Hybrid Human-Agent Social Dilemmas in Energy Markets

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments whose incentives can shape their behavior. We introduce The Energy Society, a minimal survival economy for studying how competitive and cooperative incentives affect emergent behavior when inference cost is directly tied to survival: Agents spend energy based on model size when generating tokens, regain energy by completing jobs or receiving donations, and deactivate if their energy reaches zero. We compare competitive and cooperative objectives against a baseline setting and several control variants. Across experiments, larger models consistently consume the most energy and spend more energy than they gain, even in those settings where token cost is not size-dependent. Cooperative incentives substantially alter behavior: agents donate to reactivate others, sometimes at the cost of their own survival, and job allocation changes. Ablations reveal that allowing agents to recommend actions to each other supports coordination and ambitious job selection, while memory helps agents calibrate risk from past outcomes. Agents rarely choose direct sabotage, but show more subtle signs of self-serving behavior in the competitive setting. The Energy Society is a compact testbed for studying the interaction between token costs and group incentives under a survival pressure. Source code is available at https://github.com/LucasBergholdt/EnergySociety

As electricity market participants increasingly adopt learning-based agents for their bidding strategies, electricity markets are becoming algorithmic. Evidence from algorithmic markets in other domains shows that tacit collusion can arise purely through independent learning. Moreover, electricity markets are typically oligopolistic and feature repeated interaction among a small number of participants, making them structurally susceptible to non-competitive behavior. In the face of these observations, this paper investigates the hypothesis that tacit collusion may emerge in electricity markets where participants' actions are controlled by autonomous learning-based algorithms. We model strategic bidding as a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring, and model the participants' emergent behavior using multi-agent reinforcement learning. We propose a multi-dimensional set of criteria (going beyond profit comparisons against Nash equilibria) to assess whether the resulting behavior constitutes tacit collusion. Our experimental results showcase that such a danger is realistic for electricity markets: there are cases where agents do learn to sustain supra-competitive outcomes that are supportive of tacit collusion indicators, even though the agents were never instructed to collude.

This paper proposes implicit cooperation, a framework enabling decentralized agents to approximate optimal coordination in local energy markets without explicit peer-to-peer communication. We formulate the problem as a decentralized partially observable Markov decision problem that is solved through a multi-agent reinforcement learning task in which agents use stigmergic signals (key performance indicators at the system level) to infer and react to global states. Through a 3x3 factorial design on an IEEE 34-node topology, we evaluated three training paradigms (CTCE, CTDE, DTDE) and three algorithms (PPO, APPO, SAC). Results identify APPO-DTDE as the optimal configuration, achieving a coordination score of 91.7% relative to the theoretical centralized benchmark (CTCE). However, a critical trade-off emerges between efficiency and stability: while the centralized benchmark maximizes allocative efficiency with a peer-to-peer trade ratio of 0.6, the fully decentralized approach (DTDE) demonstrates superior physical stability. Specifically, DTDE reduces the variance of grid balance by 31% compared to hybrid architectures, establishing a highly predictable, import-biased load profile that simplifies grid regulation. Furthermore, topological analysis reveals emergent spatial clustering, where decentralized agents self-organize into stable trading communities to minimize congestion penalties. While SAC excelled in hybrid settings, it failed in decentralized environments due to entropy-driven instability. This research proves that stigmergic signaling provides sufficient context for complex grid coordination, offering a robust, privacy-preserving alternative to expensive centralized communication infrastructure.