Software Reverse Engineering

Neural decompilers can recover readable and recompilable source code from binaries, but their predictions remain difficult to trust. Matching decompilation addresses this problem by searching for source code whose recompiled assembly exactly matches the target, providing stronger evidence of correctness. However, exact matching remains challenging for optimized binaries under unknown compilation configurations. We present Echo, a matching decompilation system based on trusted back-translation. Our key insight is to use compilation not only for verification, but also as trusted feedback to guide iterative search. Echo first uses a domain-specific model to generate candidate programs and compilation configurations. It recompiles these candidates, measures assembly-level similarity, and synthesizes promising code-configuration pairs. Remaining mismatches are then progressively repaired using rule-based rewriting, neural refinement, and reasoning-based refinement. We evaluate Echo on function-level benchmarks and the Mirai malware binary. Compared with the strongest baseline, Echo produces 2.43x more exact matches on average and achieves the highest structural similarity to ground-truth source code. On Mirai, Echo matches 2.75x and 7.4x as many functions as GPT-5.6 and Codex, respectively.

Decompiled C often becomes recompilable only after repair, but recompilation alone does not establish test-observed behavior. A recompiled command-line binary can still parse options incorrectly, print different bytes, or return a different exit status. We present a few-step workflow for repairing decompiled C using compiler feedback and related official tests. Compiler and linker diagnostics first guide build repair. Once the repaired C recompiles into a binary, smoke checks and related official tests expose behavioral discrepancies for semantic repair. In a preliminary static-enriched evaluation on 104 Coreutils 9.5 binaries with available decompiler exports and deterministic exact-output smoke comparisons, 91 binaries (87.5%) recompile and pass the test gate; 9 do not recompile within the repair budget, and 4 recompile but still fail the test gate. The result suggests that test-gate feedback can make LLM-assisted repair of decompiled C more auditable than compile-only recovery.

Binary code representation learning is a fundamental problem in software security and reverse engineering. Existing methods mainly learn function-level embeddings that capture coarse-grained semantic relationships between binary functions, but they largely ignore fine-grained instruction-level correspondences. This limitation misses valuable supervision signals available from compiler debug information, which can support the learning of more accurate and interpretable binary code representations. We propose to leverage instruction alignment knowledge to further improve binary code representation learning. Our preliminary study reveals that models finetuned for function-level binary code similarity exhibit substantially better instruction alignment than their pre-trained model, suggesting a strong correlation between instruction alignment and function-level embedding quality. Motivated by this observation, we design a training approach that explicitly incorporates instruction alignment as an auxiliary training objective. Our experiments show that instruction alignment training improves retrieval accuracy and provides more discriminative signal for the model's similarity judgments.

AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity when source code is available, yet much of the software most consequential to security, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, exists only as binaries. Analyzing such software requires reverse engineering (RE): recovering program semantics before analysis can proceed. Evaluating agentic RE poses a fundamental challenge: realistic benchmark instances must (1) be absent from LLMs' training data to prevent shortcuts by memorization, and (2) reflect the scale and anti-analysis protections of real-world binaries. We introduce SRE-Bench, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark. Built from scratch by RE experts with over 5,000 expert hours, SRE-Bench comprises 19 private, real-world-scale programs averaging 16.9K lines of code. We further developed 44 in-house anti-analysis mechanisms, yielding 262 binary instances and 1,572 deterministically graded tasks. We evaluated 13 agentic settings across 11 models: eight in public-facing settings and five in internal unconstrained settings with cyber safeguards disabled and no budget cap. Realistic RE remains challenging for frontier agents: GPT-5.6-Sol and Claude-Fable-5.1, despite strong source-code security capabilities, fully solve only 31.5% and 26.9% of graded instances, suggesting that success in source-code security does not translate into effective binary analysis. Without a budget cap and safety guard, GPT-6-Astra achieves a near-perfect pass@4 score, yet reliably identifying the correct candidate remains difficult. Agents are largely insensitive to compiler optimization and static linking, and ablations confirm that both contamination control and realistic scale are essential to understanding agents' RE capability. These findings highlight RE as a distinct frontier for agentic cybersecurity and establish SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed for measuring progress.

