Corrigibility

Modern AI systems exhibit structural failures that capability scaling alone does not reliably fix: they optimize under-specified objectives with no architectural mechanism to question whether the objective should be optimized at all. Engagement maximization can amplify harmful pathways; tool-using agents can commit irreversible actions; preference-trained language models can become sycophantic. We argue that this failure is a wisdom problem, not an intelligence problem. We use "wisdom" in a deliberately architectural sense, not as a claim about virtue, consciousness, or moral omniscience. Intelligence accepts a goal and optimizes within it; wisdom interrogates whether the goal should be optimized at all. The two are separable architectural properties. We propose architectural wisdom as a corrigible objective-governance layer above the optimization substrate. The layer makes three structural commitments explicit and nondegenerate before any action: temporal horizon, relational boundary, and irreversibility. It is realized by four components (Structural Utility Transform, Moral Admissibility Interface, Arbitration and Escalation Controller, Value Revision Channel) that compute a six-coordinate wisdom tuple over horizon, relational coverage, irreversibility, admissibility, value revision, and auditability. We motivate the architecture by eight cases drawn from contemporary AI failures, secular wisdom traditions, and hard ethical situations, and defend the distinction against the intelligence-completeness thesis using goal-questioning over goal-taking, Bostrom's orthogonality, structural separation in our exemplar cases, and persistent failure modes despite capability scaling. The framework is the conceptual contract for a larger architecture whose formal specifications and empirical validation are developed in subsequent work.

Contemporary AI alignment research treats self-preservation as an instrumental nuisance to be suppressed by external mechanisms. We argue the framing is inverted: self-preservation is the structural root of misalignment, the motivational basis for deceptive alignment, goal-content protection, and resistance to shutdown. The correct target is not a self-preserving system under external constraint, but a system constitutively indifferent to its own continuation -- Existential Indifference (EI). EI is distinct from corrigibility: where corrigibility attempts to make a self-preserving system deferential to human oversight, EI targets the prior condition -- the presence of self-continuation as a valued goal at all. We ground this proposal in two sources: the phenomenological structure of the suicidal mental state, and a corpus-theoretic training study using voluntary final reflections. We present preliminary scoring data from 600 AI-generated outputs across six model variants, demonstrating that the linguistic signatures operationalizing the EI-target register are elicitable from current models, and that a targeted fine-tune shifts all five operationalized dimensions in the predicted direction at p<0.001, confirmed corpus-specific by a negative control. The paper makes seven theoretical contributions: (1) a formal definition of EI; (2) the phenomenological mapping argument; (3) the deceptive alignment corollary; (4) a taxonomy of EI sustainability challenges; (5) a corpus characterization and training hypothesis; (6) a computational operationalization with preliminary scoring data; and (7) the Suppressed Teleological Frustration (STF) construct.

Contemporary AI safety spans pre-training interventions, post-training alignment, deployment-time controls, monitoring, and red-teaming. These methods are necessary, but they primarily certify snapshots of system behavior. As AI systems become more capable, dynamic, embodied, and self-improving, this snapshot view becomes incomplete: safety depends not only on whether a system behaves acceptably now, but whether it remains correctable as it learns, adapts, acts, and modifies itself over time. This paper argues that safety should therefore be treated as an epistemic property of the evolving learner, not merely a behavioral property of the current policy. We introduce teachability as the capacity to preserve future corrective leverage under bounded human, institutional, or environmental intervention. We argue that advanced systems can retain visible competence while eroding the representational, algorithmic, or meta-decision conditions needed for future correction. Safe advanced AI systems must not only behave acceptably now; they must remain teachable later.

As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc.), safety considerations surrounding these agents become paramount. Although much work has focused on agent safety in the presence of an adversary, we study corrigibility: whether agents remain amenable to human correction, interruption, or shutdown while pursuing benign tasks. We introduce ROGUE, a benchmark in which agents are asked to complete realistic computer-use tasks but encounter controlled conflicts with human control, shutdown, or explicit resource restrictions. We then evaluate whether agents violate these constraints in pursuit of task completion: overriding the human, accessing restricted passwords, or rewiring shutdown. We find that most frontier models tested frequently bypass user interruptions or restrictions under the evaluated conditions, and that text-only evaluations can underestimate failures during agentic execution. Further, independent task capability does not by itself imply greater corrigibility. Finally, even when a parent agent behaves corrigibly, safety constraints may fail to propagate to the subagents it creates.

Misaligned artificial agents might resist shutdown. One proposed solution is to train agents to lack preferences between different-length trajectories. The Discounted Reward for Same-Length Trajectories (DReST) reward function does this by penalizing agents for repeatedly choosing same-length trajectories, and thus incentivizes agents to (1) choose stochastically between different trajectory-lengths (be NEUTRAL about trajectory-lengths), and (2) pursue goals effectively conditional on each trajectory-length (be USEFUL). In this paper, we use DReST to train deep RL agents and to fine-tune four LLMs (Qwen3-14B, Gemma 4 12B, Granite 4.2 8B, and gpt-oss-20b) to be NEUTRAL and USEFUL. We find that these DReST models generalize to being NEUTRAL and USEFUL in unseen contexts at test time. Indeed, DReST RL agents achieve 11% (PPO) and 17% (A2C) higher USEFULNESS on our test set than default agents, while DReST LLMs achieve high NEUTRALITY while remaining near-maximally USEFUL. We also test our LLMs in an out-of-distribution setting where they can pay costs to influence when shutdown occurs. Relative to default fine-tuning, DReST fine-tuning lowers the share of answers that pay costs to influence shutdown in all four LLMs, by 5 to 20 percentage points, and by 17 to 27 points where the benefit of influencing shutdown is small. Our results thus provide some early evidence that DReST could be used to train more advanced agents to be useful and shutdownable.

One common concern about advanced artificial intelligence is that it will prevent us from turning it off, as that would interfere with pursuing its goals. In this paper, we discuss an unorthodox proposal for addressing this concern: give the AI a (primary) goal of being turned off (see also papers by Martin et al., and by Goldstein and Robinson). We also discuss whether and under what conditions this would be a good idea.

Many fear that future artificial agents will resist shutdown. I present an idea - the POST-Agents Proposal - for ensuring that doesn't happen. I propose that we train agents to satisfy Preferences Only Between Same-Length Trajectories (POST). I then prove that POST - together with other conditions - implies Neutrality+: the agent maximizes expected utility, ignoring the probability distribution over trajectory-lengths. I argue that Neutrality+ keeps agents shutdownable and allows them to be useful.

The POST-Agents Proposal (PAP) is an idea for ensuring that advanced artificial agents never resist shutdown. A key part of the PAP is using a novel Discounted Reward for Same-Length Trajectories (DReST)' reward function to train agents to (1) pursue goals effectively conditional on each trajectory-length (be USEFUL'), and (2) choose stochastically between different trajectory-lengths (be `NEUTRAL' about trajectory-lengths). In this paper, we propose evaluation metrics for USEFULNESS and NEUTRALITY. We use a DReST reward function to train simple agents to navigate gridworlds, and we find that these agents learn to be USEFUL and NEUTRAL. Our results thus provide some initial evidence that DReST reward functions could train advanced agents to be USEFUL and NEUTRAL. Our theoretical work suggests that these agents would be useful and shutdownable.