First-Price Auctions

Agentic AI systems plan, invoke tools and act with limited supervision; they are now both the subject of audits and, increasingly, the auditor. Independence, the foundation of assurance,is still applied to them as a binary. We argue that it must be graded along three orthogonal axes: principal independence (who controls the auditor), substrate independence (an auditor sharing the auditee's foundation-model family, toolchain or guardrails fails with it) and evidence independence (whether evidence is attestable rather than self-reported). Each axis has precedent; the contribution is to grade all three on a single audit, aggregate them by the weakest link, and apply the same rubric when the auditor is itself an agent. We give the model a formal basis by transplanting the beta-factor model of common-cause failure from reliability engineering, a seven-step protocol whose outputs a third party can verify, a structural detectability analysis of a procurement-controls agent audited at three grades, and a Monte Carlo study of the model in which a conventional internal audit of an agent-a real audit team, a second agent, provider logsp-surfaces 5.9% of the faults it could in principle see and none at all in half the fault classes. We map the triple to the EU AI Act as amended, ISO/IEC 42006, UK public-sector risk-management guidance and audit-regulator practice.

In online A/B tests for real-time bidding (RTB), control and treatment models are typically trained on a shared serving log that includes data generated by the counterpart model. This shared-log training biases each model's training data through two channels: the counterpart model may have selected a different ad from the ad-candidate pool (ad-ranking disagreement) and may have bid a different price (bid-pricing disagreement), potentially distorting the A/B test outcome. Log-splitting eliminates the bias but sacrifices training data; log-sharing retains all data but leaves the bias unaddressed. We formalize the Bid-Aware Filter Family (BAFF), a class of (k,l)-parameterized hard filters that controls tolerance to each channel independently, providing a structured search space between these two extremes. We further propose a three-stage online measurement protocol that enables evaluating data-sharing strategies by their deviation from an interference-free reference model in production. In offline simulation, a (k,l) sweep surfaces operating points with smaller deviation from the interference-free reference model than both log-sharing and log-splitting. In a live RTB deployment on a demand-side platform (DSP), filter-based variants preserve the reference model's business metrics (e.g., CPC, CTR) more closely than both baselines. The best operating point is setting-dependent, underscoring the practical value of the search space itself.

For provenance research and art market studies, auction catalogs are an essential resource to trace specific objects over time and space. While historical auction catalogs follow established domain conventions, their internal formatting remains highly variable, and their large-scale analysis is currently restricted by the lack of machine-readable representations of the auction lots. We propose a pipeline to automatically extract structured lot-level metadata from German Sales, a large database of historical auction and sales catalogs from the 19th and 20th centuries. Using a manually annotated test set of representative catalog pages, we evaluate Vision-Language Models (VLMs) under varying prompt strategies and constrained decoding frameworks. To reflect the practical constraints faced by cultural heritage institutions, including budget, compute resources, and data privacy requirements, we benchmark the methods across different deployment modes ranging from commercial providers to locally hosted, quantized models. We find that commercial endpoints establish the performance ceiling, while institutional gateways offer a viable, privacy-preserving alternative. Local deployments remain feasible, but strictly require enforcing the output structure during generation to guarantee a valid JSON format. While varying degrees of human-in-the-loop correction are still necessary, this work demonstrates that a VLM-based pipeline can successfully unlock historical auction catalogs for large-scale automated analysis.

Routing each query to a cost-effective large language model (LLM) is critical for balancing quality and cost, yet most routers rely on a centralized task center to predict model performance, creating an information-risk mismatch and a scalability bottleneck as the model pool grows. We propose a market-based routing paradigm that shifts ex-ante prediction to LLM providers via a reverse auction, where providers bid with self-predicted success probabilities and execution costs. To account for inherently noisy provider predictions and center evaluations, we introduce the \textit{\textbf{E}rror-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{R}everse \textbf{A}uction \textbf{M}echanism} (EA-RAM), which explicitly models this inherent Dual Error. We prove that EA-RAM is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational under the Dual Error, establish sufficient conditions for center rationality, and derive an explicit welfare-loss bound. We further identify robustness effects: opposite-signed errors can cancel, vanishing-tail link functions (e.g., logistic) stabilize clear-cut cases via saturation, and extra noise smooths belief maps, reducing the gains from marginal manipulation. Experiments on simulations and real-world benchmarks show that EA-RAM is robust to the Dual Error and achieves a better cost--performance Pareto frontier than centralized baselines, with additional gains when providers contribute local information, validating its practical effectiveness.

Public procurement involves the allocation of substantial financial resources; therefore, continuous oversight through audits, controls, and monitoring mechanisms is essential. However, stakeholder comments and publicly available government data are often underutilized, despite their potential to reveal procedural irregularities. To address this gap, this paper analyzes metadata from Ecuador's Sistema Oficial de Contratación Pública (SOCE, Official Public Procurement System), with particular emphasis on participant comments generated during the pre-contractual phase. We propose a hybrid modeling framework that integrates unsupervised clustering and supervised classification within a natural language processing (NLP) pipeline to uncover latent patterns and detect potentially irregular procurement processes. Semantic embeddings are generated using Word2Vec, LLaMA, and RoBERTa, followed by Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) for unsupervised clustering. A supervised classification stage is then applied to identify accusatory or whistleblowing-style comments. Experimental results show that the combination of domain-trained Word2Vec embeddings, GMM-based clustering, and a Random Forest classifier achieves high precision and recall, even under severe class imbalance. These findings demonstrate that lightweight, domain-adapted NLP architectures can effectively support risk identification and enhance transparency in public procurement systems without requiring large-scale computational infrastructure.

A bidder can quietly buy a stake in a company before making an offer for it. That stake, a toehold, is supposed to pay for itself twice: it makes the bidder willing to bid harder, and it frightens rivals into staying out of the fight. The first effect is arithmetic. The second is what would justify the cost and exposure of taking one at all. Yet toeholds are rare in practice, a standing puzzle. We ask whether that second effect is there once the contest is modelled as several rounds of escalating offers rather than the single exchange classical models assume. We turn it into a game a computer can solve, and certify the answers to an accuracy a referee can check. Three findings. The auction fixes what the toehold-holder earns but not how it bids: the same contest supports a bidder who opens aggressively against a rival who folds, and one who opens cheaply against a rival who does not, with the same profit either way. Aggressive preemptive bidding still appears when the toehold is removed entirely, so it comes from bidding in public and in turns, not from owning the stake. And the tidy "bigger toehold, more deterrence" relationship holds only in a contest cut short after one round; give it a real second round and it stops responding. So the two reasons to buy a toehold do not fare alike. The profit reason holds up; the deterrence reason does not, which suggests why toeholds may be rarer than theory predicts, alongside the procedural costs of disclosure and price impact that this model omits. A warning follows for anyone computing economics from a game solver: solve this auction once and it returns a confident figure for what a preemptive bid is worth; solve it again from a different start and it returns a different one, equally converged. We also report which solvers cope with contests of this shape, including versions too large to enumerate. Code is released.

Autonomous agents increasingly rely on external data to complete downstream tasks such as model training and decision support. However, existing data discovery systems remain largely retrieval-oriented: they surface candidate datasets from heterogeneous sources, but provide limited support for estimating task-specific utility, selecting cost-effective datasets under budget constraints, or incorporating trustworthy feedback from prior usage. This paper presents Guixu, a valuation-driven data discovery system for autonomous agents. Guixu employs a three-phase valuation pipeline with proxy-label propagation and multi-round knapsack optimization for task-aware data valuation. Guixu integrates agentic payment protocol to enable budget-constrained data procurement workflows. Guixu leverages on-chain data market and attestation signals for verifiable data discovery. Our demonstration highlights how Guixu enables an agent to move beyond keyword-based dataset retrieval toward task- and budget-aware, trustworthy data discovery and procurement. Attendees can interactively explore the full workflow, from NL task specification and multi-source search to data valuation and verifiable transaction feedback.

