Strategic Algorithmic Monoculture: Experimental Evidence from Coordination Games

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper, we study LLM agent interactions in two standard games: a network resource allocation game and a Cournot competition game. Rather than converging to Nash equilibria, we find that LLM agents tend to cooperate when given multi-round prompts and non-zero-sum context. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals that fairness reasoning is central to this behavior. We propose an analytical framework that captures the dynamics of LLM agent reasoning across rounds and explains these experimental findings.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly coordinate in multi-agent systems, yet we lack an understanding of where and why cooperation fails. Many real-world coordination problems are not social dilemmas: helping others -- sharing documentation, unblocking a teammate -- costs the helper almost nothing while producing substantial collective benefit. Whether LLM agents cooperate in this regime, where helping is free and they are explicitly instructed to do so, remains unknown. We build a turn-based multi-agent environment that strips away all strategic complexity, making cooperation costless and trivially optimal. Across eight widely used LLMs, capability does not predict cooperation: OpenAI o3 reaches only 17% of optimal collective performance while the weaker o3-mini reaches 50%, despite identical instructions to maximize group revenue. Using a causal decomposition that automates one side of agent communication, we separate cooperation failures from competence failures, and find that several capable models actively withhold information despite gaining nothing from withholding. Targeted interventions address each mode: explicit protocols roughly double the performance of competence-limited models, while small sharing incentives unlock cooperation-limited ones. Our results suggest that scaling intelligence alone will not solve coordination in multi-agent systems, and will require deliberate cooperative design, even when helping costs nothing.

As language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, they must coordinate with others over long horizons in open-ended interactive tasks. Yet existing evaluations rarely test these demands together, instead emphasising single-agent tasks, short interactions, or highly structured multi-agent settings. We introduce $alem$, a JAX-based benchmark for open-ended multi-agent coordination built on Craftax-like dynamics. Alem embeds procedurally generated coordination tasks, soft specialisation, communication, and controllable coordination difficulty into a long-horizon survival world with exploration, crafting, trading, and combat. We evaluate $13$ modern LLMs zero-shot within homogeneous teams, with trained MARL agents as reference points. Current LLM agents remain far from solving alem, averaging only ~6% normalised return, but their failures are not uniform. On the hardest coordination setting, zero-shot Gemini-3.1-Pro-High approaches MARL agents trained for one billion steps, while GPT-5.4-High achieves strong base-task reward but much lower coordination reward. This contrast shows that individual task competence does not imply coordination competence. Ablations show that communication is the largest contributor to coordination, while memory and reasoning help when used to maintain multi-step plans. Overall, our results identify coordination as a distinct bottleneck for frontier LLM agents, separate from single-agent capabilities. Alem makes this bottleneck measurable and provides a controlled testbed for developing agents that communicate, allocate roles, and execute shared plans. Code is available at https://github.com/alem-world/alem-env.