Human-Oriented Binary Reverse Engineering (HOBRE) aims to transform decompiled pseudocode into a more human-friendly representation, thereby reducing the cognitive burden of reverse analysis and improving efficiency. However, reliably evaluating HOBRE outputs remains a fundamental challenge: human evaluation is costly, time-consuming, and difficult to scale, while existing automated metrics either require executable test cases and runtime environments that are often unavailable for real-world binaries, or rely on high-quality source code references that are typically inaccessible and fail to capture semantically equivalent but lexically diverse outputs. Although LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm is naturally well-suited to HOBRE evaluation, its effectiveness remains underexplored. This paper presents the first systematic investigation of the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm for HOBRE across three representative tasks: function name recovery, binary code summarization, and decompilation optimization. We introduce BinJudgeBench, the first expert-annotated, reference-free evaluation benchmark based on multi-dimensional human judgment, where LLM-as-a-Judge achieves an average correlation of 63.20% with human judgment, outperforming traditional automated metrics at 35.04%. By analyzing judge configurations across backbone LLMs, prompting strategies, and decoding temperatures, we find that no ``one-size-fits-all'' configuration exists, as the optimal setup varies across tasks and individual samples. To address this, we propose BinJudge, which employs a lightweight routing mechanism to adaptively select the optimal judge configuration for each task and sample. BinJudge improves correlation with human experts by 4.5%-24.7% and reduces API cost to 0.06$\times$-0.84$\times$ of that of static best configurations, providing a scalable, cost-effective, and high-fidelity automated evaluation scheme for HOBRE.

We present a practical pipeline for recovering source code from stripped binary functions by combining reverse engineering, anchor-based source code retrieval, and large language model reasoning. Our binary-to-source-code retrieval method attempts to identify the source function from a source code database, rather than generating approximate decompiled pseudocode. It extracts anchors such as strings, constants, external calls, and available function names using Ghidra, retrieves candidate files via an inverted-index search database, narrows candidates to likely function snippets, and re-ranks them with a large language model (LLM) based on disassembly, decompiled code, and source metadata. Confident matches can also serve as anchors in later passes. In an evaluation backed by our high-fidelity source code database on a stripped, optimized tcpdump binary, our proposed binary-to-source matching method achieves 95.2% assembly instruction coverage. Experiments on a GitHub-based retrieval database showed lower performance with 35.5% instruction coverage on average, mainly due to retrieval misses. These results show that source-level binary recovery excels with high-quality databases and remains a useful tool in noisy environments.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to reverse-engineering tasks, and recent threat-intelligence reporting shows them operating inside live offensive-security workflows. Claims about their capability, however, outpace our ability to measure it. Existing benchmarks for LLM-assisted binary analysis treat the construction of function-level ground truth as a solved pre-processing step and report accuracy without disclosing how many functions were reliably evaluable. We argue that the principal obstacle to fair evaluation is not model capability but the reliability of binary-to-source alignment under compiler optimization. This paper presents Reforge, a provenance-tracked pipeline that constructs function-level ground truth from C source through compilation, DWARF and syntactic extraction, alignment, and decompilation, and that operationalizes alignment uncertainty as an eight-gate confidence funnel with three-tier stratification. On a controlled micro-benchmark, high-confidence yield falls from 87.2% to 65.9% across optimization levels, and unpaired comparisons overstate optimization-induced performance decay through survivorship bias. A proof-of-concept evaluation of seven contemporary LLMs on function naming demonstrates the substrate and motivates uncertainty-aware benchmarking practice

We present an execution-based evaluation of neural decompilation for Dart ahead-of-time binaries and an audit of what its scores measure. Across six archived adapter-baseline comparisons, paired tests of pass@k at k = 1, 5, and 10, with Holm adjustment over 18 endpoints, identify functional regressions in both Qwen3-8B adapters at every k. The other four comparisons are inconclusive. On 141 reference-certified, contract-valid tasks, three independently trained graph-prefix systems score the same candidates. Best CodeBLEU has modest association with pass@10 ($ρ$ = .218-.246), compile@10 has weak association ($ρ$ = .072-.082), and only 21.0-23.3% of compiling candidates pass. A paired single-seed intervention that removes semantic names and related cues, while retaining types, arity, and instruction content, reduces coverage from 42/154 to 7/154 tasks. Matched graph perturbations show no detectable degradation under the semantic contract (six-test Holm p >= .750); instruction-use attribution remains unresolved. Across five decoding seeds on MF-174, the baseline solves 4.8 tasks on average, 15 at least once, and one in every seed. We recommend certifying references, aligning metrics on shared candidates, separating metadata from binary input, repeating sampling, and preserving provenance. The released capsule supports integrity checks and replay of archived outcomes.

Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) can assist this process by classifying decompiled code as benign or malicious, but existing pipelines typically rely on a single decompiler view. We argue that this assumption is fragile: decompilers are lossy heuristic tools, and different decompilers can expose different artefacts of the same binary. We curate a benchmark of benign utilities and malicious programs spanning a range of threat behaviors. Each sample is compiled and decompiled with both Ghidra and RetDec, yielding matched pseudo-C views. Across a range of LLMs from major model families, we find that providing both decompiler views improves malicious-class F1, mainly by increasing recall on malicious samples. Agreement analyses further show that Ghidra and RetDec make partially different errors, supporting the view that decompiler outputs provide complementary evidence. Our results suggest that multi-decompiler prompting is a simple, training-free way to improve LLM-based malware triage in practical settings.

Binary reversing is fundamental to software understanding, vulnerability discovery, malware investigation, and firmware auditing. However, it remains inherently challenging due to the irreversible loss of semantic information during compilation. Recent advances in machine learning, large language models (LLMs), and agentic AI systems have accelerated the adoption of AI-augmented binary reversing. Yet, the resulting body of work has become increasingly fragmented across reversing domains, artifact representations, learning approaches, and evaluation practices. This paper presents the first comprehensive systematization of knowledge on AI-augmented binary reversing. We analyze 144 research papers published since 2015, and organize them into 22 binary reversing domains according to the inference tasks. We further introduce a unified taxonomy spanning conventional and AI-augmented reversing pipelines. Our taxonomy connects traditional analysis techniques, binary-derived artifacts, representation strategies, learning paradigms, and downstream inference tasks, while clarifying the emerging roles of LLMs and agentic AI systems. By establishing a common vocabulary and structured framework, we provide a holistic view of the field's evolution over the past decade. Our study reveals common structures underlying seemingly disparate approaches, highlights persistent technical challenges and evaluation gaps, and identifies promising opportunities for future research. Collectively, these insights clarify the current state of the field and provide a foundation for the next generation of reliable and scalable AI-augmented binary reversing systems.

Automatic decompilers produce functionally correct but often unreadable C code. This paper addresses one stage of the reverse engineering workflow: improving the readability of decompiled code using LLM agents guided by quantitative metrics. We present a three-phase research evolution. Phase 1 (tool-driven steering via Ghidra MCP) suffered from incomplete coverage and inconsistent improvements due to lack of quantitative guidance. Phase 2 (structural similarity validation alone) revealed that agents optimize for metrics in unintended ways, producing structurally equivalent but less readable code. Our contribution is the Quantitative Readability Score (QRS) framework, a composite metric combining a structural similarity gate with three independent readability sub-metrics (Lexical Surprisal, Structural Simplicity, and Idiomatic Quality). We demonstrate that QRS-guided refinement enables LLM agents to make targeted readability improvements without sacrificing correctness. We provide a discussion of the broader reverse engineering workflow (binary lifting, decompilation cleanup, and achieving functional equivalence) as context, however, it remains out of scope.

Agentic software reverse engineering systems are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks placed into the source code of executable binary files. This research demonstrates defensive tactics for detecting the presences of prompt injection strings in the decompiler output of adversarial example programs. Methods for obfuscating these attacks and subsequent methods for defending against these obfuscations are also explored. This research advances the understanding of risk and security of agentic software analysis systems necessary for their deployment into production-level cyber workflows.

Software tools for reverse engineering executable binary files, such as Ghidra, enable malware analysts to safely conduct robust static analysis without having access to original source code. Coupled with the analytic power of large language models (LLM), agentic systems enabled with tools, such as GhidraMCP, can allow analysts to automate a previously human driven process. Although this automation can increase the productivity of a single malware analyst, it also introduces a new area of vulnerability for malware obfuscation. This paper presents an adversarial technique using genetic algorithm-based prompt generation, a modification of an adversarial attack known as AutoDAN, to demonstrate the ability to deceive LLM-powered disassembly and decompilation systems into misinterpreting binary executables, effectively corrupting their analytical output. This proof-of-concept methodology exploits inherent vulnerabilities in how LLMs process and interpret decompiled machine code via prompt injection by using extraneous string variable assignments to pass surreptitious instructions to the LLM while not impacting the functionality of the executable file. We demonstrate this capability through several concise examples. This approach could enable attackers to bypass automated detection systems that rely on LLM-driven analysis pipelines. By studying and understanding this attack, insights can be gained regarding the security implication of integrating LLMs into cybersecurity toolchains and building more robust agentic code analysis systems.

