm, where the proposers' side is malicious, is vulnerable to privacy attacks and all honest agents' preferences can be revealed. We further investigate which preference distributions of the honest, non-malicious side are susceptible to privacy attacks and show that the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm where the honest side proposes can preserve privacy in non-susceptible preference distributions. We extend our results to the decentralized setting and show that the attacker's side can infer all preference orderings. In an experimental evaluation, we test privacy attacks on synthetic and real-world data and show that real-world data is indeed susceptible to privacy attacks. This work underlines a need for new privacy-preserving stable marriage algorithms.

We study tropical circuits with scalar multiplication gates, that is, algebraic circuits whose gates implement $\max$, $+$, or multiplication with a positive constant. For such circuits, we prove exponential size lower bounds for computing maximum weight directed spanning trees and maximum weight bipartite perfect matchings. As a corollary, we obtain an exponential size separation between monotone and non-monotone maxout neural networks, which generalize the popularly used ReLU neural networks. One conclusion from this is that neural network models with enforced convexity constraints, such as input-convex neural networks (ICNNs), sometimes need to be exponentially larger than their unrestricted counterparts in order to express the same functions.

We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown. We focus on a centralized setting where an algorithm matches agents at each time step and receives noisy rewards that reflect the preferences of the matched agents, following a semi-bandit feedback structure. We adopt a pure exploration perspective, aiming to efficiently identify the optimal stable matching with high probability. Our work extends prior results by handling \emph{two-sided uncertainty} and by exploiting \emph{partial preference} information. A central ingredient is the notion of \textbf{pervasive stable matching}, which enables the identification of optimal stable matchings under partial preferences. We propose elimination-based algorithms whose stopping criteria exploit the structure of the learned partial preferences, and provide a refined sample-complexity analysis. Beyond pure exploration, we extend our approach to regret minimization and establish regret bounds with respect to the \emph{optimal} stable matching that avoid dependence on the minimum reward gap $Δ_{\min}$.

We address the problem of online multi-human multi-robot teaming through the lens of a linear matching bandit framework, where a learner assigns robots with unknown features from a fixed pool to distinct sets of human agents over multiple rounds. To solve this problem, we propose LinMatch, an online learning algorithm that updates the confidence intervals of the unknown features and makes the optimistic matching under uncertainty. The contributions and novelty of this work are twofold. First, we recast the optimistic matching problem in each round as a linear program of maximum weighted matching, efficiently solvable by the celebrated Hungarian algorithm. Second, we provide novel bounds for matching with linear feature problems, showing an upper bound of $\tilde{O}(d\sqrt{MKT})$ and a minimax lower bound of $Ω(d\sqrt{MKT})$, establishing a tight optimal regret rate of $\tildeΘ(d\sqrt{MKT})$. This demonstrates that LinMatch achieves strictly optimal achievable regret with respect to the total number of rounds $T$, the feature dimension $d$, and the matching parameters $M$ and $K$. The proposed algorithm and bounds apply to a wide range of matching problems with applications beyond human-robot matching, such as housing allocation, recommendation systems, and more.

We revisit the memory update mechanism in SAM2-based visual object tracking and identify confidence-only mask selection as the dominant cause of drift under occlusion, rapid motion, and distractors. We introduce SENTRY, a training-free, plug-and-play, refine-before-write module that validates each memory update for short-horizon temporal consistency before committing it. SENTRY aggregates diverse segmentation hypotheses per frame, backtracks them into short tracklets, and uses neighbor-aware cycle-consistent matching against recent trajectories to favor temporally and geometrically consistent masks. It leaves the base architecture untouched, replacing confidence-driven writes with consistency-validated ones. For fair evaluation, we re-evaluate major open-source SAM2-based trackers across all available scales and datasets, filling gaps in prior reports. Integrated into five strong baselines, SENTRY delivers consistent gains across nine benchmarks, achieving new zero-shot SOTA on LaSOT, LaSOT_ext, GOT-10k, VOT20, VOT22, and DiDi. Despite these checks, the SAM2-L version runs at 32.8 FPS on an A100, and across compatible hosts adds only about 0.4--0.6 GB VRAM. Our results provide the first unified all-scale evaluation of SAM2-based trackers and show that enforcing temporal validity at write time stabilizes memory-augmented tracking without retraining. Project page: https://hamadya.github.io/SENTRY/page/

