Dual-Process Reasoning

Reasoning over infinitely long documents is becoming a reality with recurrent memory agents. However, increasing context length exacerbates the trade-off between reasoning performance and inference efficiency. Inspired by Kahneman's account of fast and slow thinking, we propose MemDuet, a dual-process memory framework that learns to coordinate a small language model for fast, parallel evidence selection from raw context chunks (System 1) with a large language model for memory-update verification and memory updates in document order (System 2). We train MemDuet in three stages: supervised fine-tuning of System 1 for evidence selection, Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) of System 2 for verification and memory rewriting, and joint optimization of both policies to coordinate selection and updating for long-context reasoning. Experiments on diverse long-context reasoning benchmarks (RULER-HQA, LongBench v2, and 2WikiMultiHopQA) demonstrate a favorable accuracy-efficiency trade-off as context length grows. Averaged across evaluation settings on the three datasets, MemDuet achieves an end-to-end inference speedup of 9.74x and an output-token reduction of 73.91% relative to RL-MemAgent.

Autonomous research agents must acquire and reason over evidence within a limited budget. Yet relevant sources can remain uninspected or unused, leaving a gap between retrieval coverage and the evidence that informs research. The challenge is to align fast local judgments with changing evidence needs and feed their findings back into research decisions. We introduce JevGPT, a dual-system architecture for autonomous research that couples fast evidence processing with deliberative research planning. System Two sets evidence objectives and integrates findings, while System One locates support, assesses relevance, and guides further inspection. Independent source judgments run in parallel; selected original passages inform the next research step. Experiments on fixed-corpus question answering and document ranking show that JevGPT achieves leading task performance, with faster completion and lower cost than comparably effective research agents. Evidence analysis shows broader source inspection and greater coverage of supporting documents in the research loop, highlighting efficient evidence processing as a route to more capable autonomous research.

LLM-based GUI agents increasingly act on behalf of users in digital environments that were designed with human users in mind. These graphical user interfaces were designed to support, but also deliberately steer, the behaviour and decisions of users. While behavioural biases in the textual outputs of LLMs are well-documented, far less is known about how such influence operates when models act as agents that perceive interfaces and execute decisions---and, in particular, whether the reasoning capabilities increasingly built into these agents make them more robust to it. Drawing on Dual-Process Theory, we empirically investigate whether LLM-based GUI agents are susceptible to automatic (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) digital nudges, and how their reasoning configuration moderates this susceptibility. In a randomized online shopping experiment with 3,600 agents and a total of 21,600 simulations across six frontier models from three providers, we found that agents were vulnerable to both nudge types. Crucially, the reasoning configuration moderated these effects in opposing directions, reducing susceptibility to automatic default nudges while heightening it to reflective social influence nudges. Extensive reasoning therefore did not make agents more robust but redirected the route through which choice architecture takes effect. Exploratory analysis further showed this redirection to be systematically structured by model scale. Beyond establishing nudge susceptibility as a behavioural property of agentic AI, the study positions interface design as a governance concern for organizations that delegate decisions to autonomous agents.

Recently, there has been increased interest in Small Language Models (SLMs), which are fast, show good performance, and have lower hardware demands than large language models (LLMs). However, SLMs hallucinate more frequently than LLMs, impacting their ability to solve complex multi-step reasoning problems as early mistakes cascade to the final response. To address this, existing works think-first followed by iterative retrieval to reduce hallucination. We argue that the think-first strategy is not always necessary as we find that: (i) SLMs are often accurately confident in their initial answer and, (ii) hallucinations can actually be beneficial for honing in on the true answer. As such, we position our work as an inversion of this strategy, i.e., answer first-reason later. We propose a cognitively-inspired framework where the model is first allowed to quickly answer the question (System-I (zero-shot)) and then resorts to deeper thinking (System-II) based on evidence retrieved from a knowledge source using the initial hypothesis. By combining System-I and System-II style thinking, we show that our method can outperform prior work that takes the traditional think-first route on various multi-step question-answering benchmarks.

Making high-stakes personal decisions involves cognitive, emotional, and intuitive processes, and individuals differ in how they allocate attention across these modes. Integration of these processes has shown to benefit decision making. Yet, most current decision-support systems focus primarily on supporting cognitive aspects, rather than adapting to the individual's thinking profile to support integration of different types of thoughts. In this study, we investigate an agent designed to encourage integration by adapting to the individual user's thought patterns. We explore its effects on participants' perceptions of the agent and their reflective behavior, in comparison with unaided pre-reflection and a baseline agent. In a between-subjects study (N = 128), our agent, which fostered broad and elaborated thinking, enabled more personalized reflective trajectories, elicited more integrative reflective language, and was perceived as providing stronger support for holistic reflection. In contrast, the baseline agent produced homogenized profiles dominated by cognitive language across participants.