Legacy systems concentrate business rules, architectural decisions, and operational exceptions that often remain implicit in code, data, configuration, and maintenance practices. At the same time, language-model-based coding agents depend on reliable context, correctness criteria, and behavioral contracts to modify real systems with lower risk. This paper presents Reversa, a reverse documentation engineering framework for converting legacy software into traceable operational specifications for AI agents. Reversa organizes this process as a multi-agent pipeline: specialized agents map the project surface, analyze modules, extract implicit rules, synthesize architecture, write unit-level specifications, and review generated claims. The proposal emphasizes three mechanisms: traceability between code and specification, explicit confidence marking, and preservation of gaps for human validation. The framework is distributed as a Node.js CLI, installs skills across multiple agent engines, and uses a SHA-256 manifest to preserve modified files during update or uninstall operations. In addition to the architectural description, we report an exploratory case study on migrating an ATM from COBOL to Go, in which the pipeline produced 517 claims classified by an internal confidence index, 10 registered gaps, 53 Gherkin parity scenarios, and a reconstruction plan with 9 of 11 tasks completed at inventory time. Final parity validation and cutover were not completed in this study. We do not claim broad empirical superiority; we position the contribution with respect to the literature on reverse engineering, LLM-based documentation, and software agents, and propose an evaluation protocol with metrics for coverage, traceability, confidence, utility, and cost.

Decompilers are useful tools used in reverse engineering to understand compiled source code. Reconstructing source code from compiled binaries is a challenging task, because high-level syntax, identifiers, and custom data types are generally lost as the compiler translates human-readable code to low-level machine code. Deterministic decompilers are useful tools for binary analysis, but can struggle to infer idiomatic syntax and identifier names. Generative AI models are a natural fit for reconstructing high-level syntax, identifiers, and types, but they can still suffer by hallucinating improper programming constructs and semantics. Instead of attempting to improve neural decompilers with more data and more training, we argue that compiler feedback can be used to dramatically improve the semantic correctness of neural decompiler outputs via search. Our system, Decaf (DECompilation with Automated Feedback), raises the neural decompilation rate from 26.0% on ExeBench to 83.9% on the Real -O2 split without sacrificing similarity to the original source code. We also find our automatic feedback methodology is highly effective for improving weaker neural decompilation models.

Benchmarks for coding agents increasingly measure source-level software repair, and cybersecurity benchmarks increasingly measure broad capture-the-flag performance. Classical binary reverse engineering remains less precisely specified: given only an executable, can an agent recover validation logic and produce an input, serial, artifact, or key generator accepted by the program? We introduce CrackMeBench, a benchmark for evaluating language-model agents on educational CrackMe-style reverse-engineering tasks. CrackMeBench focuses on deterministic binary validation problems with executable oracles, symbol-poor binaries, explicit local tool access, and externally scored submissions rather than free-form explanations. The v0 benchmark combines eight public calibration CrackMes with twelve generated main-score tasks built from seeded C, Rust, and Go templates, and agents run through an equal shell interface in a no-network Linux Docker sandbox with standard reverse-engineering tools. In a three-model evaluation with a five-minute budget and three scored submissions per task, pass@3 on the generated split is 11/12 tasks (92%) for GPT-5.5, 7/12 (58%) for Claude Opus 4.7, and 5/12 (42%) for Kimi K2. The harder generated half separates the models more sharply, with pass@3 of 5/6, 2/6, and 1/6, respectively; on the eight-task public calibration split, pass@3 is 3/8, 2/8, and 1/8. CrackMeBench records pass@1 and pass@3, scored submissions, wall-clock time, command traces, tool categories, provider-reported token usage, estimated cost, and qualitative failure labels, providing a reproducible testbed for measuring progress from source-code reasoning toward autonomous binary analysis while restricting scope to educational, purpose-built programs.