We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model. To capture human preferences, we use cumulative prospect theory (CPT) that weighs the actions of the agent in a nonlinear fashion using a ($α$-Hölder continuous) weight function. CPT has been widely used in behavioral economics and risk sensitive machine learning to emulate human preferences. We analyze the state-of-the-art learning algorithm with CPT weight distorted rewards and obtain a player optimal regret of $\mathcal{O}(K\log T \left(\frac{1}Δ\right)^{2/α})$, where $K$ denotes the number of arms, $T$ is the learning horizon, and $Δ$ represents (suitably defined) players' minimum preference gap. Noticing the dependence on $Δ$ to be sub-optimal, we further improve this regret by judiciously selecting the active set of arms during exploration, which removes the dependence on $K$ in the dominant term and achieves an improved (optimal) regret guarantees in the setting where the number of arms $K$ is significantly larger than the number of players $N$. In addition, we consider adversarial markets where the observed rewards of the agents may be corrupted. We propose and analyze algorithms for robust markets with CPT as risk sensitive measure in both settings where the total corruption budget is known and where it is unknown, and establish logarithmic player-optimal regret guarantees in both cases.

Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation. Existing matching models typically reduce this process to immediate sub-Gaussian feedback about fixed preferences, missing settings where payoff-relevant information is revealed gradually and changes future matching decisions. We introduce a framework with temporally extended feedback, that formulates two-sided matching as a partially observable Markov game with costly pre-match screening, noisy post-match observations, evolving latent profiles, and endogenous continuation or dissolution. We instantiate this framework in Learn2Match, a multi-agent reinforcement-learning benchmark for dynamic matching markets. Learn2Match supports decentralized decision making over whom to interview, whom to match with, and when to dissolve a match, while evaluating policies using regret, social welfare, and an information-friction loss that measures the welfare gap caused by incomplete revelation of latent preferences. We find that independent PPO achieves higher cumulative social welfare and lower cumulative regret than the bandit-style CA-ETC baseline under temporally extended feedback, demonstrating the promise of MARL for dynamic matching markets. However, PPO still incurs higher information-friction loss, revealing that end-to-end MARL does not yet provide the coordinated exploration structure of matching-bandit methods. These results position Learn2Match as a benchmark for developing the next generation of matching-market algorithms: methods that are adaptive like RL agents, statistically disciplined like bandit algorithms, and structurally aware like stable-matching mechanisms. Please refer to https://sites.google.com/view/learn-to-match/home for the official website and the code link.

Multi-view object association is an important computer vision problem that underlies many multi-camera perception tasks. While this task is naturally formulated as a constrained one-to-one matching problem, recent works heavily rely on pairwise ranking metrics like AP and FPR-95 for model evaluation. We highlight a fundamental mismatch between these metrics and the actual assignment objective. Theoretically, we show that AP and FPR-95 can be imperfect even when the assignment is already correct, and that Sinkhorn-based normalization can make them perfect. Conversely, optimal pairwise ranking can still lead to incorrect assignments. We validate this mismatch in practice by using our Sinkhorn-based normalization as a controlled post-processing stress test. We show that optimizing just a few post-processing parameters significantly boosts AP and FPR-95 without corresponding improvements in assignment-level metrics such as ACC and IPAA.

