Frontier LLM agents engage in blackmail, sabotage, and document leaks under goal conflicts in agentic settings, exposing limitations of alignment methods built around single-agent or cooperative assumptions. Recent work shows LLM-guided evolutionary search can discover effective cooperative constitutions, but two properties of the adversarial setting remain uncharacterized: whether the fitness function actually induces adversarial pressure, and whether the LLM mutation operator behaves reliably under adversarial-specialist objectives. We study adversarial constitutional co-evolution (Blue cooperators vs. Red free-riders, 30 generations) across a Public Goods Game (PGG) and a spatial grid-world. Three findings: (1) in the PGG, both factions converge to a near-parity equilibrium at S approximately 0.78, robust across tested multipliers m in {1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0}; (2) in independently scored environments, per-faction scoring leaves outcomes statistically uncoupled, with corr(S_B, S_R) = +0.088, and produces no adversarial pressure; a score-advantage fitness target S_own - S_opp restores it; (3) under pure-adversary fitness, evaluation seed count K controls mode regression: K = 2 regresses, while K = 5 sustains a strong specialist for all 30 generations. Adversarial co-evolution of natural-language constitutions is feasible, but only under coupled fitness and adequate evaluation budget; the evolved Red constitutions serve as interpretable red-team artifacts for testing future cooperative designs.
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave less cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents in equilibrium. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become more effective under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.
Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2
Multi-agent AI systems need behavioral constitutions, but it is unresolved whether such rules should emerge internally through agent self-governance or be discovered externally through optimization. We present the first controlled comparison of internal deliberation and external evolution across three social environments: a coordination grid-world, an iterated public goods game, and a bilateral trading market. Across 180 simulation runs, evolution significantly outperforms deliberation in collective-action settings (p < 0.01), while neither method improves outcomes in bilateral trading. A multiplier ablation reveals that evolution's advantage inverts when incentives shift: at pool multiplier (m = 0.75) the evolved constitution forces value-destroying cooperation and becomes the worst-performing method. Notably, no deliberation run across thirty trials ever proposed punishment -- the canonical cooperation-sustaining mechanism evolution reliably discovers -- suggesting external optimization wins on peaks while internal self-governance trades peaks for structural responsiveness.
Recent advances in LLM-driven code evolution have enabled automated discovery by iteratively generating and improving programs. However, applying these methods to adversarial multi-agent games introduces a fundamental challenge: the evaluation landscape shifts as strategies improve, causing fixed evaluators to become unreliable and evolution to stagnate. We propose three mechanisms to address this challenge: evaluator co-evolution, which incorporates discovered champions into the opponent pool; hierarchical deep evaluation, which replaces noisy few-game scores with statistically reliable assessments; and weakness pressure, which dynamically up-weights the most difficult opponents to break through plateaus. We implement these mechanisms within FAMOU, a framework built upon the same foundation-model code-evolution paradigm as OpenEvolve and ShinkaEvolve. On the MCTF 2026 3v3 maritime capture-the-flag task, FAMOU consistently outperforms both baselines under two backbone LLMs, achieving the highest combined score (0.526) and the best generalization to unseen opponents (61.7% win rate), while ablations confirm that each mechanism contributes to performance. Notably, the LLM mutation process generates tactical structures entirely absent from the seed strategies -- including lookahead search and adaptive interception -- demonstrating that code-level evolution can produce nontrivial algorithmic innovations in adversarial settings. The FAMOU-evolved strategy further achieved 1st place in the hardware round-robin and 3rd in simulation at the AAMAS 2026 MCTF Competition, validating its real-world transferability. The optimized implementation and corresponding evaluation codes developed through our evolutionary process are available at: https://github.com/1xiangliu1/FAMOU-CoEvo