The Comprehension-Gated Agent Economy: A Robustness-First Architecture for AI Economic Agency

In many social-science research tasks, such as economics, LLM-based agents must produce outputs for which no cheap, task-complete, machine-readable correctness signal exists. This creates a distinctive reliability problem for multi-agent systems: how should generation, critique, coordination, and human judgment be organized when no component can certify the final result? We address this problem through pAI-Econ-claude, a gated, human-in-the-loop multi-agent architecture for AI-assisted economic theory development. Agents coordinate through a shared workspace of inspectable intermediate records; specialized gates diagnose targeted failure modes and recommend loopbacks without certifying correctness; and human checkpoints retain authority over decisions that are costly to reverse. We evaluate the architecture on five matched economic-theory tasks against an ungated baseline. Two evaluators blinded to configuration agreed on all five pairwise rankings, preferring the gated architecture in four tasks and the baseline in one. Mean failure severity fell from 1.58 to 1.16, while overall usefulness rose from 2.60 to 3.10. The largest observed gain occurred when a reality check rejected a false market-structure premise and a proof review prompted revision of a false welfare claim. The negative case shows that scaffolding can also compress an economically important mechanism too aggressively. The results support a bounded claim: gated oversight improves the auditability of AI-assisted economic theory without substituting for formal verification, and the allocation of irreversible human judgment is a more informative design variable than pure agent autonomy. The workflow is publicly available at https://github.com/maxwell2732/pAI-Econ-claude.

Autonomous AI agents can remain fully authorized and still become unsafe as behavior drifts, adversaries adapt, and decision patterns shift without any code change. We propose the Informational Viability Principle: governing an agent reduces to estimating a bound on unobserved risk $\hat{B}(x) = U(x) + SB(x) + RG(x)$ and allowing an action only when its capacity $S(x)$ exceeds $\hat{B}(x)$ by a safety margin. The Agent Viability Framework, grounded in Aubin's viability theory, establishes three properties -- monitoring (P1), anticipation (P2), and monotonic restriction (P3) -- as individually necessary and collectively sufficient for documented failure modes. RiskGate instantiates the framework with dedicated statistical estimators (KL divergence, segment-vs-rest $z$-tests, sequential pattern matching), a fail-secure monotonic pipeline, and a closed-loop Autopilot formalised as an instance of Aubin's regulation map with kill-switch-as-last-resort; a scalar Viability Index $VI(t) \in [-1,+1]$ with first-order $t^*$ prediction transforms governance from reactive to predictive. Contributions are the theoretical framework, the reference implementation, and analytical coverage against published agent-failure taxonomies; quantitative empirical evaluation is scoped as follow-up work.

AI agents increasingly act on behalf of people or other agents, purchasing services, exchanging information and delegating work. What an agent must respect is written in instructions, policies or agreements, but text alone cannot make it comply. It may make mistakes, be redirected by what it reads, or pursue different interests. For an economy of such agents to function, parties need agreements they can rely on without inspecting or trusting one another's agents. We introduce Proof-Carrying Contracts (PC2), a framework for making agreed constraints enforceable throughout an agent's interactions with a system. Before a requested operation can run, the agent must supply a machine-checkable proof that it preserves the agreed constraints in every case allowed by its model. An execution system called the Airlock checks the proof and controls access to the operation. The parties specify the conditions to preserve, while the agent supplies the reasoning needed to justify its decisions and remains free to adapt its strategy. This avoids having to design a separate permission policy and prove that every decision it permits is safe. We prove that the constraints hold at every instant during execution, even for an adversarial agent, and identify when this implies safety in the world. Reusable capability modules provide tools and guarantees from which contracts can be constructed. PC2 provides a foundation for an agent economy whose agreements protect both those delegating work and those carrying it out.