First-Price Auctions

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

Large-scale renewable energy deployment introduces pronounced volatility into the electricity system, turning grid operation into a complex stochastic optimization problem. Accurate electricity price forecasting (EPF) is essential not only to support operational decisions, such as optimal bidding strategies and balancing power preparation, but also to reduce economic risk and improve market efficiency. Probabilistic forecasts are particularly valuable because they quantify uncertainty stemming from renewable intermittency, market coupling, and regulatory changes, enabling market participants to make informed decisions that minimize losses and optimize expected revenues. However, it remains an open question which models to employ to produce accurate forecasts. Should these be task-specific machine learning (ML) models or Time Series Foundation Models (TSFMs)? In this work, we compare four models for day-ahead probabilistic EPF (PEPF) in European bidding zones: a deterministic NHITS backbone with Quantile-Regression Averaging (NHITS+QRA) and a conditional Normalizing-Flow forecaster (NF) are compared with two TSFMs, namely Moirai and ChronosX. On the one hand, we find that TSFMs outperform task-specific deep learning models trained from scratch in terms of CRPS, Energy Score, and predictive interval calibration across market conditions. On the other hand, we find that well-configured task-specific models, particularly NHITS combined with QRA, achieve performance very close to TSFMs, and in some scenarios, such as when supplied with additional informative feature groups or adapted via few-shot learning from other European markets, they can even surpass TSFMs. Overall, our findings show that while TSFMs offer expressive modeling capabilities, conventional models remain highly competitive, emphasizing the need to weigh computational expense against marginal performance improvements in PEPF.

The Winner Determination Problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions is NP-hard, and no existing method reliably predicts which instances will defeat fast greedy heuristics. The ML-for-combinatorial-optimization community has focused on learning to \emph{replace} solvers, yet recent evidence shows that graph neural networks (GNNs) rarely outperform well-tuned classical methods on standard benchmarks. We pursue a different objective: learning to predict \emph{when} a given instance is hard for greedy allocation, enabling instance-dependent algorithm selection. We design a 20-dimensional structural feature vector and train a lightweight MLP hardness classifier that predicts the greedy optimality gap with mean absolute error 0.033, Pearson correlation 0.937, and binary classification accuracy 94.7% across three random seeds. For instances identified as hard -- those exhibiting ``whale-fish'' trap structure where greedy provably fails -- we deploy a heterogeneous GNN specialist that achieves ${\approx}0\%$ optimality gap on all six adversarial configurations tested (vs.\ 3.75--59.24% for greedy). A hybrid allocator combining the hardness classifier with GNN and greedy solvers achieves 0.51% overall gap on mixed distributions. Our honest evaluation on CATS benchmarks confirms that GNNs do not outperform Gurobi (0.45--0.71 vs.\ 0.20 gap), motivating the algorithm selection framing. Learning \emph{when} to deploy expensive solvers is more tractable than learning to replace them.

Optimizing a single advertising campaign across heterogeneous channels is a central challenge in industrial autobidding. Auction mechanisms vary across channels in ranking rules (pure eCPM vs. UE-augmented scoring), pricing formats (first- vs. second-price), and bidding conventions (uniform vs. non-uniform), while advertisers impose shared campaign-level constraints. We propose HOB, which makes marginal cost (MC) computable and alignable across heterogeneous channels, especially for first-price auctions (FPA) with organic-paid coexistence, where existing bidding formulations do not yield a practical aligned MC form. At the global level, HOB derives channel-specific MC forms and coordinates disparate channels through a shared MC target. At the local level, HOB models free-win probability and winning-price uncertainty with a zero-inflated exponential distribution, yielding an efficient surplus-optimal bidding strategy for non-uniform first-price auctions. We show that any interior optimum satisfies MC equalization across channels. Experiments on a controlled offline benchmark, industrial log replay, and large-scale online A/B tests demonstrate that HOB consistently delivers significant performance gains. Deployed on a large-scale commercial DSP, HOB delivers a 3.0% lift in GMV while maintaining return on advertising spend (ROAS) constraints.

We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is $O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T)$, where $\mathcal W_T$ measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided $O(\sqrt{T})$ fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by $(b/2a)PlanError$. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through $PlanError$. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.

The data market design problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the information known to a seller and has a corresponding price [Bergemann et al., 2018]. Each buyer has their own decision to make in a world environment, and their subjective expected value for the information associated with a particular experiment comes from the improvement in this decision and depends on their prior and value for different outcomes. In a setting with multiple buyers, a buyer's expected value for an experiment may also depend on the information sold to others [Bonatti et al., 2022]. We introduce the application of deep learning for the design of revenue-optimal data markets, looking to expand the frontiers of what can be understood and achieved. Relative to earlier work on deep learning for auction design [Dütting et al., 2023], we must learn signaling schemes rather than allocation rules and handle obedience constraints $-$ these arising from modeling the downstream actions of buyers $-$ in addition to incentive constraints on bids. Our experiments demonstrate that this new deep learning framework can almost precisely replicate all known solutions from theory, expand to more complex settings, and be used to establish the optimality of new designs for data markets and make conjectures in regard to the structure of optimal designs.