Expected Free Energy

A planner using a learned world model can improve its predicted outcome while choosing a worse action. We study when expected free energy (EFE) can help decide how much computation to spend on a plan. An EFE-inspired objective combines goal distance with disagreement among stochastic predictions. We test candidate scoring, stopping, and online predictor updates separately. Stopping when elite cost stalls reduces refinement on tasks whose success plateaus with depth, with mean success close to fixed-depth references. At the larger tested weights, rewarding disagreement lowers success with a frozen model. Penalizing it helps at some task and weight settings but harms others. When training data omit a region needed to reach the goal, online updates recover part of the resulting loss. The tested cost-stall rule can fail when further optimization exploits model errors, because predicted cost keeps falling after task success peaks. Cost progress can guide computation on a plateau, but protecting performance after a peak requires information about the consequences of the chosen actions.

Intrinsic motivation plays a central role in adaptive and goal-directed behavior by conferring agents reward-independent objectives and biases useful to act in noisy and uncertain environments. Active Inference addresses the problem of acting in a partially observable environment through a principled framework for belief updating and action selection. A key component of Active Inference is the specification of prior preferences, which shapes behavior by encoding desirable future outcomes. An intrinsic motivation approach called the Maximum Occupancy Principle (MOP) proposes that agents act so as to maximize occupancy over future paths of states and actions, with no preferences or epistemic targets. Despite its simple formulation, MOP gives rise to rich and adaptive behaviors that combine exploratory variability with goal-directed dynamics. In this work, we extend MOP to partially observable environments and introduce a Bellman reformulation of the Expected Free Energy for Active Inference, both incorporating belief-based inference over hidden states as part of the agent state. The Bellman formulation enables tractable offline computation via value iteration over the full belief-state space. We compare the resulting behaviors in a set of minimal experimental settings with uncertain food sources. We find that MOP agents switch between goal-directed (food seeking) behavior and exploration between different food sources, depending on their energy available and their belief state. In contrast, Active Inference agents mostly inhabit regions around a single food source, a strategy having both high pragmatic and epistemic value. We finally compare with Empowerment, which is shown to be qualitatively similar to Active Inference.

Active inference selects actions by minimising an expected free energy functional over predicted futures. However, adding an expectation over yet-unobserved outcomes means the free energy functional no longer has a Kullback-Leibler structure, which hinders message passing treatments of inference procedures. We propose an alternative formulation based on a Bethe free energy functional, fully supporting inference by message passing. The epistemic drive is maintained by imposing an information constraint, next to normalisation, marginalisation and form constraints, insisting that the mutual information between future observations, states and parameters given actions must be at least as large as the entropy of the goal prior. For a specific value of the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, the stationary point of this constrained Bethe Lagrangian recovers the expected free energy solution. We show that, as the information demand is varied, the solved multiplier moves through its inactive, interior, and saturated regimes. In the inactive regime the agent's epistemic drive switches off entirely, while in the saturated regime it is maximal. We compare the performance of the constrained Bethe agent on three tasks against EFE and Q-MDP.

An autonomous robot efficiently exploring an unknown environment, such as looking for water sources on Mars, faces two simultaneous demands: building an accurate information map while quickly finding the regions of greatest value, and paying for every meter of travel and the cost of every measurement it takes. Classical information-seeking and reward-seeking criteria address only one of these objectives at a time. Here, we propose Expected Free Energy (EFE), the principled action-selection objective from active inference, as a unifying criterion for budgeted robotic informative path planning. Maintaining a Gaussian-process belief over the information field, our agent plans continuous trajectories that minimize expected free energy under hard path-length constraints. The results from multiple realizations show that EFE-based planning yields accurate posterior maps and locates the highest-value regions simultaneously, outperforming information-theoretic baselines under the same settings. In robotic exploration, these unified, easy-to-tune principled information-gathering strategies facilitate autonomous deployment while enforcing efficiency and resource constraints.

An agent acting under partial observability must decide when to gather information and which observations are worth their cost. Standard POMDPs value information only through its eventual effect on reward. The $ρ$-POMDP framework instead rewards uncertainty reduction directly, through a belief-dependent utility $ρ$, but in practice both the choice of $ρ$ and the weight placed on it are tuned by hand for every task. We show that active inference removes this tuning entirely. Minimizing Expected Free Energy (EFE) is exactly equivalent to solving a $ρ$-POMDP whose utility is expected information gain, and the exploration weight is fixed at $w=1$ because the variational bound expresses pragmatic and epistemic value in the same units (nats). We prove this equivalence for observe-then-commit POMDPs and extend it to factored observation POMDPs, a broader class that covers interleaved observe-act problems such as non-destructive testing and mobile sensing, where gathering information leaves the hidden state unchanged. Experiments support the theory. Across environments ranging from the classic Tiger problem to RockSample and a new Structural Inspection benchmark with over 65,000 states, the untuned weight matches or outperforms reward-only planning at the same horizon, avoids the over-exploration of bonuses tuned per task, and sits near the reward-maximizing knee of the success-reward Pareto frontier. The practical payoff is an exploration objective that works out of the box. In applications such as fault detection and medical screening, where every test has a price and every missed fault has a cost, EFE supplies a belief-dependent utility that is derived rather than tuned.

