Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.
Large language models can report a numerical confidence together with generated content, but it is unclear whether this report is more than calibrated rhetoric. We analyze three training-free signals: confidence verbalized with the answer, post-hoc P(True), and agreement with three additional generations on the same 100 TriviaQA questions for two model families. Direct verbalization is a surprisingly strong baseline: after auditing benchmark errors, it reaches AUROC 0.956 and 0.937 for correctness prediction. Three-sample agreement is substantially weaker (0.765 and 0.790), and a fixed interpolation with verbalized confidence has no statistically reliable benefit. Four of nine errors from one model and two of eight from the other receive unanimous sample support, showing that self-consistency can amplify shared misconceptions. Re-eliciting confidence for the same fixed answers with equivalent prompts changes scores by 0.043 to 0.084 on average and flips 4% to 9% of decisions at a 0.8 threshold. An exploratory audit of 100 confidence-tagged biography claims further finds only a modest confidence gap between supported and contradicted claims. These results argue that useful self-reports remain sensitive to elicitation, correlated errors, and benchmark noise.
Large language models can easily generate explanations for their own outputs, but such self-explanations are not necessarily faithful to the model's behavior. We study this issue through counterfactual self-explanations, where a model minimally edits an input so that its own prediction changes. Across sentiment analysis and natural language inference, we evaluate ten instruction-tuned models from the LLaMA-3 and Qwen-2.5 families, measuring faithfulness, minimality, and alignment with human-annotated rationales. Our results show that model scale is the strongest determinant of explanation quality: larger models are substantially more likely to generate counterfactuals that flip their own predictions and target decision-relevant evidence. In contrast, the rationale-guided condition produces edit-minimal counterfactuals that are also more human-aligned. However, it does not consistently improve faithfulness. Overall, counterfactual self-explanations can provide useful behavioral evidence about model decisions, but their reliability depends strongly on model capacity and should be empirically validated rather than assumed.
Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.