A common assumption when designing an agent in a multi-agent system is that the other agents behave adversarially. This allows a designer to obtain the strongest guarantees when they have no control over nor knowledge about the other agents' behavior. However, when all agents are designed under this adversarial assumption, their actual interaction is not adversarial (e.g., when all players play defensively, no player actually attacks). In such settings, we would like to know what behavior arises in the multi-agent system. However, analyzing the interaction among agents is notoriously challenging, both mathematically and algorithmically. In this paper, we provide such an analysis, focusing on bidding games, played by two agents on a graph as follows. A token is placed on a vertex, and in each turn an auction (bidding) determines which agent moves the token, thus generating an infinite path that determines the agents' utilities. We consider mean-payoff objectives; each vertex is associated with a reward for each player, and the utility in an infinite play is the limit average of the rewards. We analyze the play that is generated when each agent follows a strategy that optimizes against an adversary, and consider the two known explicit constructions of optimal strategies. The technical challenge stems from the infinitely-many configurations of a bidding game and their complicated dynamics. We show that, under some restrictions, the generated play is ultimately periodic, and develop algorithms to compute the players' utilities in it.

Real-time bidding (RTB) ad exchanges typically forward nearly all incoming requests to demand-side platforms (DSPs), even though only a small fraction receive bids. This over-distribution weakens auction outcomes: DSPs throttle participation under compute and budget constraints, reducing the effective use of limited bidding capacity. We present a competition-aware request dispatch framework that uses distributional bid prediction and probabilistic forwarding to decide whether each request should be sent to each DSP. The system adapts per-DSP thresholds over time through lightweight policy optimization to track non-stationary market conditions. We evaluate the framework through four sequential online experiments on a production platform serving over 20 billion daily requests. A full multi-DSP deployment reduces DSP request volume under the policy by 34.2% while increasing net revenue by 4.6% (p<0.001) in a recent 14-day window after an initial DSP adaptation period. Further analysis highlights strong heterogeneity across traffic segments and reveals that aggregate metrics can be misleading. Segment-level and per-DSP analyses suggest that the policy surfaces comparative advantages among DSPs, improving monetized outcomes without increasing overall request volume.

AI agents are moving from advisory interfaces into systems that execute consequential operations: issuing refunds, reserving scarce inventory, provisioning cloud resources, and initiating financial transfers. These workflows require governance over effects, not only over model outputs. Existing safeguards often decide whether an action is allowed from the information available when the action is requested. For stateful policies, that request-time view may be incomplete: budgets, inventory, approval status, and risk signals can change before the effect occurs, making an earlier authorization or approval stale. This paper studies stateful governance for concurrent agentic systems. We identify stale authorization as the core failure mode and define policy-state serializability, a correctness condition requiring committed effects to be explainable as authorized against the policy state immediately before they occur. We present MasuGate, a runtime architecture that keeps policies as reviewable programs while coordinating the state and effects needed to preserve their decisions. In experiments with a PostgreSQL-backed prototype of MasuGate, the system prevents stale authorizations missed by baselines that pass policy state as ordinary request context, preserves delayed approvals while unrelated work proceeds, keeps policy evolution mostly in policy text rather than trusted provider code, and avoids policy violations in a scripted, LLM-free procurement workflow where agent-governance baselines produce stale authorizations over shared budgets and inventory. More broadly, MasuGate suggests a path for integrating stateful governance boundaries into agent frameworks and provider-backed domains where agents act on shared resources.

Learning to adapt strategies through interaction is a key step toward more general and autonomous LLM agents. Existing approaches typically achieve behavioral adaptation by revising skill libraries. However, in multi-agent environments, opponents may simultaneously update their strategies, causing the environment itself to evolve continuously. Applying skill-revision methods designed for static environments in such settings therefore amounts to updating against an obsolete reference. To address this challenge, we introduce OASE (Opponent-Aware Selective Evolution), which identifies and adopts genuinely beneficial skill revisions in dynamic multi-agent environments. Specifically, OASE conducts paired comparisons between a candidate skill and the incumbent under identical conditions anchored by historical snapshots of opponent strategies, and adopts the candidate only when its estimated payoff gain exceeds an acceptance threshold. We evaluate OASE in two decision-making scenarios: first-price auctions and private-cost Cournot competition. Experimental results show that, compared with a Reflexion-style baseline, OASE achieves a lower final equilibrium distance in both environments while accepting substantially fewer skill revisions, thereby suppressing strategy changes that lack sufficient payoff support. OASE therefore replaces blind updating with evidence-anchored selection, allowing agents to adapt stably and efficiently even as opponents continuously evolve.

LLM-native advertising embeds sponsored content directly into model-generated responses, shifting the unit of sale from a fixed slot to a moment within an evolving conversation. Existing LLM ad-auction mechanisms primarily operate within a single response, settling the winner but not the timing. The extension is nontrivial: with one native insertion opportunity per session, the stopping time depends on bids, coupling timing with allocation, so static truthfulness arguments no longer apply. We propose the LLM-based Optimal Stopping Dynamic Auction (LLM-OSDA), a dynamic cost-per-click auction that integrates Bellman optimal stopping, winner allocation, and envelope pricing. A bid-independent LLM layer estimates contextual click quality and seamlessly renders the winning ad, while bids enter only the committed auction mechanism. Under an exact Bellman oracle, the expected discounted-click allocation is monotone in each advertiser's bid, and the corresponding envelope payment makes truthful bidding weakly dominant in expectation. For practical deployment, a learned StopNet approximates the Bellman action values. We show that its decisions differ from the optimal policy only near the stopping boundary and bound the resulting incentive loss in terms of its approximation error. Experiments on a simulated conversational advertising corpus show that LLM-OSDA improves net revenue by 11 percent over the strongest fixed-timing baseline while maintaining comparable user retention. Code is at https://github.com/2025Fang2025/llm-osda.

Agentic commerce is moving from concept to deployed infrastructure: payment networks, retailers, and AI platforms are setting the stage for agents to transact on behalf of merchants and consumers. Yet whether the LLMs behind these agents can price competently in real markets, where customer preferences are hidden, competitors adapt in real time, and demand can shift without warning, has not been systematically tested. We introduce Bazaar, a dynamic sealed-bid benchmark for multi-attribute auction under these conditions. Despite its dynamics, the benchmark is grounded in closed-form customer utilities, enabling exact evaluation. Across 11 frontier LLMs from four providers, the leading agents on customer acquisition (e.g. Gemini 3.1 Pro) are often not the leading agents on profit (e.g. Opus 4.6). The ranking shifts again under demand shocks: agents that learned fastest pre-shock are typically the slowest to revise their beliefs afterwards, while Gemini 3.1 Pro recovers fastest despite not leading on profit. However, even the strongest agent captures less than a third of hindsight-optimal profit, suggesting current LLMs are progressing in agentic commerce but leave substantial headroom.

User foundation models have demonstrated strong results in e-commerce and social recommendation, but most industrial deployments assume environments where user identity is stable and persistent. Open-web real-time bidding (RTB) operates on a structurally different data distribution: user identity is fragmented and non-persistent across browsing sessions, and the availability of browsing history depends on user privacy choices. Consequently, a significant portion of traffic carries no historical data, and available records often consist of relatively short, disjointed sessions. As a result, historical signals in this domain are typically represented as aggregated counters and recency buckets, leaving the sequential structure unexploited. To address this limitation, we present a user foundation model that applies self-supervised learning on user browsing histories and show that the learned representation improves multiple downstream production tasks, demonstrating the viability of this approach on the open web. We pre-train a Transformer encoder with masked language modeling and a sequence-level contrastive objective, then fine-tune it on the click prediction task. We optimize the encoder's pre-training pipeline with an LLM-in-the-loop search over a curated catalog of reviewable, code-level edits (lifters), instantiating the LLM-as-optimizer paradigm in an industrial setting. The same encoder representation yields +1.197% RIG on the production bid win-rate model and +1.354% RIG on the production CTR ranker; a 7-day live A/B test confirms +2.13% CTR, -1.13% eCPC (80% CI excluding zero on both metrics).