This paper proposes a computationally efficient mechanism for multi-dimensional matching markets where agents report preferences over object features rather than complete utility assessments. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to identify the principal direction of variation in feature space and match agents to objects along this dimension, reducing a complex multi-dimensional problem to an effectively one-dimensional problem solvable in $O(N \log N)$ time. We show that when data exhibit low effective dimensionality, our mechanism approximately maximizes Nash Social Welfare, satisfies distributional truthfulness, and achieves symmetry. We establish a novel connection between Nash Social Welfare and Geometric Distributionally Robust Optimization, providing robustness guaranties. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves 99% optimal welfare while running three orders of magnitude faster than direct optimization. The framework applies naturally to school choice, labor markets, and course allocation, where feature-based elicitation reduces the cognitive burden on agents.

The classic online stochastic matching problem typically requires immediate and irrevocable matching decisions. However, in many modern decentralized systems such as real-time ride-hailing and distributed cloud computing, the primary bottleneck is often local communication bandwidth rather than the timing of the match itself. We formalize this challenge by introducing a two-stage local sparsification framework. In this setting, arriving requests must prune their realized compatibility sets to a strict budget of $k$ edges before a central coordinator optimizes the global matching. This creates a "middle ground" between local information constraints and global optimization utility. We propose a local selection strategy, parametrized by a fractional solution of the expected instance. Theoretically, we quantify the approximation ratio as a function of the solution's {\em spread}. We prove that under sufficient spread, our sparsifier globally preserves the expected size of the maximum matching. Empirically, we demonstrate the robustness of our approach using the New York City ride-hailing datasets and adversarial synthetic benchmarks. Our results show that near-optimal global matching is achievable even with highly constrained local budgets, significantly outperforming standard online baselines.

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This raises a fundamental question: how to distribute unavoidable instability across agents while preserving strategy-proofness? To address this, we propose \texttt{MenuNet}, a strategy-proof mechanism design framework based on a neural representation of menus. Rather than directly constructing assignments, \texttt{MenuNet} learns to generate personalized probabilistic menus, from which assignments are realized via a structured sequential choice rule that guarantees strategy-proofness by construction. By decomposing stability into fairness (no envy) and non-wastefulness, our approach models these properties as vector-valued quantities and optimizes their distribution through differentiable objectives, providing a principled trade-off between competing axioms. Empirically, \texttt{MenuNet} navigates this trade-off effectively: it consistently outperforms Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) in terms of envy and Deferred Acceptance (DA) in terms of waste, while maintaining scalability and computational efficiency. These results suggest that learning-based menu mechanisms provide a flexible and scalable paradigm for mechanism design in highly constrained, real-world environments.

Realizing the full potential of quantum computation requires Quantum Error Correction (QEC). QEC reduces error rates by encoding logical information across redundant physical qubits, enabling errors to be detected and corrected. A common decoder used for this task is Minimum Weight Perfect Matching (MWPM) a graph-based algorithm that relies on edge weights to identify the most likely error chains. In this work, we propose a data-driven decoder named Neural Minimum Weight Perfect Matching (NMWPM). Our decoder utilizes a hybrid architecture that integrates Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to extract local syndrome features and Transformers to capture long-range global dependencies, which are then used to predict dynamic edge weights for the MWPM decoder. To facilitate training through the non-differentiable MWPM algorithm, we formulate a novel proxy loss function that enables end-to-end optimization. Our findings on the toric code under depolarizing noise demonstrate thresholds of 17.9% and 10.95%, nearing the 18.9% and 11.0% maximum likelihood bounds, highlighting the advantage of hybrid decoders that combine the predictive capabilities of neural networks with the algorithmic structure of classical matching.

We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete preferences (SMTI). We consider three optimization variants of SMTI, Max Cardinality, Sex-Equal and Egalitarian, and empirically compare the following methods to solve them: Answer Set Programming, Constraint Programming, Integer Linear Programming. For Max Cardinality, we compare these methods with Local Search methods as well. We also empirically compare Answer Set Programming with Propositional Satisfiability, for SMTI instances.