Pragmatic Reasoning in Language Models

We investigate how language models handle the proviso problem, an unresolved issue in pragmatics where presuppositions in conditional sentences diverge between theoretical and human interpretations. We reformulate this phenomenon as a Natural Language Inference task and introduce a diagnostic dataset designed to probe presupposition projection in conditionals. We evaluate RoBERTa, DeBERTa, LLaMA, and Gemma using explainability analyses. The results show that models broadly align with human judgments but rely on shallow pattern matching rather than semantic or pragmatic reasoning. Our work provides the first computational evaluation framework for the proviso problem and highlights the need for diagnostic, multi-method approaches to assess pragmatic competence and context-dependent meaning in language models.

Navigating complex social situations is an integral part of corporate life, ranging from giving critical feedback without hurting morale to rejecting requests without alienating teammates. Although large language models (LLMs) are permeating the workplace, it is unclear how well they can navigate these norms. To investigate this question, we created HR Simulator, a game where users roleplay as an HR officer and write emails to tackle challenging workplace scenarios, evaluated with GPT-4o as a judge based on scenario-specific rubrics. We analyze over 600 human and LLM emails and find systematic differences in style: LLM emails are more formal and empathetic. Furthermore, humans underperform LLMs (e.g., 23.5% vs. 48-54% scenario pass rate), but human emails rewritten by LLMs can outperform both, which indicates a hybrid advantage. On the evaluation side, judges can exhibit differences in their email preferences: an analysis of 10 judge models reveals evidence for emergent tact, where weaker models prefer direct, blunt communication but stronger models prefer more subtle messages. Judges also agree with each other more as they scale, which hints at a convergence toward shared communicative norms that may differ from humans'. Overall, our results suggest LLMs could substantially reshape communication in the workplace if they are widely adopted in professional correspondence.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) for everyday moral and interpersonal guidance, yet these systems cannot interrogate missing context and judge dilemmas as presented. We introduce a perturbation framework for testing the stability and manipulability of LLM moral judgments while holding the underlying moral conflict constant. Using 2,939 dilemmas from r/AmItheAsshole (January-March 2025), we generate three families of content perturbations: surface edits (lexical/structural noise), point-of-view shifts (voice and stance neutralization), and persuasion cues (self-positioning, social proof, pattern admissions, victim framing). We also vary the evaluation protocol (output ordering, instruction placement, and unstructured prompting). We evaluated all variants with four models (GPT-4.1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3, Qwen2.5-72B) (N=129,156 judgments). Surface perturbations produce low flip rates (7.5%), largely within the self-consistency noise floor (4-13%), whereas point-of-view shifts induce substantially higher instability (24.3%). A large subset of dilemmas (37.9%) is robust to surface noise yet flips under perspective changes, indicating that models condition on narrative voice as a pragmatic cue. Instability concentrates in morally ambiguous cases; scenarios where no party is assigned blame are most susceptible. Persuasion perturbations yield systematic directional shifts. Protocol choices dominate all other factors: agreement between structured protocols is only 67.6% (kappa=0.55), and only 35.7% of model-scenario units match across all three protocols. These results show that LLM moral judgments are co-produced by narrative form and task scaffolding, raising reproducibility and equity concerns when outcomes depend on presentation skill rather than moral substance.

Natural language database interfaces broaden data access, yet they remain brittle under input ambiguity. Standard approaches often collapse uncertainty into a single query, offering little support for mismatches between user intent and system interpretation. We reframe this challenge through pragmatic inference: while users economize expressions, systems operate on priors over the action space that may not align with the users'. In this view, pragmatic repair -- incremental clarification through minimal interaction -- is a natural strategy for resolving underspecification. We present PleaSQLarify, which operationalizes pragmatic repair by structuring interaction around interpretable decision variables that enable efficient clarification. A visual interface complements this by surfacing the action space for exploration, requesting user disambiguation, and making belief updates traceable across turns. In a study with twelve participants, PleaSQLarify helped users recognize alternative interpretations and efficiently resolve ambiguity. Our findings highlight pragmatic repair as a design principle that fosters effective user control in natural language interfaces.