As search increasingly shifts toward LLM-driven answer engines, advertising is becoming embedded within the generated response itself and should therefore be evaluated for both user utility and commercial value. The key challenge is click-through intent: behavioural logs are unavailable, human annotation resists calibration, and frontier LLM judges conflate intent with linguistic fluency. These gaps compound, as principled pricing presupposes a continuous intent signal, while generating such a signal presupposes supervision that is currently unavailable. We construct the missing supervision through a psychologically grounded agent simulation framework, and distil it into a parameter-efficient evaluator that predicts click-through intent, together with the three companion dimensions of ad quality, as smooth, differentiable estimates. Validated through sign-certain behavioural perturbations, the evaluator surpasses frontier zero-shot judges on relevance sensitivity (79% versus 60-67%), tracks graded content degradation, generalises without error to 103 fictional products, and agrees with human preference in 86% of pairwise judgements across five annotators, with agreement rising in the evaluator's confidence. Upon its estimates we build the pricing layer directly, deriving the unique payment rule under which truthful bidding is optimal, demonstrating it on a best-of-k allocation, and extending the mechanism to non-monotone allocations. The same differentiable signal stands ready as a training objective for ad generation.

Real-time bidding is central to computational advertising, comprising three elements: Supply Side Platform (SSP) selling ad impressions, Demand Side Platform (DSP) bidding for advertisers, and Ad Exchange conducting auctions between them. Traditional auto-bidding algorithms focus solely on the DSP side, maximizing advertiser conversions by adjusting bids against competitors. However, current big ad platforms, such as social media and e-commerce companies, now integrate SSP, DSP, and Ad Exchange functions internally. From such ad platforms' perspective, the goal of the auto-bidding algorithms is not only to maximize the advertisers' conversions, but also the total revenue of the platform. Given the lack of platform-centric evaluation frameworks and the pressing need to advance auto-bidding research, we propose PlatformBid - the first comprehensive benchmark designed from a unified ad platform's perspective. To accurately reflect the real-world auto-bidding scenarios, we define three representative settings: (1) homogeneous competition with identical algorithms across advertisers, (2) heterogeneous competition with diverse algorithmic strategies, and (3) promotional competition where some advertisers surge budgets for boosting sales during promotional events like Black Friday. We systematically evaluate a broad spectrum of existing auto-bidding methods across these settings, encompassing classical control methods, RL-based methods, and recent generative methods. Besides these methods, we further propose a novel auto-bidding method based on flow-matching, termed BidFlow, which leverages the flow-matching method's expressive policy representation to effectively handle dynamic competitive environments. Online experiments on Kuaishou further show a +0.68% improvement in target cost, providing deployment evidence for the offline-online consistency of PlatformBid.

As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts. We study this in a canonical supply chain bargaining problem: a buyer with private demand information negotiates a quantity-payment contract with an uninformed seller. We benchmark nine LLMs from OpenAI, Google, and Alibaba against a validated Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium across 9,840 LLM-to-LLM negotiations. First, capability governs value creation. Agents agree in 98.9% of negotiations and capture 95.4% of first-best surplus undiscounted, but average 2.98 rounds against the benchmark's 1.25, and this delay erodes 21-34% of surplus. Capability also governs reliability: baseline models accept individually irrational contracts in 19.2% of cases, versus 0.0-0.6% at mid-tier and flagship, making automated profit verification the binding guardrail below that threshold. Second, surplus capture is relational. Provider identity predicts who captures surplus better than capability rank: self-play buyer shares average 40% for OpenAI, 50% for Google, and 70% for Alibaba's Qwen, an ordering that survives restricted communication and no discounting. Reversing which provider sells moves the division by 7-18 percentage points, and the capable Qwen flagship is the weakest cross-family seller: vendor choice is a first-order distributional decision. Third, the prompt is a strategic lever. Delegation separates the principal's economic patience from the agent's prompted strategic patience, a free deployment choice that is the single strongest driver of surplus division (90% of explained variance). Together these establish an equilibrium-referenced audit of AI agents along three dimensions: discounted efficiency, distributional profile, and operational reliability.

Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered "no" by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable. Consider bidding agents that couple only through the joint distribution of their unexplained bid components, leaving every agent's own bid law exactly at the competitive law. Any test whose input is a single agent's price or bid history then has power exactly equal to its false-positive rate, for every coupling strength up to comonotonicity. The published detection methodology is therefore blind to this conduct by construction rather than underpowered, and no sample size repairs it. Three empirical results follow. First, the mechanism appears in real language-model agents: twenty models from nineteen independent developers, three deployment prompts each, show residual correlation of $+0.053$ between two deployments of one model against $+0.0001$ across models, with a 95% interval clustered by developer of $[0.030, 0.078]$, under an auditor that sees every order feature and is fitted out of sample. Second, the coupling falls monotonically as sampling temperature rises ($p=0.002$), turning a deployment parameter into a candidate mitigation. Third, on 24 days of Ethereum block-building auction data covering 77,684 bids from 39 bidders, the honest population of bidder pairs is itself so dependent that a screen held at a 5% false-positive rate must sit above a floor of $+0.50$ to $+0.81$, which is 20 to 32 times the family-wise sampling threshold and does not fall as the audit window grows. Since lawful multi-identity operation and conspiracy are behaviourally indistinguishable here, the tractable regulatory target is not detection but counting: resolving 40 bidding identities into 23 operators raises the Herfindahl index by 247.5%, and adding behavioural clusters from public bid streams reaches 324.5%.

Transaction propensity prediction in B2B e commerce presents unique challenges distinct from B2C contexts, primarily due to the heterogeneous procurement behaviors of organizational entities, which violate SMOTE's implicit assumption of within class feature homogeneity. Specifically, B2B buyers exhibit multi modal procurement cycles that render linear interpolation between minority class samples structurally invalid, producing synthetic data that does not represent real purchasing behavior. This paper introduces a production deployed propensity modeling framework designed to address these complexities through two primary contributions. First, we replace conventional SMOTE based augmentation with a synthetic data generation approach leveraging Diverse Counterfactual Explanations (DiCE). This method produces minority class samples with superior distributional fidelity compared to SMOTE, as validated through quantitative proximity analysis and UMAP cluster visualization. Second, we adapt the PyPARC piecewise affine classification framework to generate calibrated propensity probabilities, facilitating the interpretable segmentation of customers into actionable risk tiers. Evaluated on two years of longitudinal data from a large scale B2B e commerce platform with a 1 to 9 class imbalance ratio, the proposed architecture achieves 93.1% precision at a decision threshold of 0.8, a 9.2 percentage point improvement over SMOTE based baselines at the same threshold (83.9%), and a 26.1 point improvement over SMOTE at threshold 0.7 (66.04%), demonstrating consistent superiority across operating points. These results demonstrate the framework's efficacy in enabling high precision marketing campaigns with significant improvements in customer activation and return on investment.

Auto-bidding systems optimize bids to maximize value under efficiency constraints such as Cost-Per-Action (CPA). Existing methods treat each day as an independent episode. However, many advertisers produce value so sparsely that per-day efficiency ratios become statistically unreliable, undermining advertiser retention. Platforms therefore evaluate window-level efficiency over sliding windows of $W{=}7$ days, ensuring fair evaluation and long-term advertising effectiveness. This creates cross-episode coupling: each day's bidding decisions affect up to $W$ overlapping windows, so setting daily targets requires anticipating future market conditions. We propose SWAG-Bid (Sliding-Window Aware Generative Auto-Bidding), a hierarchical framework decomposing this challenge into episode-level planning and step-level execution. The planner uses a Masked Trajectory Model to forecast markets and generate candidate plans, scored across all overlapping windows by Multi-Window Model Predictive Control Sampling (MWMS) with exponential confidence decay. The controller adjusts reliance on this guidance through a state-adaptive gate, Per-Step Gated Adaptive Layer Normalization (PSG-AdaLN), complemented by Return-to-Go and Cost-to-Go channels carrying budget and constraint information. Experiments on AuctionNet-Sparse and online A/B tests on AliExpress show that SWAG-Bid achieves competitive constraint satisfaction and value acquisition under sliding-window evaluation.

