LiDAR sensors are critical for autonomous driving perception, yet remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Jamming attacks inject high-frequency laser pulses that completely blind LiDAR sensors by overwhelming authentic returns with malicious signals. We discover that while point clouds become randomized, the underlying full-waveform data retains distinguishable signatures between attack and legitimate signals. In this work, we propose PULSAR-Net, capable of reconstructing authentic point clouds under jamming attacks by leveraging previously underutilized intermediate full-waveform representations and simultaneous laser sensing in modern LiDAR systems. PULSAR-Net adopts a novel U-Net architecture with axial spatial attention mechanisms specifically designed to identify attack-induced signals from authentic object returns in the full-waveform representation. To address the lack of full-waveform representations in existing LiDAR datasets under jamming attacks, we introduce a physics-aware dataset generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic full-waveform representations under jamming attacks. Despite being trained exclusively on synthetic data, PULSAR-Net achieves reconstruction rates of 92% and 73% for vehicles obscured by jamming attacks in real-world static and driving scenarios, respectively.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Reconstruction demo of our PULSAR-Net from LiDAR sensing under a jamming attack. Our PULSAR-Net can effectively recover the point cloud (d), which is faithful to the original one (b), by leveraging the intermediate full-waveform representation and simultaneous sensing feature available in modern LiDARs.
Figure 2: Conceptual illustration of a LiDAR jamming attack and simultaneous sensing.
Figure 3: Overview of PULSAR-Net, a U-Net-inspired architecture using depthwise-separable 3D convolutions for efficient, lightweight feature extraction. It incorporates axial attention to model both spatial and temporal dependencies within full-waveforms.
Ours
Naive Average Sub.
Neural DSP [ 22 ]
No Defense
ϕ
nuScenes-J
KITTI-J
nuScenes-J
KITTI-J
nuScenes-J
KITTI-J
nuScenes-J
KITTI-J
1
67.95
73.21
-
-
4.57
3.92
3.37
2.92
4
82.66
89.63
38.22
28.6
6.21
21.4
3.36
2.87
5
86.13
89.90
38.26
30.33
9.56
26.39
3.39
2.92
10
85.95
89.86
37.77
35.93
36.67
29.47
3.39
2.93
25
86.35
89.62
36.91
42.28
46.35
21.03
3.42
2.90
Table 1: Point-level recovery accuracy of PULSAR-Net (Ours) and the baselines (Naive Average Subtraction and Neural DSP) on the nuScenes-J and KITTI-J datasets. ϕ is the number of simultaneous sensing lasers.
nuScenes-J (mAP)
KITTI-J (mAP)
ϕ
Method
PointPillars
CenterPoint
PointPillars
PV-RCNN
25
No Defense
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Naive Average Sub.
1.94
0.00
21.81
41.06
Neural DSP [ 22 ]
20.09
4.07
4.32
6.25
Ours
64.03
59.08
48.33
56.06
110
No Defense
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Table 2: Object detector-level mAP of PULSAR-Net (Ours) and baselines on the nuScenes-J and KITTI-J datasets. ϕ denotes the number of simultaneous sensing lasers.
Table 6
Figure 4: Overview of the real-world experiment and its results: (i) experimental setup of a jamming attack on our LiDAR developed with a major LiDAR supplier to stream full waveform, (ii) benign, attack-compromised, and reconstructed point clouds in a static scenario with a reference vision, and (iii-iv) 3 frames of camera frames and point clouds of benign, attack-compromised, and reconstructed point clouds in driving scenarios
Scenario
Condition
PointPillar
CenterPoint
PV-RCNN
Static (4 scenarios)
No Attack
49.7
67.1
44.0
No Defense
0.10
0.00
0.00
Ours
49.8
69.4
49.8
Moving (3 scenarios)
No Defense
0.70
0.20
0.00
Ours
50.7
63.1
53.8
Table 5: Quantitative results of the case study. We evaluate the mAP across three driving (moving) and four static scenarios. Note that benign (no attack) data is not available for moving scenarios.
Appendix figures & tables5 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 5: Point cloud denoising methods fail under jamming attacks. Red points indicate valid structures (neighbors within 5cm), and gray points indicate isolated points.
Table 10Table 11
nuScenes-J (mAP)
KITTI-J (mAP)
ϕ
Method
PointPillars
CenterPoint
PointPillars
PV-RCNN
1
No Defense
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Naive Average Sub.
