Stackelberg Equilibrium

A pool of language models can collaborate and improve collectively by learning from one another's responses. These interactions depend on the instructions used during training. Existing methods typically sample instructions uniformly, even though their usefulness may change as the models improve: an instruction on which models' responses once differed in quality may later be answered equally well, while a previously difficult instruction may begin to provide a useful learning signal. We propose Stackelberg Alignment, a game-theory-inspired leader-follower framework that turns instruction selection into an adaptive curriculum. An EXP3 bandit acts as the leader, allocating a fixed sampling budget across instructions and updating its sampling distribution using a reward that combines instruction difficulty and response discriminability. The language models act as followers: they respond to the selected instructions, evaluate one another's responses, and learn from the resulting preference signals through DPO or GRPO. The framework uses Elo-style reputation-weighted peer judgment and reputation-based opponent matching to support reliable and competitive model interactions. Experiments across three heterogeneous model pools and 12 benchmarks spanning scientific discovery, reasoning, code, instruction following, and knowledge show that Stackelberg Alignment achieves the highest macro-average across three diverse model pools, outperforming the strongest training-time baseline by up to 7.4% and the best static inference baseline by 12-25%. Analysis confirms that the adaptive leader concentrates duels on the most informative instructions, and ablations show that both reputation-weighted judgment and reputation-based matching improve the effectiveness of multi-LLM evolution.

Discrete diffusion models offer the ability to re-draft, revisiting and correcting earlier tokens throughout generation. This capability depends on the forward corruption process that defines what the denoiser learns to correct. Masked diffusion models fix tokens once they are unmasked, while uniform diffusion permits revisions but relies on uniformly random token substitutions. We instead learn which substitutions are most useful for training the denoiser to re-draft. We introduce Variational Stackelberg Discrete Diffusion (VSDD), a framework for learning a semantically aware corruption process. VSDD formulates training as a leader-follower game: the leader defines a Markovian corruption process parameterized by the denoiser's token embeddings, while the follower optimizes a variational denoising objective with the corruption process held fixed. The leader rewards corruptions based on how much the denoiser improves after learning from them, rather than on how easily the current denoiser can reconstruct them. We measure this improvement under a fixed reference corruption process, approximate the follower's response with a one-step gradient update, and optimize the leader using a score-function estimator. We evaluate VSDD across molecular, text, and playlist generation. VSDD substantially improves molecular validity over uniform and masked diffusion, reduces text perplexity relative to uniform diffusion while remaining competitive with masked diffusion, and achieves sizable improvements in offline playlist recommendation metrics.

Target-oriented vision-and-language navigation (VLN) on aerial platforms is attracting growing attention for missions such as disaster rescue, infrastructure inspection, and security patrol. In this task, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) needs to locate targets given only a concise description of their appearance and surroundings. This requires global exploration and grounding as well as collision-free close-range approach, two interleaved processes difficult to reconcile within a single agent. Most existing methods transfer the ground VLN paradigm to a low-altitude UAV and compensate for its inefficient exploration with external assistance. A recent attempt deploys two UAVs at complementary altitudes yet still relies on privileged information and trains its two agents independently, precluding any mutual adaptation essential for cooperation. Here we propose CoNav-UAV, which explicitly models the task as a Stackelberg game between a high-altitude leader and a low-altitude follower, with the system operating on onboard visual and linguistic inputs alone. To solve this game, we introduce Iterative Stackelberg Learning. The leader's high-level vision-language reasoning is refined via memory-based in-context learning, while the follower's precise motion control is updated via DAgger-style expert distillation. The alternation drives both agents toward a Stackelberg equilibrium. CoNav-UAV consistently outperforms single- and dual-agent baselines across three high-fidelity urban scenes from the AerialVLN benchmark. Success rate improves by up to 30.8 points on the learning scene, and 9.0 points under cross-scene transfer while using about 3x less adaptation data. Further analyses validate the complementary gains of the leader and follower updates and reveal robust gains yet distinct learning dynamics across VLM backbones.