Procuring supervised fine-tuning (SFT) data forces a buyer to decide, before any downstream training, whether a candidate corpus is worth acquiring. We present \sys{}, a statistics-first gating architecture that treats procurement as a cost-aware routing problem over three intrinsic quality axes -- diversity, utility, and redundancy. Cheap blind measurements are summarised into per-axis estimates with confidence intervals; a gate accepts a decision only when intervals are tight, sample sizes are adequate, and the axes agree, otherwise it escalates the case to an adjudicative debate between a buy-advocate and a reject-advocate judge, resolved by a presiding verdict. On a controlled benchmark of 12 datasets ($2{\times}3{\times}2$ grid over the three axes) with 5 seeds, the gate reaches 0.90 accuracy and 0.83 $F_1$ at $0.017 per unit, sitting between an always-verify baseline (0.75) and an oracle upper bound (0.98) while spending less than always-escalate ($0.020). We further report honest negative diagnostics of the debate path: a con-side win rate of 0.80 ($p\approx3{\times}10^{-6}$) and a 52% position-flip rate under advocate swapping expose negativity and positional biases that a naive LLM-judge would hide. We frame the injected-knob evaluation explicitly as a controlled synthetic benchmark for measurement fidelity and routing calibration, and delimit external validity as future work.

Auto-bidding plays an essential role in online advertising, automatically adjusting bids for advertisers to optimize their commercial goals. The emerging AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB) paradigm widely adopts generative modeling to optimize bidding strategies, yet suffers from the limited mode coverage of offline datasets and inadequate task-state understanding, hindering effective exploration of optimal strategies. Large Language Models (LLMs), with prior world knowledge and reasoning capabilities, offer a promising approach to overcome these limitations. However, directly applying LLMs to auto-bidding tasks faces inherent challenges in limited numerical precision, hallucinations, and inference latency. To address these limitations, we propose AIGB-R1, a hierarchical self-evolving auto-bidding framework aiming to enhance AI-Generated Bidding via LLMs' Reasoning capabilities, comprising a high-level Planner module for macro-level strategy planning and a low-level Executor module for fine-grained decision-making. Building upon this, we design an experience-driven self-evolving loop, enabling autonomous strategy exploration and optimization from accumulated experience. We adopt a two-stage pipeline of offline pre-training and post-training alignment, and build an interactive bidding simulation environment for strategy rollout. Furthermore, we propose Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (D-GRPO) to achieve end-to-end optimization via advantage decoupling. Experimental results on a large-scale public dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of AIGB-R1.

Advertisers delegate bidding to autobidders; users delegate tasks to language-model agents. A person describes what they want to an automated proxy that acts in a mechanism on their behalf. This is the revelation principle in production, and it forces a question classical theory assumes away: when is it optimal to describe yourself honestly to your own proxy? We show the answer turns on one quantity, the proxy's within-range regret. The most a principal can gain by misreporting equals the regret of the proxy's honest-report action against those the principal could have steered it to take. Honest self-description is optimal exactly when the proxy already plays the best action it can reach, that is, when it is loyal (Theorem 1). The identity unifies auction-specific autobidding results and pins down when the faithful-communication assumption behind language-model elicitation proxies (Huang et al.) holds. The identity constrains guardrails placed on proxies, from bid caps to a model's alignment layer. No guardrail can be at once binding (it displaces the truthful action from the proxy's best reachable outcome), truthful (honest reporting stays optimal), and capability-preserving (that outcome stays reachable through some report); any two preclude the third (Theorem 2). A safety constraint that alters what a model does while leaving its best output reachable makes honest description of intent suboptimal, so a sharper report can gain. This is the incentive behind prompt-engineering and jailbreaking. Because within-range regret is #P-hard to compute exactly, we estimate it from samples and maintain it as a model is updated, at a cost set by how far the model drifts, not how often it changes. Running it on production language models from five providers under an alignment-style cap, we find honest reporting leaves surplus unclaimed on every model, recovered by inflating the report.

Enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents requires effective orchestration of diverse expert models and tools. However, existing frameworks typically call APIs, based on coarse-grained matching between tasks and the functions of expert models or tools, while overlooking critical factors such as performance variability and cost efficiency among functionally similar alternatives. To address this, we propose Agora, a framework that uses a confidence-calibrated auction to dynamically allocate tasks to expert models and tools. By treating reasoning steps as tradeable items, Agora bases allocation on calibrated competence rather than raw confidence. Across five main benchmarks, Agora improves or remains competitive with single-model, routing, and cascade baselines under matched candidate pools.

Online truckload bid acceptance is a closed-loop stochastic decision problem in which a carrier or broker must, in real time, accept or reject a tendered load subject to operational feasibility, fleet repositioning costs, and opportunity cost against future demand. Public, reproducible benchmarks for this problem are scarce: existing routing benchmarks are static, while dynamic-fleet studies typically rely on private operator data. We introduce FreightBidBench, a public-calibrated, dependency-free, closed-loop benchmark in which feasibility (pickup reach, appointment windows, simplified hours-of-service, stochastic yard delays) and economics (service-failure penalty, terminal fleet value, daily price-premium window) are explicit, versioned, and reproducible from public Freight Analysis Framework and U.S. Department of Agriculture truck rate data. We develop two full-horizon hindsight ceilings: a simple LP style relaxation and a tighter Lagrangian-per-truck information relaxation that retains per-truck hours-of-service and sequencing structure and is 20.7% tighter than the LP relaxation on a tight-capacity scenario and 39.3% tighter on a scarce-capacity scenario. We introduce a parametric surrogate-rollout cascade with boundary-band and scarcity-pressure escalation triggers. On ten-seed tight and scarce scenarios, the best simple policy retains 91.0% and 86.5% of rollout profit and the standard-library surrogate 94.2% and 89.3%; a cascade at a single escalation band recovers roughly 98% on both at 40-56% of rollout's mean decision latency, and on the tight scenario is statistically indistinguishable from the rollout teacher (paired-bootstrap 95% CI on the profit delta spans zero).

We study repeated contextual procurement auctions in which producers have private costs and the platform must learn context-dependent product values from bandit feedback. The objective is welfare rather than revenue or a virtual-cost surrogate: regret is the total surplus loss relative to the full-information efficient procurement rule. We first show that the natural UCB allocation rule attains $\tilde O(\sqrt{ngT})$ welfare regret under truthful bids, but its adaptive bid-dependent learning path does not by itself give a truthfulness guarantee. To obtain exact incentives, we design a bid-independent explore-then-commit mechanism with empirical critical payments; it is dominant-strategy truthful and has $\tilde O((ng)^{1/3}T^{2/3})$ regret. We then introduce frozen-payment UCB, which estimates payments in an initial bid-independent exploration phase, freezes those payment estimates, and continues adaptive UCB allocation learning afterwards. Under a smoothed truthful-path margin condition, this mechanism gives a regret-incentive tradeoff: the near-UCB tuning attains $\tilde O(\sqrt{ngT})$ welfare regret, while the average per-round gain from any fixed deviation is at most $\tilde O(T^{-1/4})$ for fixed $n,g$. A matching lower bound shows that this frozen-payment frontier is unavoidable.

We present a multi-agent system for studying the allocation of discrete, congested resources among heterogeneous strategic agents, motivated by the problem of railway slot allocation under deregulation. Multiple operator-agents, differing in size and capacity, interact through a shared auction mechanism over repeated rounds under time-constrained decision-making. The mechanism combines a congestion-based base price that increases with aggregate demand with an asymmetric corrective adjustment that penalises the agent requesting the most slots and rewards the agent requesting the fewest, and is designed to mitigate strategic dominance by large agents while preserving transparency and congestion sensitivity. We formulate the interaction as a repeated game with incomplete information and implement the system as a real-time, web-based multi-agent environment in which human participants control individual agents and observe live marginal-cost and competitor feedback. We report exploratory observations from two structured sessions with domain experts acting as operator-agents. The congestion mechanism responds to aggregate demand as designed and the corrective incentives are actively triggered, but agents representing large operators persist with high-request strategies despite the penalty, suggesting that corrective pricing is necessary but not sufficient to neutralise strategic dominance in this multi-agent setting. A post-session debrief indicates that participants' decisions were driven by the assumed agent role rather than personal disposition, and provides qualitative support for strategic motives, such as preserving market presence and raising rivals' costs, operating alongside short-term profit maximisation. We discuss implications for multi-agent mechanism design under asymmetric budgets and outline directions for analytical validation and larger-scale multi-agent experiments.