Sentences like "She will go to France or Spain, or perhaps to Germany or France." appear formally redundant, yet become acceptable in contexts such as "Mary will go to a philosophy program in France or Spain, or a mathematics program in Germany or France." While this phenomenon has typically been analyzed using symbolic formal representations, we aim to provide an account grounded in artificial neural mechanisms. We first present new behavioral evidence from humans and large language models demonstrating the robustness of this apparent non-redundancy across contexts. We then show that, in language models, redundancy avoidance arises from two interacting mechanisms: models learn to bind contextually relevant information to repeated lexical items, and Transformer induction heads selectively attend to these context-licensed representations. We argue that this neural explanation sheds light on the mechanisms underlying context-sensitive semantic interpretation, and that it complements existing symbolic analyses.

The lack of reasoning capabilities in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has remained at the forefront of research discourse. We posit that this behavior stems from a reporting bias in their training data. That is, how people communicate about visual content by default omits tacit information needed to supervise some types of reasoning; e.g., "at the game today!" is a more likely caption than "a photo of 37 people standing behind a field". We investigate the data underlying the popular VLMs OpenCLIP, LLaVA-1.5 and Molmo through the lens of theories from pragmatics, and find that reporting bias results in insufficient representation of four reasoning skills (spatial, temporal, negation, and counting), despite the corpora being of web-scale, and/or synthetically generated. With a set of curated benchmarks, we demonstrate that: (i) VLMs perform poorly on the aforementioned types of reasoning suppressed in the training data by reporting bias; (ii) contrary to popular belief, scaling data size, model size, and to multiple languages does not result in emergence of these skills by default; but, promisingly, (iii) incorporating annotations specifically collected to obtain tacit information is effective. Our findings highlight the need for more intentional training data curation methods, rather than counting on scale for emergence of reasoning capabilities.

While emerging Persian NLP benchmarks have expanded into pragmatics and politeness, they rarely distinguish between memorized cultural facts and the ability to reason about implicit social norms. We introduce DivanBench, a diagnostic benchmark focused on superstitions and customs, arbitrary, context-dependent rules that resist simple logical deduction. Through 315 questions across three task types (factual retrieval, paired scenario verification, and situational reasoning), we evaluate seven Persian LLMs and reveal three critical failures: most models exhibit severe acquiescence bias, correctly identifying appropriate behaviors but failing to reject clear violations; continuous Persian pretraining amplifies this bias rather than improving reasoning, often degrading the model's ability to discern contradictions; and all models show a 21% performance gap between retrieving factual knowledge and applying it in scenarios. These findings demonstrate that cultural competence requires more than scaling monolingual data, as current models learn to mimic cultural patterns without internalizing the underlying schemas.

While recent Arabic NLP benchmarks focus on scale, they often rely on synthetic or translated data which may benefit from deeper linguistic verification. We introduce ALPS (Arabic Linguistic & Pragmatic Suite), a native, expert-curated diagnostic challenge set probing Deep Semantics and Pragmatics, capabilities that complement specialized large-scale benchmarks. While broad-coverage benchmarks prioritize scale and multi-task coverage, ALPS targets the depth of linguistic understanding through 531 rigorously crafted questions across 15 tasks and 47 subtasks. We developed the dataset with deep expertise in Arabic linguistics, guaranteeing cultural authenticity and eliminating translation artifacts. Evaluating 23 diverse models (commercial, open-source, and Arabic-native) against a single-pass human performance (avg. 84.6% accuracy) and an expert-adjudicated oracle (99.2%), we reveal a critical dissociation: models achieve high fluency but fail on fundamental morpho-syntactic dependencies, with elevated error rates on morpho-syntactic dependencies (36.5% across diacritics-reliant tasks) compared to compositional semantics. While top commercial models (Gemini-3-flash at 94.2%) surpass the average single human, a substantial gap persists between commercial giants and Arabic-native models, with the best Arabic-specific model (Jais-2-70B at 83.6%) approaching but not matching human performance.

A growing body of work attempts to evaluate the theory of mind (ToM) abilities of humans and large language models (LLMs) using static, non-interactive question-and-answer benchmarks. However, theoretical work in the field suggests that first-personal interaction is a crucial part of ToM and that such predictive, spectatorial tasks may fail to evaluate it. We address this gap with a novel ToM task that requires an agent to persuade a target to choose one of three policy proposals by strategically revealing information. Success depends on a persuader's sensitivity to a given target's knowledge states (what the target knows about the policies) and motivational states (how much the target values different outcomes). We varied whether these states were Revealed to persuaders or Hidden, in which case persuaders had to inquire about or infer them. In Experiment 1, participants persuaded a bot programmed to make only rational inferences. LLMs excelled in the Revealed condition but performed below chance in the Hidden condition, suggesting difficulty with the multi-step planning required to elicit and use mental state information. Humans performed moderately well in both conditions, indicating an ability to engage such planning. In Experiment 2, where a human target role-played the bot, and in Experiment 3, where we measured whether human targets' real beliefs changed, LLMs outperformed human persuaders across all conditions. These results suggest that effective persuasion can occur without explicit ToM reasoning (e.g., through rhetorical strategies) and that LLMs excel at this form of persuasion. Overall, our results caution against attributing human-like ToM to LLMs while highlighting LLMs' potential to influence people's beliefs and behavior.