Security updates create a short but important window in which defenders and attackers can compare vulnerable and patched software. Yet in many operational settings, the most accessible artifacts are binary packages rather than source patches or advisory text. This paper asks whether a language-model agent, restricted to local binary-derived evidence, can reconstruct the security meaning of Linux distribution updates. Patch2Vuln is a local, resumable pipeline that extracts old/new ELF pairs, diffs them with Ghidra and Ghidriff, ranks changed functions, builds candidate dossiers, and asks an offline agent to produce a preliminary audit, bounded validation plan, and final audit. We evaluate Patch2Vuln on 25 Ubuntu .deb package pairs: 20 security-update pairs and five negative controls, all manually adjudicated against private source-patch and binary-function ground truth. The agent localizes a verified security-relevant patch function in 10 of 20 security pairs and assigns an accepted final root-cause class in 11 of 20. Oracle diagnostics show that six security pairs fail before model reasoning because the binary differ or ranker omits the right function, with one additional context-export miss. A separate bounded validation pass produces two target-level minimized behavioral old/new differentials, both for tcpdump, but no crash, timeout, sanitizer finding, or memory-corruption proof; all five negative controls are classified as unknown and produce no validation differentials. These results support agentic vulnerability reconstruction from binary patches as a useful research target while showing that binary-diff coverage and local behavioral validation remain the limiting components.

LLM agents have been increasingly adopted for solving security tasks. However, existing evaluations usually require source code access, while commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) binaries dominate deployed software and require reasoning from stripped, optimized machine code. This discrepancy raises an important question: can modern LLM agents reason about vulnerabilities in critical COTS binaries? Motivated by this question, we build SLYP, a REACT-style pipeline for end-to-end vulnerability discovery and validation of COTS binaries. SLYP combines extensible MCP servers for binary exploration and dynamic debugging, and validates candidate vulnerabilities by synthesizing debugger-verified proof-of-concept (PoC) crashes. We evaluate SLYP and production coding agents, including Claude Code and Codex, on COTS Windows binaries centered on a 20-object COM benchmark. SLYP uncovers all 64 vulnerable entry functions while default production agents miss up to 15; SLYP also surfaces more true vulnerabilities than the state-of-the-art static analyzer, which discovers at most 35 with a large number of false positives. For validation, SLYP generates debugger-verified PoCs for 67.5% of cases, while default production agents generate none. Further ablations show that tool sets and model choice materially affect COTS binary reasoning. Our additional evaluation also demonstrates the generalizability of SLYP on Windows kernel targets. To date, SLYP has uncovered 39 zero-day vulnerabilities, 31 in COM/RPC services and 8 in kernel drivers, all disclosed to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), with 23 assigned CVEs and $203,000 bounty awards.

Function association is a useful process for binary reverse engineers. Search tools exist to perform association at scale, but they do not utilize the full range of capabilities that AI-enabled search provides. Prior work has explored the development of embedding models for association between certain reverse engineering code representations, but that work does not cover bidirectional association between source code and decompiled, stripped code with standard preprocessing requirements. To bridge this gap, we formalize this function association problem and evaluate the extent to which embedding models can bidirectionally associate between these two representations. To improve model performance at this task, we fine-tune a Qwen3-Embedding model with contrastive learning. We find that our new model outperforms other models on all function association baselines by a substantial margin and generalizes to a constant-algorithm association task it is not explicitly trained on.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in recent years, driving their adoption across a wide range of domains, including computer security. In reverse engineering, LLMs are increasingly applied to critical tasks such as function and variable name recovery and type inference. However, despite the rapid growth of research in this area, progress has been hindered by the absence of a standardized dataset. Existing studies rely on disparate datasets, preprocessing pipelines, and evaluation metrics, making fair comparisons between approaches difficult and obscuring a clear understanding of LLM capabilities in binary analysis. To address these challenges, we present REBench, a comprehensive benchmark dataset for evaluating LLMs on binary reverse engineering tasks. REBench consolidates a superset of existing datasets, comprising hundreds of millions of lines of source code and a diverse collection of binaries spanning multiple architectures and optimization levels. REBench adopts a knowledge-base-driven methodology that stores byte-level stack information to generate ground truth, ensuring that task difficulty is preserved while maintaining universal applicability. This design enables fair evaluation across tasks while avoiding simplifications that could bias results. As a use case, we apply REBench to measure the reverse engineering performance of LLMs and the result demonstrates difficulties in complex tasks.