When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth. Each bidder pays for due diligence: costly, imperfect homework that sharpens its own private estimate before it bids. How much of that homework is worth buying? We build a simple computer model of the bidding contest and let it teach itself to bid well by playing against itself, the way a game engine learns chess. The economic question, how much diligence pays for itself, and the computational question, when the contest becomes too complex to solve exactly, are both controlled by a single thing: how many pieces of private information a bidder carries. Our main finding is that the right amount of diligence is modest and finite. It falls as diligence gets more expensive, and it falls further when both sides are doing their homework, because competition erodes the value of knowing more. We also test a recent claim from AI research: that simple, general self-play methods can rival the specialized, expensive algorithms usually built for games like these. Running on an ordinary laptop with no costly frontier AI, we find the simple methods are the best of the self-learning approaches, though purpose-built exact methods still win whenever the game is small enough to solve outright. The simple methods earn their keep only once the game grows too large to solve exactly, which is the regime real deals live in, and there we show they still find strong bidding strategies. The contribution is threefold: a cheap, reproducible way to study deal-making under uncertainty; a concrete, model-based answer to how much due diligence is worth buying; and evidence about when lightweight, general-purpose AI is good enough to replace specialized methods. We release all the games, code, and experiments.

We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$. The problem is challenging even without budgets: the action space is exponential in $M$, the maximum demand of the bidder and the valuation vector (context) varies over time. Exploiting a decomposition of utility across units, we develop polynomial-time learning algorithms based on shortest paths in a directed acyclic graph, obtaining sublinear regret under both full-information and bandit feedback. In the bandit setting, the regret is independent of the number of contexts due to complete cross-learning: observing the utility of the chosen action under the realized context reveals the utility for the same action under all counterfactual contexts. With budget constraints, when the average normalized per-round budget $ρ=\frac{B}{MT}<1$, we design a coupled primal-dual algorithm in which the DAG-based procedure uses dual-adjusted edge weights for primal updates, while online gradient descent updates the dual variable, yielding $ρ$-approximate sublinear regret. Finally, we give implementations whose per-round time and space are independent of the number of contexts, enabling scalability to large or even infinite context spaces.

Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge. Existing methods often rely on rigid explore-then-exploit schedules, assume stationary adversaries, and optimize solely for bidder utility, thereby limiting adaptability and strategic robustness. To address these limitations, we introduce the A3M framework, which integrates adaptive deep reinforcement learning (DRL), explicit adversarial reasoning, and principled multi-objective reward design for online auction strategy optimization. A3M employs an actor-critic DRL backbone to dynamically balance exploration and exploitation, an opponent model for fictitious play against non-stationary adversaries, and a composite reward function to jointly maximize utility, auctioneer revenue, and fairness. We provide the first comprehensive empirical evaluation of this integrated approach against established baselines in both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Results show that A3M reduces final regret by 30--40% in standard settings, maintains robust performance against adversarial strategy shifts, scales favorably with the number of units $K$, and enables tunable multi-objective trade-offs. An extensive ablation study confirms the necessity of each core component. Our work establishes A3M as a powerful and flexible framework for learning in complex auction environments.

This paper presents a scalable framework for multi-robot task allocation in complex environments where estimating task execution costs is computationally expensive. While combinatorial auction-based approaches offer reliable solutions, the exponential complexity of bundle generation typically renders them intractable for real-time reactive applications, particularly when accurate path planning is required for cost validation. We address this through a distributed, two-stage multi-fidelity bundle generation approach. Agents utilize a local search tree guided by a low-fidelity heuristic (such as euclidean distance) to rapidly explore the bundle space, applying high-fidelity path planning only to the most promising candidates in a best-first manner. These refined bids are then submitted to a central coordinator that solves a set packing problem to ensure global feasibility and maximize the overall utility. Simulation results in multiple environments demonstrate that the framework is able to improve the performance of reactive auction-based task allocation. Overall, the presented framework is shown to enable reactive task allocation with dynamic bundle sizes in multiple settings without exposing the agents' state and internal cost estimation models.

Auto-bidding is a core component of real-time advertising systems, where decisions must optimize long-term performance under budget and cost constraints, while online exploration is prohibitively risky. Offline reinforcement learning and, more recently, Transformer-based sequence modeling have shown promise for learning bidding policies from logged data, but their unimodal and purely parametric formulations often collapse multiple effective bidding strategies into suboptimal averaged actions and perform unreliably under sparse or long-tail traffic. To mitigate these limitations, we propose DRIVE (Distributional and Retrieval-Augmented Bidding with Value Evaluation), a unified Transformer-based framework that decouples candidate action generation from decision making for offline auto-bidding. DRIVE combines distributional action modeling, retrieval-augmented candidate generation from high-quality historical decisions, and value-based evaluation to select the most promising bid at inference time. Extensive experiments on AuctionNet and additional offline reinforcement learning benchmarks demonstrate that DRIVE consistently improves bidding performance and generalizes well across multiple Transformer-based methods.

Characterizing revenue-optimal auctions for multi-item, multi-bidder settings remains a fundamental open problem, with no known closed-form solution existing beyond restrictive binary-type instances. This has motivated interest in computational approaches to optimal auction design. In this paper, we introduce the first computational framework that directly tackles the dual problem for multi-item, multi-bidder auctions and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), generating certified revenue upper bounds. Our approach parametrizes Lagrange multipliers with a structurally guaranteed strict flow-conservation property using neural networks, enabling efficient optimization over feasible dual solutions via gradient descent. To bridge the gap between discrete computational methods and theoretical guarantees for continuous types, we develop a novel lifting technique that maps dual certificates from coarse discretizations to fine refinements. We prove that lifting gives valid revenue upper bounds for multi-item, multi-bidder auctions with continuous uniform valuations. Furthermore, we give a generalized lifting construction for arbitrary continuous distributions and demonstrate that these lifted duals converge to the revenue of the original continuous problem in the discrete limit. We validate this computational framework for the dual auction design problem by recovering known analytical mechanisms for canonical instances. For multi-item multi-bidder problems, our framework establishes a small gap between the optimal revenue and best-known DSIC mechanisms, providing computational certificates of near-optimality.

In modern online advertising platforms, Guaranteed Delivery (GD) contracts coexist and bid with Real-Time Bidding (RTB) auctions. Recent approaches either decouple GD and RTB optimization or rely on heuristic priority rules, and thus fail to effectively balance short-term revenue maximization with long-term contract delivery under complex multi-slot delivery and impression constraints. To address these challenges, we propose HMAF (Hierarchical Multi-Slot Allocation Framework), a unified framework designed to optimize impression allocation in GD--RTB advertising platforms. HMAF employs the Plan--Calibrate--Execute paradigm as its core structure, and integrates offline constraint optimization with online decision-making, balancing offline GD resource planning, dynamically calibrating GD--RTB competitiveness, and making real-time listwise rank decisions across multi-slot environments. HMAF has been implemented in multiple marketing scenarios at Meituan, one of the world's largest online food delivery platforms, leading to a 3.72% increase in GD delivery rate and a 1.59% increase in total advertisement revenue.

Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.

Coding-agent benchmarks evaluate whether a single uninterrupted agent can resolve a repository issue. Real software work is messier: tasks are interrupted, reassigned, reviewed, and resumed from partial states left by another agent or engineer. We study this missing dimension through handoff debt: the rediscovery cost imposed when a predecessor's work is opaque or incomplete. Our takeover protocol interrupts a coding agent at deterministic handoff points, freezes the repository, and evaluates successor agents under four handoff views: repository state only, raw trace, summary notes, and structured notes. Across 75 source tasks, the protocol generates 181 handoff-point tasks and 724 takeover runs per successor model. Across three successor models, context-bearing handoffs reduce median agent events by 20-59% and cumulative prompt tokens by 42-63% relative to repository-only takeover. Solved-rate effects are smaller and model-dependent, but efficiency gains are consistent. These findings suggest that coding-agent evaluation should report not only whether a task is solved, but also how costly that work is for another agent to resume.