-
-
-
-
Neural DSP [ 22 ]
0.43
0.02
0.00
0.00
Ours
0.94
0.19
15.09
27.36
4
No Defense
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Appendix
Table 10: Object detector-level mAP of PULSAR-Net (Ours) and baselines on the nuScenes-J and KITTI-J datasets. ϕ denotes the number of simultaneous sensing lasers.
Table 11: Simultaneous laser sensing capabilities of commercial LiDAR systems. ϕ is the number of simultaneous sensing lasers.
Autonomous driving perception is typically evaluated on clean benchmark data, yet real-world deployment requires robustness to rare, structured, and potentially adversarial sensor anomalies. This gap is especially critical for LiDAR, where external actors can physically manipulate the sensing process to induce black-box perception failures without accessing the model. Existing LiDAR benchmarks provide little visibility into this failure mode. Prior adversarial LiDAR studies have largely centered on attack hardware, geometric and algorithmic defenses, and early-generation detectors, leaving the robustness of modern perception systems unexplored. To address this evaluation gap, we introduce ATLAS (Adversarial Temporal LiDAR Attack Suite), the first large-scale, physically grounded evaluation benchmark for LiDAR perception models under black-box sensor attacks, simulating the two primary attack modes -- point injection and point removal -- across real driving sequences. Evaluating a broad cross-section of current state-of-the-art LiDAR perception models, ATLAS reveals a surprising robustness asymmetry: models with stronger performance on standard benchmarks tend to better withstand removal attacks, yet are actually more vulnerable to injection attacks than weaker models. We trace this vulnerability to standard object database sampling augmentations, revealing how current training practices can induce architecture-agnostic robustness failures, and study initial directions for mitigating both attack modes. We release the ATLAS generation code to support extensible, reproducible evaluations as attack capabilities evolve, helping make black-box sensor robustness an explicit consideration in future LiDAR perception development.
In this work, we introduce Dynamic SLAMSpoof (D-SLAMSpoof), a novel attack that compromises LiDAR SLAM even in feature-rich environments. The attack leverages LiDAR spoofing, which injects spurious measurements into LiDAR scans through external laser interference. By designing both spatial injection shapes and temporally coordinated dynamic injection patterns guided by scan-matching principles, D-SLAMSpoof significantly improves attack success rates in real-world, feature-rich environments such as urban areas and indoor spaces, where conventional LiDAR spoofing methods often fail. Furthermore, we propose a practical defense method, ISD-SLAM, that relies solely on inertial dead reckoning signals commonly available in autonomous systems. We demonstrate that ISD-SLAM accurately detects LiDAR spoofing attacks, including D-SLAMSpoof, and effectively mitigates the resulting position drift. Our findings expose inherent vulnerabilities in LiDAR-based SLAM and introduce the first practical defense against LiDAR-based SLAM spoofing using only standard onboard sensors, providing critical insights for improving the security and reliability of autonomous systems.
Rokuto Nagata, Kenji Koide, Kazuma Ikeda +2
Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Keio University · Department of Information Technology and Human Factors, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Accurate LiDAR simulation is crucial for autonomous driving, especially under adverse weather conditions. Existing methods struggle to capture the complex interactions between LiDAR signals and atmospheric phenomena, leading to unrealistic representations. This paper presents a physics-informed learning framework (PICWGAN) for generating realistic LiDAR data under adverse weather conditions. By integrating physicsdriven constraints for modeling signal attenuation and geometryconsistent degradations into a physics-informed learning pipeline, the proposed method reduces the sim-to-real gap. Evaluations on real-world datasets (CADC for snow, Boreas for rain) and the VoxelScape dataset show that our approach closely mimics realworld intensity patterns. Quantitative metrics, including MSE, SSIM, KL divergence, and Wasserstein distance, demonstrate statistically consistent intensity distributions. Additionally, models trained on data enhanced by our framework outperform baselines in downstream 3D object detection, achieving performance comparable to models trained on real-world data. These results highlight the effectiveness of the proposed approach in improving the realism of LiDAR data and enabling robust perception under adverse weather conditions.
Vivek Anand, Bharat Lohani, Rakesh Mishra +1
Geoinformatics Group, Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, India · Department of Geodesy and Geomatics Engineering, University of New Brunswick, NB, Canada · Department of Engineering Technology & Industrial Distribution (ETID) of Texas A&M University