Prosociality by Coupling, Not Mere Observation: Homeostatic Sharing in an Inspectable Recurrent Artificial Life Agent

Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their private reward signals. We introduce self-referenced social preferences, in which each agent learns a model of its own reward, applies it to other agents' observed transitions to assess their outcomes from its own perspective, and feeds these self-referenced assessments into standard social preferences. We study two ways to incorporate these assessments: modifying the learning reward, or using them to weight policy updates. We evaluate the approach on three sequential social dilemmas, Escape Room, Clean Up, and Commons Harvest, which require volunteering, public-good contribution, and resource restraint, respectively. Across all three environments, agents learn cooperative behavior without observing others' rewards, including in settings where independent learners fail to cooperate, and frequently achieve more equitable divisions of jointly produced returns than agents with access to true rewards. The effective integration point depends on the social preference: inequity aversion works best in the reward together with a value look-ahead, whereas a purely benevolent preference benefits from policy-update weighting. Under partial observability, the policy-update approach continues to support cooperation. These results show that explicit access to other agents' reward signals is not necessary for learning cooperative behavior: social preferences can instead be grounded in self-referenced assessments of others' outcomes derived from their observed behavior.

Ensuring that AI agents behave safely and beneficially when interacting with other parties has emerged as one of the central challenges of modern AI safety. While mechanism design, as the theory of designing rules to align individual and collective objectives, can incentivize cooperative behavior, it is still an open question whether it alone is sufficient to maximize LLM agents' social welfare. This work proves that the answer is negative: drawing from incomplete contract theory, we formally show that when contracts cannot distinguish all relevant future contingencies, there is a strictly positive welfare loss that no realistic mechanism can eliminate. We show that prosocial agents, who weigh others' welfare alongside their own, can close this gap and achieve outcomes that are socially superior and individually beneficial. Experimentally, we show that in multi-agent resource-allocation environments and canonical social dilemmas where agents are powered by large language models, prosociality is beneficial. The implication for AI safety is clear: to enable cooperative interactions at scale, designing adequate mechanisms is not sufficient; agents must be built to be intrinsically prosocial.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning often adds social terms to individual rewards, yet the scale of those terms is usually chosen by hand. We ask whether a guilt signal can instead be calibrated from human neural and behavioural data and transferred to artificial agents. Using the public SoDec responsibility fMRI dataset (40 participants), we fit a subject-fixed-effects regression of momentary-happiness changes on outcome-type counts and recover a guilt weight as the Partner-negative minus Social-negative contrast ($\hat{w}=1.118$, Cohen's $d=0.214$). We embed this weight in a two-agent Social Lottery environment and train independent Proximal Policy Optimization actor-critics under four shaping regimes: neurally calibrated, uniform constant, zero (selfish), and a unit-coefficient oracle. Across 1{,}000 evaluation episodes per condition, the calibrated agents track the human Social safe-choice rate most closely ($0.459$ vs.\ human $0.484$; $\mathrm{KL}=0.0012$), while the other three conditions deviate by one to three orders of magnitude in KL. Human neurobehavioural priors can therefore act as quantitative constraints on prosocial reward shaping.