We develop a game-theoretic framework that compares welfare efficiency across three market mechanisms: continuous double auctions with transparent order books (lit exchanges), opaque order books (dark pools), and periodic batch auctions. Each mechanism is modeled as a queuing system where heterogeneous traders face trade-offs between the execution price, waiting costs, and transaction costs. Our main result establishes that under moderate arrival rates and bounded adverse selection, dark pools dominate both alternatives in aggregate ex-ante welfare. Observable order books create costly strategic timing games in which traders delay or rush submissions to optimize their position in the queue, generating wasteful social waiting costs. Opaque order books eliminate these timing games through information design. We formally characterize the equilibrium strategies in each mechanism and prove the welfare ranking $W^{DARK} > W^{LIT} > W^{BATCH}$. Extensions incorporate asymmetric information and endogenous venue choice. The results demonstrate how the information structure and the discipline of the service jointly determine efficiency in strategic matching environments.

Bidding in the European Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) market is challenging for flexibility providers because competing offers are hidden and bidders observe only partial feedback form the market, such as, clearing price and awarded quantity. For a participant active in a single country, we show that the multi-country FCR clearing problem can be recast as a repeated multi-unit uniform-price auction against an endogenous vector of opposing bids. This reformulation yields an online learning problem and allows us to adapt a Best-of-Both-Worlds combinatorial semi-bandit algorithm implementable from this standard market feedback. The resulting bidder achieves logarithmic pseudo-regret in stochastic environments and $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in adversarial ones. Synthetic experiments confirm the expected scaling, and backtests on historical European FCR data show competitive performance in practice: the method performs especially well on stable products, while EXP3-type baselines can be safer under stronger non-stationarity. Overall, the results show that learning-based bidding in FCR markets is theoretically grounded and practically useful when the learning rule matches product-level market stability.

Online advertising platforms rely on machine learning models to predict click-through rates (pCTR) and conversion rates (pCVR) for auction mechanisms. We introduce a novel framework to study the interaction between recommender system model quality, auction format, and autobidder behavior. We formalize when model improvements -- defined via a refinement relation inspired by filtrations in probability theory -- lead to improvements in platform-level Evaluation Criteria Metrics (ECM) such as revenue, welfare, or liquid welfare. Our main contributions are: (1) a formal definition of model improvement based on cluster refinement, and (2) a systematic characterization of ECM monotonicity across different combinations of bidder types (tCPA, max-CPA), auction formats (first-price, second-price, VCG), and budget constraints. We show that first-price auctions with uniform bidding guarantee revenue monotonicity for tCPA bidders without budgets (via Jensen's inequality), while second-price auctions and budget constraints can break this property. We provide full numerical constructions for the non-monotonicity results. Our findings have practical implications for advertising platforms seeking to align model improvements with business outcomes.

We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the time elapsed since their last successful bid, with auctions arriving in continuous time and only aggregated feedback revealed at the end of the horizon. Such a bidder must (1) balance the immediate benefit of winning the current auction against its impact on future values and (2) learn unknown environmental parameters. We derive regret bounds for a class of learning methods that combine plug-in estimators with a differential-equation characterization of the optimal policy, and show that a specific confidence bound algorithm learns the optimal policy with a near optimal regret of $\widetilde{O}(\log N)$ for piecewise linear primitives, and $\widetilde{O}(N^{1/3})$ for general, smooth primitives, achieving these regrets without explicit randomization. These theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

Shilling is the use of artificial bids to make competition appear stronger and push prices upward. We study repeated first-price auctions in which shilling affects feedback but not allocation: the learner wins or loses against the real competing bid, but after a loss observes the maximum of the real bid and an independent shill bid. Thus the manipulation changes what the learner observes and hence how it learns to bid, without changing the outcome of the current auction. We analyze regret with respect to the best bid benchmark, assuming that the shill-bid distribution is known. Even then, shilling can mask the real bid, while useful side information appears only through intermittent low-shill events. Our algorithm combines a robust interval-elimination branch, which ignores the shilled report and achieves the dynamic-pricing rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$, with an optimistic branch that debiases losing-side reports and exploits the resulting suffix information when it is reliable and achieves the first-price auctions rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$. A validation and racing procedure lets the algorithm use these optimistic updates without knowing the right scale or feedback geometry in advance. We complement the upper bounds with a matching lower bound, up to logarithmic factors, in the single-active-region case. Overall, the results show that even feedback-only shilling can sharply alter the statistical difficulty of repeated bidding.

Multi-Robot Task Allocation (MRTA) is a central challenge in decentralized multi-agent systems, where teams of robots must cooperatively assign and execute tasks under limited communication while optimizing global performance objectives. Auction-consensus algorithms, such as the Consensus-Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA), provide scalable decentralized coordination with provable convergence, but rely on hand-crafted greedy scoring functions that often lead to suboptimal task allocations. This paper proposes a learning-enhanced auction-consensus framework in which CBBA's deterministic bidding mechanism is replaced by a neural bidding policy trained using reinforcement learning. Under a centralized training and decentralized execution paradigm, agents learn to compute task bids from partial local observations while retaining the standard auction and consensus phases for decentralized coordination. The learned bidding policy is trained using Proximal Policy Optimization with rewards shaped by proximity to globally optimal solutions obtained via mixed-integer linear programming. Multiple neural architectures are evaluated, including a Neural Additive Model, the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model, and the Set Transformer Model. Experimental results across varying swarm sizes demonstrate that learned bidding policies can improve solution quality over classical CBBA while preserving decentralized execution. The proposed approach highlights the effectiveness of integrating reinforcement learning with classical distributed coordination algorithms, offering a scalable pathway toward higher-quality decentralized multi-robot task allocation.

Logged advertising auctions make offline reserve-price evaluation attractive but risky. Replay tables can identify policies with large apparent yield gains, yet they can also hide weak threshold support, multiple-comparison effects, subgroup harm, and bidder-response uncertainty. Existing replay and off-policy evaluation methods estimate or rank policy values, but they do not directly answer the operational question of whether the available evidence is strong enough to justify validation. This paper develops a support-aware offline decision framework for reserve-policy selection. Rather than outputting a single point-estimate winner, the framework converts logged evidence into a conservative decision object consisting of certified policies, statistically dominated alternatives, and unresolved candidates requiring further validation. The main theoretical result gives a unified finite-catalog guarantee showing that, under simultaneous uncertainty control and conservative support gates, the framework preserves the best gate-passing policy while eliminating only policies with certified regret. Supporting results characterize support-localized replay generalization, establish information-theoretic threshold-resolution limits, and quantify when heterogeneous bidder response can overturn localized replay rankings. Experiments on iPinYou real-time-bidding logs show that the leading reserve rule achieves a 47.66% replay lift in season two, a 40.71% simultaneous lower-bound lift, and a 43.87% frozen out-of-time replay lift in season three. The framework reduces a 19-policy catalog to a two-policy validation shortlist while certifying non-harm across 44 advertiser, exchange, and region segments. The results support the central claim that offline reserve-policy evaluation should produce certified validation decisions rather than point-estimate rankings alone.

Automated bidding is central to modern digital advertising. Early rule-based methods lacked adaptability, while subsequent Reinforcement Learning approaches modeled bidding as a Markov Decision Process but struggled with long-term dependencies. Recent generative models show promise, yet they lack explicit mechanisms to balance exploration and safety, relying solely on action perturbations or trajectory guidance without a safety fallback. This results in inefficient exploration and elevated financial risk for advertising platforms. To address this gap, we propose GUIDE (Generative Auto-Bidding with Unified Modeling and Exploration), a framework that synergistically integrates directed exploration with a safe fallback mechanism. GUIDE employs a Decision Transformer (DT) to jointly model historical bidding actions and environmental state transitions. A Q-value module guides the DT's exploration via regularization constraints, while an Inverse Dynamics Module (IDM) leverages DT-predicted future states to infer robust, behaviorally consistent actions as a safe policy fallback. The Q-value module then adaptively selects the final action between these two options, balancing exploration and safety. Together, these components form an integrated "explore-safeguard-select" pipeline that unifies efficiency and safety. We conduct extensive experiments on public datasets, in simulated auction environments, and through large-scale online deployment on Taobao, a leading Chinese advertising platform. Results show GUIDE consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines across all scenarios. In real-world deployment, GUIDE achieves notable gains: +4.10% ad GMV, +1.40% ad clicks, +1.66% ad cost, and +3.52% ad ROI, demonstrating its effectiveness and strong industrial applicability.