Stackelberg differential games (SDGs) provide a powerful framework for hierarchical decision-making in stochastic and continuous-time environments, yet their solution remains computationally challenging due to the complexity of traditional dynamic programming and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) methods, especially in high-dimensional systems. This paper proposes an entropy-regularized reinforcement learning (ERRL) approach for linear-quadratic SDGs (LQ-SDGs) within a continuous-time diffusion framework governed by Markovian regime switching. The key innovation lies in deriving exploratory weakly-coupled HJBI equations with entropy regularization, which promotes stochastic policies that actively avoid suboptimal equilibria -- a limitation of classical SDG methods. Neural networks are integrated to approximate regime-dependent value functions and solve high-dimensional partial differential equations (PDEs) efficiently, while a novel sampling technique enhances computational tractability. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework compared to conventional approaches, particularly in escaping suboptimal traps through exploratory policies. The study highlights the critical role of entropy regularization and neural network approximations in achieving robust solutions for hierarchical decision-making problems under abrupt environmental shifts.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate as multi-turn systems that must allocate context, prompt verbosity, and tool access under finite computational budgets. Static thresholds are simple, but they are brittle under heterogeneous tasks and evolving session states. We formulate resource governance as a contextual Stackelberg game: a controller commits to a quality target and a cost incentive, while an executor responds with resource actions over context, prompting, and tool usage. We learn a conditional response model, optimize a leader policy against that model, and repair the resulting policy using real-API calibration and projection onto an empirically selected action set. For the restricted game, we establish conditional guarantees for equilibrium existence, follower-response stability, safe-set projection, and transfer from a surrogate environment to the real environment under bounded value error. The primary real-API experiment comprises 300 evaluated turns. Relative to a conservative baseline, the selected repaired controller reduces mean token cost by 17.4% (Welch $p=0.022$), while the measured quality difference is not statistically significant ($p=0.44$). The theoretical results are conditional and the experiments do not estimate their regret or transfer constants; consequently, the evidence establishes a promising repaired operating point, not a certified real-system equilibrium.

Neural networks are typically trained with a single learning rate across all layers. While recent empirical evidence suggests that assigning layer-specific learning rates can accelerate training, a principled understanding of the conditions and mechanisms under which non-uniform learning rates are beneficial remains limited. In this work, we investigate non-uniform learning rates through the lens of Stackelberg optimization. Specifically, we demonstrate that training neural networks with a smaller learning rate for the body layers and a larger learning rate for the final layer can be interpreted as a two-time-scale alternating gradient descent algorithm applied to a Stackelberg reformulation of the original objective. We establish finite-time convergence guarantees for the algorithm under broad conditions that accommodate constraint sets and non-smooth activation functions. Beyond convergence, we identify two mechanisms by which non-uniform learning rates can outperform uniform learning rates: (i) we show that certain problem instances induce a Stackelberg objective with stronger optimization structure than the original objective, yielding faster convergence to globally optimal solutions, (ii) our numerical analysis reveals that the Stackelberg objective can exhibit substantially sharper local curvature, especially in early training, which leads to more informative gradients and learning acceleration. Experiments in supervised learning and reinforcement learning support our findings.

Regulatory audits of AI systems increasingly rely on differential privacy (DP) to protect training data and model internals. We study audit design when the audited developer can strategically respond to the privacy-constrained audit interface. We formalize privacy-constrained auditing as a bilevel Stackelberg game, in which an auditor commits to a query policy and DP budget allocation across harm dimensions, and a strategic developer reallocates mitigation efforts in response. We introduce the welfare-weighted under-detection gap $B_w$, the welfare-weighted true residual harm the audit fails to detect at the developer's strategic best response, and prove that naive DP auditing (uniform or harm-proportional allocation) induces a strictly larger $B_w$ than any non-strategic mitigation baseline whenever effective detectability is heterogeneous, the welfare weights are not comonotone with detectability, and the developer's optimum is interior. We characterize the optimal auditor allocation as a four-factor balance of welfare weight, audit miss-probability, detectability elasticity, and mitigation-cost curvature, and provide a single-level reformulation of the bilevel problem via the developer's KKT system. We propose Strategic Private Audit Design (SPAD), a projected-gradient algorithm with hypergradients computed through the developer's best response.

Current research applying N-level Stackelberg Game to multi-agent systems often uses the default decision order of agents provided by the environment. However, this raises the question: does the order of agents necessarily affect the final equilibrium point of the game? To address this, we formally analyze the N-level Stackelberg Game, where changing the order in which agents make decisions typically leads to an overdetermined system. As a result, the equilibrium point shifts unless special structural conditions are satisfied. Based on this analysis, we propose the Hierarchical Priority Adjustment (HPA) method, which adjusts and selects the agents' decision order. At the upper level, an upper policy dynamically selects the optimal decision order of agents based on the current game state. At the lower level, agents execute strategies in the Spatio-Temporal Sequential Markov Game (STMG) according to the selected order. To coordinate learning across time scales, we employ a slow-fast update scheme with shared intrinsic rewards derived from the advantage function of the upper policy. Experimental results on high-precision control tasks, including multi-agent MuJoCo, show that HPA outperforms benchmark algorithms and robustly adapts to changing environments. These results highlight the crucial role of optimizing the agents' decision order in N-level Stackelberg Game.