Research on mental state reasoning in language models (LMs) has the potential to inform theories of human social cognition--such as the theory that mental state reasoning emerges in part from language exposure--and our understanding of LMs themselves. Yet much published work on LMs relies on a relatively small sample of closed-source LMs, limiting our ability to rigorously test psychological theories and evaluate LM capacities. Here, we replicate and extend published work on the false belief task by assessing LM mental state reasoning behavior across 41 open-weight models (from distinct model families). We find sensitivity to implied knowledge states in 34% of the LMs tested; however, consistent with prior work, none fully explain away'' the effect in humans. Larger LMs show increased sensitivity and also exhibit higher psychometric predictive power. Finally, we use LM behavior to generate and test a novel hypothesis about human cognition: both humans and LMs show a bias towards attributing false beliefs when knowledge states are cued using a non-factive verb (John thinks...'') than when cued indirectly (``John looks in the...''). Unlike the primary effect of knowledge states, where human sensitivity exceeds that of LMs, the magnitude of the human knowledge cue effect falls squarely within the distribution of LM effect sizes-suggesting that distributional statistics of language can in principle account for the latter but not the former in humans. These results demonstrate the value of using larger samples of open-weight LMs to test theories of human cognition and evaluate LM capacities.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly capable of carrying out complex, long-horizon tasks, yet effective assistance requires more than faithfully executing user instructions. Users' requests reflect their current understanding of the problem, which may be incomplete, outdated, or incorrect. When this understanding diverges from the actual task state, literal instruction following can fail to accomplish the user's underlying goal. We introduce BASIS (Belief-Aware Solutions in Interactive Settings), a benchmark that evaluates whether agents can infer the mental states underlying user requests, recognize belief-reality mismatches, and use this understanding to develop appropriate solutions. Rather than assessing mental-state inference solely through explicit questions, BASIS evaluates both the utility of such inferences and the quality of downstream solutions in user-agent interactions. Evaluation results show that current models often fail to account for users' mental states when generating solutions, and that solution quality is consistently higher when such information is explicitly elicited and made available during problem solving. We further investigate the practical value of mental-state consideration through comparisons with generic Chain-of-Thought prompting, controlled interventions on mental-state information, targeted training, and multi-agent collaboration experiments under partial observability. Together, these studies highlight the importance of not merely inferring others' mental states, but also using those understandings to provide grounded, goal-directed assistance.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce judgments similar to those of humans, but their interpretation of figurative language remains unclear. We compared human participants and four instruction-tuned LLMs (GPT-4, Gemma-2-9B, Llama-3.2, and Mistral-7B) on their ratings of 240 dialogue-based sentences spanning six linguistic traits: conventionality, sarcasm, funny, emotion, idiomacy, and Gen Z slang. While humans and LLMs were strongly aligned at the surface level, differences emerged in representational similarity patterns, particularly in idiomacy and Gen Z slang. GPT-4 showed the closest alignment to humans, though all models differed at the representational level, suggesting that similar outputs may arise from different underlying language representations. We also examined the relationship between model scale and representational similarity using the Gemma model series (Gemma-2-9B-IT, Gemma-3-27B-IT, and Gemma-4-31B-IT), and found that representational similarity patterns were largely unaffected by model size.

In this work, the task and domain interaction of reasoning and mental health are investigated. As large language models (LLMs) present exceptional text understanding and fluent text generation capability, we analyze whether they can reason in the high-stakes domain of mental health. We begin by introducing three datasets and three tasks leveraging the existing work in pragmatic reasoning. The analysis constitutes an evaluation of $12$ LLMs, including MentaLLaMA, which is a mental health reasoning and explanation generation model. The performance of the models remains on par with human evaluation, with the Mistral-7B model giving the best performance. We further analyze the performance of the models with error asymmetry ratio and conduct first-order attention rollout experiment with MentaLLaMA-7B. We present the results for the community reporting the architectural behaviour of the models for the input text and recommend further careful analysis for the high-stakes domain.