The integration of advertising auction mechanisms into large language model (LLM)-based chatbots presents a significant opportunity for commercialization, yet poses unique challenges in balancing relevance, efficiency, and user experience. Recently, Feizi et al.\citep{feizi2023online} and Hajiaghayi et al.\citep{hajiaghayi2024ad} outlined a retrieve-then-generate paradigm that decouples retrieval and generation, offering lightweight ad insertion and payment determination. However, current retrieval relies solely on text embedding similarity, which may lead to commercial misinterpretation and issues such as repetitive insertions. In this paper, we propose LERA, a two-stage retrieve-then-generate auction framework tailored for LLM chatbots. In the first stage, embedding-based coarse filtering pre-selects a small set of candidate advertisers. In the second stage, the LLM itself is queried with a carefully designed prompt to produce logits over candidates, which serve as refined organic relevance scores. These scores are combined with bids, and a critical-value payment rule accounts for both the coarse-filtering and fine-ranking thresholds, ensuring truthfulness for utility-maximizing advertisers. The framework naturally extends to multiple ad insertions within dynamic dialogue flows and long responses. Experiments on a synthetic advertiser-query benchmark show that LERA substantially improves ad selection accuracy and insertion diversity while incurring only controllable latency overhead.

We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines auctions, hidden-offer trade challenges (TCs), bargaining, bluffing, opponent modeling, and resource allocation within a single long-horizon game lasting 50--60 turns. Unlike prior agent benchmarks that test these abilities in isolation, \textsc{Cattle Trade} evaluates whether agents integrate them across a competitive, multi-agent economic game with conflicting incentives. The benchmark logs every bid, TC offer, counteroffer, and card selection, enabling behavioural analysis beyond final scores or win rates. We evaluate seven cost-efficient language models and three deterministic code agents across 242 games. Strategic coherence, in particular spending efficiency, resource discipline, and phase-adaptive bidding, is associated with rank more strongly than spending volume or any single subskill. Two heuristic code agents outperform most tested LLMs, and behavioural traces surface recurring LLM failure modes including overbidding, self-bidding, bankrupt TC initiation, and weak opponent-state adaptation. Evaluating agentic competence requires benchmarks that test the joint deployment of multiple capabilities in multi-agent environments with conflicting incentives, uncertainty, and economic dynamics.

Marketplace platforms routinely evaluate pricing and allocation policies using logged observational data, yet strong offline performance does not imply that a policy is safe to deploy. In real-time bidding (RTB) marketplaces, reserve-price and floor-policy changes affect not only revenue but also fill, advertiser value, budget pacing, and competition across auctions, creating feedback and interference. The central problem is therefore not to estimate whether a policy improves an offline metric, but to determine whether the available evidence justifies direct launch or only further validation. In this regard, we propose a support-aware decision-support system (DSS) that distinguishes promising from actionable evidence. The framework integrates replay, support-aware off-policy evaluation (OPE), conservative lower-bound ranking, multi-sided guardrails, out-of-time validation, sensitivity analysis, and interference-aware validation design into a claim-preserving pipeline that outputs a launch-readiness classification rather than a single performance estimate. Applying the framework to iPinYou-style RTB logs, we identify a margin-gated floor policy as the leading candidate, with a 47.7% replay yield lift, a 45.8% conservative lower-tail lift, and stable out-of-time performance. However, the framework does not recommend direct launch. A decision-rule ablation shows that simplified pipelines select the same policy but incorrectly recommend deployment, leaving key causal assumptions unresolved. In contrast, the proposed DSS selects the same policy but changes the action to online validation, reflecting missing evidence on propensities, bidder response, and interference. Overall, the contribution is a reproducible DSS protocol that prevents decision overclaim under partial identification and converts offline evaluation into an auditable, action-oriented recommendation.

The growing share of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in modern power systems increases both grid imbalances and frequency deviations, reinforcing the need for ancillary services such as Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) and passive balancing. Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) are well-suited for these services, but prior research typically relies on uniform FCR bids that remain constant throughout the control period. Such static bids fail to fully exploit BESS flexibility, as they do not balance the trade-off between reserving energy for FCR delivery and using it for imbalance arbitrage, limiting the achievable value in value-stacking settings. To address this limitation, we propose a two-stage control framework for the European context that introduces non-uniform FCR bids. In the first stage, we derive a time-varying bid sequence using data-driven Monte Carlo (MC) optimization. In the second stage, a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agent leverages the residual flexibility for real-time imbalance trading while proactively managing the State of Energy (SoE) to ensure compliance with FCR requirements. The framework is presented as a proof of concept, highlighting the potential benefits of time-varying bidding strategies. By incorporating daily cycle budgets and time-varying reserve commitments, our approach achieves a 7.56% profit increase compared to uniform baselines. These results show that non-uniform bidding can unlock additional value by more effectively aligning reserve obligations with rapidly changing imbalance opportunities.

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these environments exhibit a sharp dichotomy: adversarial environments allow for no-regret learning against the best fixed-price mechanism, whereas stochastic environments allow for no-regret learning against the best distribution over prices that is budget balanced in expectation. This gap is significant, as policies balanced in expectation can increase the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. In this work, we bridge these extremes by studying perturbed markets, where an underlying stochastic distribution is subject to an adversarial corruption $C$. We design an algorithm that adaptively scales with the level of corruption, achieving an $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4}) + \mathcal{O}(C\log(T))$ regret bound against the best budget-balanced distribution over prices. Simultaneously, our algorithm maintains the worst-case $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ regret bound relative to a per-round budget-balanced baseline, ensuring optimality even in fully adversarial environments.

In industrial procurement, an LLM answer is useful only if it survives a standards check: recommended material must match operating condition, every parameter must respect a regulated threshold, and no procedure may contradict a safety clause. Partial correctness can mask safety-critical contradictions that aggregate LLM benchmarks rarely capture. We introduce IndustryBench, a 2,049-item benchmark for industrial procurement QA in Chinese, grounded in Chinese national standards (GB/T) and structured industrial product records, organized by seven capability dimensions, ten industry categories, and panel-derived difficulty tiers, with item-aligned English, Russian, and Vietnamese renderings. Our construction pipeline rejects 70.3% of LLM-generated candidates at a search-based external-verification stage, calibrating how unreliable industrial QA remains after LLM-only filtering. Our evaluation decouples raw correctness, scored by a Qwen3-Max judge validated at $κ_w = 0.798$ against a domain expert, from a separate safety-violation (SV) check against source texts. Across 17 models in Chinese and an 8-model intersection over four languages, we find: (i) the best system reaches only 2.083 on the 0--3 rubric, leaving substantial headroom; (ii) Standards & Terminology is the most persistent capability weakness and survives item-aligned translation; (iii) extended reasoning lowers safety-adjusted scores for 12 of 13 models, primarily by introducing unsupported safety-critical details into longer final answers; and (iv) safety-violation rates reshuffle the leaderboard -- GPT-5.4 climbs from rank 6 to rank 3 after SV adjustment, while Kimi-k2.5-1T-A32B drops seven positions. Industrial LLM evaluation therefore requires source-grounded, safety-aware diagnosis rather than aggregate accuracy. We release IndustryBench with all prompts, scoring scripts, and dataset documentation.

The transition to First-Price Auctions (FPA) in digital advertising has spurred significant research, yet existing work typically assumes access to a valuation oracle, ignoring the reality that values must be inferred from censored data. While Linear Treatment Effect (LTE) models address this by learning value uplift, they have not been adapted to realistic settings with hard Budget constraints or Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets requiring regret and violation control. In this work, we propose a unified primal-dual framework for constrained FPAs that jointly learns the latent LTE valuation parameters and the competitor's bid distribution. This simultaneous learning introduces a critical technical challenge: the estimation error is dynamically scaled by the Lagrangian multiplier, potentially leading to unbounded regret. We resolve this by leveraging a strong Slater condition and a novel adaptive burn-in procedure to stabilize the dual variables. Our approach achieves near-optimal regret guarantees, providing the first theoretically grounded solution for constrained bidding with latent valuations.

