LLM Auditing
LLM: Large Language Model
Overview
Large language model auditing examines how models are trained and how they behave in use, looking for problems such as bias, privacy leakage, hallucinations, unsafe actions, and unreliable reasoning. Common approaches include controlled benchmarks and counterfactual tests, multi-turn red-teaming, membership-inference and provenance analysis, human review, and probes of model activations or weights. Audits increasingly examine whole systems—including prompts, tools, interfaces, and model updates—rather than judging only a model’s final answer. A central challenge is that results can shift with prompts, access methods, versions, and evaluators, while behavioral scores or internal signals alone may not establish why a failure occurred or whether it will recur in deployment.
Latest papers
644 papers82 papers in the last four weeks, level with the four weeks before. 0.5% of all new papers.
ABLE: Representing and Mapping LLMs via Attribution-Based Large-model Embedding
AIRA: AI-Induced Risk Audit: A Structured Inspection Framework for AI-Generated Code
PsychBench: Auditing Epidemiological Fidelity in Large Language Model Mental Health Simulations
The Granularity Gap: A Multi-Dimensional Longitudinal Audit of Sycophancy in Gemini Models
Auditing Support Strategies in LLMs through Grounded Multi-Turn Social Simulation
One Mask to Rule Them All: On Hidden Facts after Editing and How to Find Them
DART: Mitigating Harm Drift in Difference-Aware LLMs via Distill-Audit-Repair Training
Introspection Adapters: Training LLMs to Report Their Learned Behaviors
Auditing Sabotage Bench: A Benchmark for Detecting and Fixing Research Sabotage in ML Codebases
LLMSniffer: Detecting LLM-Generated Code via GraphCodeBERT and Supervised Contrastive Learning
The Verification Tax: Fundamental Limits of AI Auditing in the Rare-Error Regime
Do LLMs Follow Their Own Rules? A Reflexive Audit of Self-Stated Safety Policies
Spectral Geometry of LoRA Adapters Encodes Training Objective and Predicts Harmful Compliance
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct, we manufacture 38 LoRA adapters across four categories: healthy SFT baselines, DPO on inverted harmlessness preferences, DPO on inverted helpfulness preferences, and activation-steering-derived adapters, and extract per-layer spectral features (norms, stable rank, singular-value entropy, effective rank, and singular-vector cosine alignment to a healthy centroid). Within a single training method (DPO), a logistic regression classifier achieves AUC