Supervised talking head forgery detection faces severe generalization challenges due to the continuous evolution of generators. By reducing reliance on generator-specific forgery patterns, self-supervised detectors offer stronger cross-generator robustness. However, existing research has mainly focused on building stronger detectors, while the discriminative capacity of trained detectors remains insufficiently exploited. In particular, for score-based self-supervised detectors, the limited discriminative ability on hard cases is often reflected in unreliable anomaly ordering, leaving room for further refinement. Motivated by this observation, we draw inspiration from the dual-system theory of human cognition and propose a Training-Free Dual-System (TFDS) framework to further exploit the latent discriminative capacity of existing score-based self-supervised detectors. TFDS treats anomaly-like scores as the basis of System-1, using lightweight threshold-based routing to partition samples into confident and uncertain subsets. System-2 then revisits only the uncertain subset, performing fine-grained evidence-guided reasoning to refine the relative ordering of ambiguous samples within the original score distribution. Extensive experiments demonstrate consistent improvements across datasets and perturbation settings, with the gains arising mainly from corrected ordering within the uncertain subset. These findings show that existing self-supervised talking head forgery detectors still contain underexploited discriminative cues that can be effectively unlocked through training-free dual-system reasoning.

Implicit biases in both humans and large language models (LLMs) pose significant societal risks. Dual process theories propose that biases arise primarily from associative System 1 thinking, while deliberative System 2 thinking mitigates bias, but the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to this phenomenon remain poorly understood. To better understand what underlies this duality in humans, and possibly in LLMs, we model System 1 and System 2 thinking as semantic memory networks with distinct structures, built from comparable datasets generated by both humans and LLMs. We then investigate how these distinct semantic memory structures relate to implicit gender bias using network-based evaluation metrics. We find that semantic memory structures are irreducible only in humans, suggesting that LLMs lack certain types of human-like conceptual knowledge. Moreover, semantic memory structure relates consistently to implicit bias only in humans, with lower levels of bias in System~2 structures. These findings suggest that certain types of conceptual knowledge contribute to bias regulation in humans, but not in LLMs, highlighting fundamental differences between human and machine cognition.

We propose a society-first theory of normative appropriateness where individuals, modeled as pre-trained actors with cognitive architectures analogous to Large Language Models (LLMs), generate behavior via predictive pattern completion. Our theory posits that individuals act by completing distributed symbolic patterns based on context, answering questions such as "What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?". This sense-making mechanism provides a parsimonious account of the key features of human norms: their context-dependence, arbitrariness, automaticity, dynamism, and their support from social sanctioning. It challenges rational-choice theories of social norms by accounting for their key features without needing to exogenously posit scalar rewards or preference relations. By distinguishing between explicit norms, which we associate with in-context adaptation, and implicit norms, which we associate with long-term memory, the theory reconceptualizes several foundational ideas in cognitive science. In particular, it gives an alternative account to the data traditionally seen as supporting dual-process models, and it flips the role of rationality, allowing us to construe it as adherence to culturally-contingent justification standards.

Reasoning is a hallmark of human intelligence, enabling adaptive decision-making in complex unfamiliar scenarios. In contrast, machine intelligence remains bound to training data, unable to dynamically refine solutions at inference. While recent advances have explored machine reasoning - trading inference-time compute for improved performance - they focus on verbal domains such as mathematical problem-solving where explicit rules govern step-by-step solution generation. Many tasks lack sufficient labelled data and require alternative performance improvement mechanisms, such as inference-time compute. Here we present a paradigm for machine reasoning in vision, enabling performance improvements with increasing thinking time (inference-time compute), even with limited labelled data. Our approach is inspired by dual-process theories of human cognition, integrating a fast-thinking System I module for generating and verifying solutions in familiar tasks, with a slow-thinking System II module that iteratively refines predictions using self-play reinforcement learning, even when task-specific data is limited. This paradigm involves proposing, competing over, and refining solutions until convergence. We demonstrate that extended inference-time compute yields superior performance compared to large-scale supervised learning, foundation models, and human experts in vision tasks. These include computer-vision benchmarks and cancer localisation across five organs, highlighting the potential of inference-time compute for data-scarce problems.