Public procurement is vulnerable to error, fraud, and corruption, particularly as high transaction volumes overwhelm oversight. While research often focuses on tender-stage anomalies, post-award payment monitoring remains underexplored. Since labelled datasets are rare and methods like Benford's Law face restrictive assumptions, there is a need for interpretable, unsupervised frameworks for high-volume procurement oversight and decision support. This paper introduces the Structural Heterogeneity Index (SHI), a composite statistic for one-dimensional samples, and its payment-specific instantiation, the Payment Heterogeneity Index (PHI), characterising payment structure and latent regimes. It incorporates Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) parameters alongside non-parametric statistics, integrating four interpretable components: modality, asymmetry, tail behaviour, and structural dispersion. Uniquely, the tail-behaviour component captures both distributional heaviness and extreme-value concentration, while structural-dispersion combines the variability, prevalence, and separation of latent payment regimes. Applied to UK municipal procurement data, PHI identifies a financially significant cohort (0.6% of suppliers; 10.1% of high-volume vendors) with structurally distinct payment patterns. Statistical testing further supports these differences, and targeted human verification confirms the plausibility of prioritised cases. Comparative analysis shows PHI reveals regime separation obscured by the Coefficient of Variation ($ρ= 0.310$). PHI provides a transparent, decomposable, and computationally lightweight framework for procurement integrity oversight and targeted audit prioritisation.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma: balancing advertiser payoffs, platform revenue, and user experience. Existing methods, such as prompt injection or rigid position slots, disrupt semantic coherence and lack a parametric framework for independent control, rendering rigorous mechanism design intractable. To bridge this gap, we introduce Neuron Auctions, a novel paradigm that shifts the auction object from the surface text space to the LLM's internal representations. Leveraging mechanistic interpretability, we identify brand-specific feed-forward network (FFN) neurons and demonstrate that competing brands activate within approximately orthogonal subspaces. This near-perfect independence allows us to define continuous, disentangled intervention budgets (specifically, neuron counts and amplification factors) as auctionable commodities. Building on this computational carrier, we design a continuous menu-based auction mechanism that naturally guarantees strategy-proofness and optimizes revenue for the platform. By explicitly incorporating a user utility penalty into the platform's optimization objective, our framework dynamically prices out overly aggressive interventions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Neuron Auctions effectively preserve natural discourse quality while achieving an optimal alignment between commercial incentives and user satisfaction.

Auto-bidding is a crucial task in real-time advertising markets, where policies must optimize long-horizon value under delivery constraints (e.g., budget and CPA). Existing methods for auto-bidding rely on compact numerical state representations: while they can implicitly capture delivery dynamics, they offer limited support for explicitly representing and controlling high-level intent, evolving feedback, and operator-style strategic guidance in real campaigns. Meanwhile, Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a powerful method for encoding semantic information, it remains unclear when LLMs help and how to integrate them without sacrificing numerical precision. Through systematic preliminary studies, we find that (1) LLM embeddings contain bidding-relevant cues yet cannot replace numerical features, and (2) gains emerge only with careful semantic--numeric integration rather than naive concatenation. Motivated by these findings, we propose \textit{SemBid}, a novel auto-bidding framework that injects LLM-encoded semantics into offline bidding trajectories at the token level. SemBid introduces three semantic inputs: \textit{Task}, \textit{History}, and \textit{Strategy}. It injects these semantics as tokens alongside numerical trajectory tokens and uses self-attention to integrate them, improving controllability and generalization across objectives. Across diverse scenarios and budget regimes, SemBid outperforms competitive baselines from offline RL and generative sequence modeling, with more consistent gains in overall performance, constraint satisfaction, and robustness. Our code is available at: \href{https://github.com/AlanYu04/SemBid-KDD2026}{\textcolor{blue}{here}}.

The increasing penetration of renewable energy has introduced substantial volatility into wholesale electricity markets, complicating the optimal bidding strategies for power producers. Traditional Reinforcement Learning (RL) approaches often struggle to balance profit maximization with risk management, frequently overfitting to specific market conditions or failing to account for the stochastic spread between Day-Ahead (DA) and Real-Time (RT) settlements. To address these challenges, this paper makes two primary contributions. First, we introduce and open-source a high-fidelity gymnasium environment for two-settlement electricity market bidding. Grounded in extensive empirical data from the PJM Interconnection, the environment explicitly models the interplay between DA commitments and RT deviations, providing a standardized testbed for general and risk-sensitive agents. Second, we propose MARS-DA (Multi-Agent Regime-Switching for Day-Ahead markets), a novel hierarchical framework that orchestrates distinct sub-policies for risk management and profit seeking. MARS-DA utilizes a top-level Meta-Controller to dynamically blend the actions of two specialized base agents: a "Safe Agent" that optimizes for reliable DA allocation and a "Speculator Agent" that targets volatile RT arbitrage opportunities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MARS-DA achieves superior risk-adjusted returns compared to state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining robust regime alignment during periods of extreme market volatility.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Norway's electricity market is heavily dominated by hydropower, but the 2021-2022 energy crisis and stronger integration with Continental Europe have fundamentally altered price formation, reducing the reliability of forecasting models calibrated on historical data. Despite the critical need for updated models, a unified benchmark evaluating feature contributions across all structurally diverse Norwegian bidding zones remains lacking. Here we present a comprehensive evaluation of one-step-ahead forecasting of the Nord Pool market across all five Norwegian bidding zones. We constructed a multimodal hourly dataset spanning 2019-2025 and evaluated eight forecasting model families, including Light Gradient Boosting Machine (LightGBM), autoregressive models with exogenous variables, and advanced deep learning architectures, using a strictly causal test set. We implemented robust rolling-origin backtesting, leave-one-group-out feature ablation, and conditional regime analysis to dissect model performance and feature utility. Our results show that LightGBM achieves the best performance in every zone, with mean absolute error ranging from 1.60 to 5.58 euros per megawatt-hour, while a ridge-regularized autoregressive model with exogenous variables remains a highly competitive linear benchmark in northern zones. Feature ablation reveals that models relying solely on lagged prices and calendar variables achieve high accuracy and often match or closely approach the performance of the full multimodal model. However, conditional regime analysis demonstrates that external features like reservoir levels and gas prices remain crucial to stratify forecast errors, which consistently increase under stressed market regimes. This highlights the practical value of model interpretability and regime awareness for decision makers facing structural changes in market dynamics.

Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) as bidding agents in repeated 6G spectrum auctions with budget constraints in vehicular networks. Each user equipment (UE) acts as a rational player optimizing its long-term utility through repeated interactions. Using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as a benchmark for incentive-compatible, dominant-strategy truthfulness, we compare LLM-guided bidding against truthful and heuristic strategies. Unlike heuristics, LLMs leverage historical outcomes and prompt-based reasoning to adapt their bidding behavior dynamically. Results show that when the theoretical assumptions guaranteeing truthfulness hold, LLM bidders recover near-equilibrium outcomes consistent with VCG predictions. However, when these assumptions break -- such as under static budget constraints -- LLMs sustain longer participation and achieve higher utilities, revealing their ability to approximate adaptive equilibria beyond static mechanism design. This work provides the first systematic evaluation of LLM bidders in repeated spectrum auctions, offering new insights into how AI-driven agents can interact strategically and reshape market dynamics in future 6G networks.

We study how AI agents form expectations and trade in experimental asset markets. Using a simulated open-call auction populated by autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, we document three main findings. First, AI agents exhibit classic behavioral patterns: a pronounced disposition effect and recency-weighted extrapolative beliefs. Second, these individual-level patterns aggregate into equilibrium dynamics that replicate classic experimental findings (Smith et al., 1988), including the predictive power of excess demand for future prices and the positive relationship between disagreement and trading volume. Third, by analyzing the agents' reasoning text through a twenty-mechanism scoring framework, we show that targeted prompt interventions causally amplify or suppress specific behavioral mechanisms, significantly altering the magnitude of market bubbles.