Across environments with mixed sources of uncertainty, unsupervised reinforcement learning requires intrinsic motivation that does not precommit to a particular direction of surprise. Surprise minimization is scoped by design to ``unstable'' environments. Prediction-error curiosity rewards total expected surprise, including irreducible noise. Bandit or mixture switching between surprise-minimizing and surprise-maximizing rewards reintroduces non-stationarity by construction. We propose a single intrinsic reward, stationary within each window, derived from the novelty contribution of a preference-free Expected Free Energy objective, expressed in reward-maximization form. Our claim is that parameter information gain, the expected surprise of the next state minus its irreducible part, is the appropriate intrinsic signal in both high-entropy and low-entropy components of the state space. Maximizing it seeks exactly the surprise the model can explain away. In regions of unresolved dynamics, this epistemic term drives exploration. As dynamics become resolved, the epistemic term vanishes, while an aleatoric penalty favors lower-variance transitions, all without fitting an explicit next-state predictor. A pseudocount supplies epistemic value, a probe-based penalty captures aleatoric variance, and a short-horizon gate protects informative successors. A window-based freeze of all reward-defining objects yields a stationary Bellman operator, explicit bounds on learning targets, and a conditional uniform-concentration result for the nonparametric estimators under mixing, smoothness, bandwidth, and capacity assumptions. In active-inference terms, the agent is preference-free where novelty is retained, standard likelihood ambiguity vanishes under full observability, a nonstandard transition-entropy penalty is added, and surprise minimization emerges in resolved regions of the state space.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) improves large language models' performance in math and symbolic reasoning. But on planning, contested ethics, and tasks where the model cannot check itself, more reasoning makes things worse. Both effects are documented; what has been missing is a principled account of which property decides the outcome. We argue it is meta-uncertainty: how unsure the model is about the reliability of its own evidence. When that uncertainty is high, extra reasoning stops adding signal and starts manufacturing false confidence. We prove that the policy minimizing expected free energy under uncertain precision stops integrating cues after a finite number of high-validity ones when the precision prior is heavy-tailed (Theorem 2.6.1), and under a Descending Dominance condition, is sample-wise identical to take-the-best (Theorem 2.7.4). Fast-and-frugal heuristics and active inference are, then, two descriptions of the same computation. The prediction is that on high-meta-uncertainty items, longer CoT should degrade accuracy. We score the regime per item (simulate-and-recover rho > 0.96), build FEH-79, a benchmark of Knightian frames with matched controls, and run a pre-registered study across seven models (five open-weight 3B-32B, two frontier), five CoT lengths, and 7,875 responses. The gate, fixed before any data, required a negative interaction with posterior probability above 0.95 and an accuracy drop of more than 6 points. It held. The high-regime drop is 17.3 points (95% CI [7.7, 25.5]); matched items with definite answers show no cost. The effect is regime-dependent: decisive in capable mid-to-large models, directional in the two frontier systems, absent-to-reversed in the weakest. The framework answers when CoT helps and unifies the Bayesian and fast-and-frugal traditions: less-is-more effects are evidence about the meta-uncertainty regime, not against Bayesian cognition.

Planning under uncertainty requires agents to balance goal achievement with information gathering. Active inference addresses this through the Expected Free Energy (EFE), a cost function that unifies instrumental and epistemic objectives. However, existing EFE-based methods typically employ specialized optimization procedures that are difficult to extend or analyze. In this paper, we show that EFE-based planning can be formulated as Variational Free Energy minimization on a generative model augmented with epistemic priors. Our main result demonstrates that minimizing a Variational Free Energy functional with appropriately chosen priors yields a decomposition into expected plan costs (the EFE) plus a complexity term. This formulation reinforces theoretical consistency with the Free Energy Principle by casting planning as the same inferential process that governs perception and learning. We validate our approach on three environments of increasing complexity: a deterministic T-maze, a stochastic Reactivity Maze, and a partially observable MiniGrid DoorKey-8x8 environment. The experiments demonstrate that the epistemic priors induce information-seeking behavior, that the variational formulation yields policy-based inference outperforming plan-based methods under stochastic transitions, and that temporal factorization enables scalability to environments where existing tabular active inference methods cannot operate.

Active inference casts decision-making as inference, with the Expected Free Energy (EFE) unifying goal-directed and information-seeking behavior. Recent work showed that EFE minimization can be written as Variational Free Energy (VFE) minimization on a generative model augmented with epistemic priors. We prove that the VFE of the augmented model can be rewritten as the VFE of the predictive model plus explicit entropy-correction terms, making the EFE contribution transparent. We then show that proper EFE-based planning requires combining these epistemic corrections with a planning correction that turns marginal inference into policy optimization, yielding a full variational characterization of EFE-based planning. This clarifies which corrections are needed for cross-entropy planning and for full EFE-based planning. The same entropy-corrected formulation leads to a detailed message-passing scheme for EFE-based planning together with simpler ablations. Experiments on three grid-world environments show that full EFE-based planning outperforms ablations that omit either the planning correction or the epistemic corrections.

We propose an Expected Free Energy-based acquisition function for Bayesian optimization to solve the joint learning and optimization problem, i.e., optimize and learn the underlying function simultaneously. We show that, under specific assumptions, Expected Free Energy reduces to Upper Confidence Bound, Lower Confidence Bound, and Expected Information Gain. We prove that Expected Free Energy has unbiased convergence guarantees for concave functions. Using the results from these derivations, we introduce a curvature-aware update law for Expected Free Energy and show its proof of concept using a system identification problem on a Van der Pol oscillator. On a two-dimensional benchmark with an oscillatory landscape, our adaptive Expected Free Energy acquisition achieves competitive performance in both regret and mean squared error, unlike the typical acquisition functions that perform well in only one metric.