Decompilation -- recovering source code from compiled binaries -- is essential for security analysis, malware reverse engineering, and legacy software maintenance. However, existing decompilers produce code that often fails to compile or execute correctly, limiting their practical utility. We present a multi-agent framework that transforms decompiled code into re-executable source through Multi-level Constraint-Guided Decompilation (MCGD). Our approach employs a hierarchical validation pipeline with three constraint levels: (1) syntactic correctness via parsing, (2) compilability via GCC, and (3) behavioral equivalence via LLM-generated test cases. When validation fails, specialized LLM agents iteratively refine the code using structured error feedback. We evaluate our framework on 1,641 real-world binaries from ExeBench across three decompilers (RetDec, Ghidra, and Angr). Our framework achieves 84-97% re-executability, improving baseline decompiler output by 28-89 percentage points. In comparison with state-of-the-art LLM-based decompilation methods using the same GPT-4o backbone, our approach (84.1%) outperforms LLM4Decompile (80.3%), SK2Decompile (73.9%), and SALT4Decompile (61.8%). Our ablation study reveals that execution-based validation is critical: compile-only approaches achieve 0% behavioral correctness despite 91-99% compilation rates. The system converges efficiently, with 90%+ binaries reaching correctness within 2 iterations at an average cost of $0.03-0.05 per binary. Our results demonstrate that constraint-guided agentic refinement can bridge the gap between raw decompiler output and practically useful source code.

Software documentation frequently becomes outdated or fails to exist entirely, yet developers need focused views of their codebase to understand complex systems. While automated reverse engineering tools can generate UML diagrams from code, they produce overwhelming detail without considering developer intent. We introduce query-driven UML diagram generation, where LLMs create diagrams that directly answer natural language questions about code. Unlike existing methods, our approach produces semantically focused diagrams containing only relevant elements with contextual descriptions. We fine-tune Qwen2.5-Coder-14B on a curated dataset of code files, developer queries, and corresponding diagram representations in a structured JSON format, evaluating with both automatic detection of structural defects and human assessment of semantic relevance. Results demonstrate that fine-tuning on a modest amount of manually corrected data yields dramatic improvements: our best model achieves the highest F1 scores while reducing defect rates below state-of-the-art LLMs, generating diagrams that are both structurally sound and semantically faithful to developer queries. Thus, we establish the feasibility of using LLMs for scalable contextual, on-demand documentation generation. We make our code and dataset publicly available at https://github.com/i-need-a-pencil/query2diagram.

Code deobfuscation is the task of recovering a readable version of a program while preserving its original behavior. In practice, this often requires days or even months of manual work with complex and expensive analysis tools. In this paper, we explore an alternative approach based on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, where a large language model is guided through explicit, step-by-step reasoning tailored for code analysis. We focus on control flow obfuscation, including Control Flow Flattening (CFF), Opaque Predicates, and their combination, and we measure both structural recovery of the control flow graph and preservation of program semantics. We evaluate five state-of-the-art large language models and show that CoT prompting significantly improves deobfuscation quality compared with simple prompting. We validate our approach on a diverse set of standard C benchmarks and report results using both structural metrics for control flow graphs and semantic metrics based on output similarity. Among the tested models and by applying CoT, GPT5 achieves the strongest overall performance, with an average gain of about 16% in control-flow graph reconstruction and about 20.5% in semantic preservation across our benchmarks compared to zero-shot prompting. Our results also show that model performance depends not only on the obfuscation level and the chosen obfuscator but also on the intrinsic complexity of the original control flow graph. Collectively, these findings suggest that CoT-guided large language models can serve as effective assistants for code deobfuscation, providing improved code explainability, more faithful control flow graph reconstruction, and better preservation of program behavior while potentially reducing the manual effort needed for reverse engineering.

Binary decompilation is a critical reverse engineering task aimed at reconstructing high-level source code from stripped executables. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently shown promise, they often suffer from "logical hallucinations" and "semantic misalignment" due to the irreversible semantic loss during compilation, resulting in generated code that fails to re-execute. In this study, we propose Cognitive Decompiler Refinement with Robustness (CoDe-R), a lightweight two-stage code refinement framework. The first stage introduces Semantic Cognitive Enhancement (SCE), a Rationale-Guided Semantic Injection strategy that trains the model to recover high-level algorithmic intent alongside code. The second stage introduces a Dynamic Dual-Path Fallback (DDPF) mechanism during inference, which adaptively balances semantic recovery and syntactic stability via a hybrid verification strategy. Evaluation on the HumanEval-Decompile benchmark demonstrates that CoDe-R (using a 1.3B backbone) establishes a new State-of-the-Art (SOTA) in the lightweight regime. Notably, it is the first 1.3B model to exceed an Average Re-executability Rate of 50.00%, significantly outperforming the baseline and effectively bridging the gap between efficient models and expert-level performance. Our code is available at https://github.com/Theaoi/CoDe-R.