We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader selects an optimal mixed strategy, anticipating that the follower population plays an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the induced subgame and may satisfy additional ecological conditions. We consider both leader-optimal and leader-pessimal selection among ESSs, which arise as special cases of our framework. Prior approaches to Stackelberg evolutionary games either define the follower response via evolutionary dynamics or assume rational best-response behavior, without explicitly enforcing stability against invasion by mutations. We present algorithms for computing SESS in discrete and continuous games, and validate the latter empirically. Our model applies naturally to biological settings; for example, in cancer treatment the leader represents the physician and the followers correspond to competing cancer cell phenotypes.

Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols, essential for wireless networks, are typically manually configured. While deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based protocols enhance task-specified network performance, they suffer from poor generalizability and resilience, demanding costly retraining to adapt to dynamic environments. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a game-theoretic LLM-empowered multi-agent DRL (MARL) framework, in which the uplink transmission between a base station and a varying number of user equipments is modeled as a dynamic multi-follower Stackelberg game (MFSG), capturing the network's natural hierarchical structure. Within this game, LLM-driven agents, coordinated through proximal policy optimization (PPO), synthesize adaptive, semantic MAC protocols in response to network dynamics. Protocol action grammar (PAG) is employed to ensure the reliability and efficiency of this process. Under this system, we further analyze the existence and convergence behavior in terms of a Stackelberg equilibrium by studying the learning dynamics of LLM-empowered unified policies in response to changing followers. Simulations corroborate that our framework achieves a 77.6% greater throughput and a 65.2% fairness improvement over conventional baselines. Besides, our framework generalizes excellently to a fluctuating number of users without requiring retraining or architectural changes.

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing policy in both the online and distributional settings. In the online setting, we first prove that standard learning-theoretic measures of complexity do not characterize the difficulty of the leader's learning task. Notably, we find that there exists a learning-theoretic measure of complexity, analogous to the Littlestone dimension in online classification, that tightly characterizes the leader's instance-optimal regret. We term this the Stackelberg-Littlestone dimension, and leverage it to provide a provably optimal online learning algorithm. In the distributional setting, we provide analogous results by showing that two new dimensions control the sample complexity upper- and lower-bound.

To alleviate the training burden in federated learning while enhancing convergence speed, Split Federated Learning (SFL) has emerged as a promising approach by combining the advantages of federated and split learning. However, despite its advantages, existing SFL studies have largely overlooked the strategic interactions among self-interested participants during the SFL process. In this framework, the SFL model owner can choose the cut layer to balance the training load between the server and clients, ensuring the necessary level of privacy for the clients. Additionally, the SFL model owner sets incentives to encourage client participation in the SFL process. The optimization strategies employed by the SFL model owner influence clients' decisions regarding the amount of data they contribute, taking into account the shared incentives over clients and anticipated energy consumption from both computation and networking during SFL. To address this framework, we model the problem using a hierarchical decision-making approach, formulated as a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. We demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium among clients and analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium by examining the leader's game. Furthermore, we discuss privacy concerns related to differential privacy and the criteria for selecting the minimum required cut layer. Our findings show that the Stackelberg equilibrium solution maximizes the utility for both the clients and the SFL model owner while achieving a well-balanced trade-off between model accuracy and the associated computing and networking overhead during the SFL process.

We introduce \emph{Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs)}, a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework. In CSGs, a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent who (contrary to standard SGs) does not have direct access to the principal's action but instead best-responds to calibrated forecasts about it. This framework provides a powerful and realistic modeling tool that goes beyond assuming that agents use ad hoc and highly specified algorithms for interacting in strategic settings and instead builds on statistical foundations of forecasts and calibration. We show that in CSGs, despite both the principal and the agent having less information than in standard SGs, the principal's optimal utility remains upper and lower bounded by the Stackelberg value of the one-shot game, in both finite and continuous settings. Alongside CSGs, we develop stronger notions of calibration and corresponding algorithms that address two central challenges for calibration in game-theoretic environments. First, achieving point-wise calibration typically incurs an error that scales exponentially with the dimension of the strategy space. Second, the principal's convergence rate in CSGs depends critically on the adaptivity of the agent's calibration algorithm. To address these challenges, we establish a meaningful, efficiently achievable relaxation of calibration based on conditioning on best-response regions. This yields the first notion of calibration in games with a statistical rate that only depends on the number of agents' actions rather than the dimension of the principal's strategy space and that leads to no-swap regret for the agent. We further develop adaptive calibration algorithms for the agents that provide fine-grained, any-time calibration guarantees against adversarial sequences, enabling the principal to achieve faster convergence in CSGs.