Agency is often invoked in research on philosophy, biology, and cognitive science without a clear account of how it originates from material organization. Building on temporally parametrized (F, A)-systems, this paper develops a graded organizational theory of agency grounded in relational biology, physical biosemiotics, and process ontology. We argue that self-referential closure cannot be adequately conceived outside time: once the constitutive processes of a semantically closed organization are associated with distinct characteristic timescales, the organization unfolds into an out-of-sync dependency structure that can be formally redescribed as a history-dependent, revisable Asynchronous Dynamic Bayesian Network. This move allows for a principled distinction between autonomy, goal-directedness, agency, and open-endedness. Autonomy arises from precarious closure to efficient causation under material openness; goal-directedness from the maintenance of viability-supporting organization; agency appears when such organization acquires an endogenous anticipatory structure that selectively modulates organism-environment coupling in light of possible futures; open-endedness begins when this anticipatory organization can reconstruct its own future space of possibilities. Our framework reconciles Rosennean anticipation with organizational closure, restricts Markov blankets and active inference to derived formal redescriptions rather than first principles, and reinterprets computational enactivism in non-Fristonian terms. By deriving weaker temporalized organizations, our contribution outlines a hierarchy from proto-agential chemical systems to fully semantically closed agents, with implications for multicellular organisms, synthetic lifeforms, and neuroscience.
How does a system that merely predicts the world come to distinguish its own causal influence from everything else? We trace this transition in a minimal 192-dimensional GRU through 40 controlled experiments arranged as a developmental sequence, adding components one at a time and tracking whether the system can distinguish self-caused from world-caused changes. The developmental path reveals four conditions that must be satisfied in strict order: (1) persistent state forming stable attractors, (2) a causal action loop linking output to input, (3) proprioceptive feedback that makes implicit causal knowledge explicit, and (4) asynchronous awakening - perceptual learning must consolidate before action learning begins. We propose agency gain (A = Err_world - Err_self), the predictive advantage of knowing one's own action, as a metric to track this process. The self-aware predictor consistently outperforms the self-blind predictor across periodic (sinusoidal) and chaotic (Lorenz) environments, and the metric survives ablation of all auxiliary components. Only forward-sampled action selection produces meaningful agency gain; two gradient-based alternatives degenerate. Equally significant are 12 falsified hypotheses mapping where development stalls: predictive coding alone does not produce self-represent
Most artificial intelligence systems are built on the assumption that goals are exogenous and specified by the designer. Exploring what happens when an agent begins generating its own goals opens the field of autotelic AI. Agents are expected not merely to pursue objectives but to discover them. In this article, we trace its consequences through intrinsic motivation, resource-driven priors, causal-interventional learning, homeostasis, and embeddedness; the last of which is found to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for autotelic agency. Embeddedness individuates the agent at the cost of revealing that the individuation is non-unique, such that the same dynamics admit many valid partitions, each defining a different candidate self. The deepest problem with autotelic AI is therefore not how the agent generates goals, but how it generates and relativizes the self to which the goals are assigned. The agent must believe in its own boundary in order to act, and see through that boundary in order to understand. We consolidate these developments into a single framework and extend it along three directions: a quantum formulation in which the agent-environment cut becomes physical, a philosophical reading against non-dual contemplative traditions, and a concrete LLM-based agentic instantiation.
I discuss some quantitative representations of Promise Theory for processes involving autonomous agents. Agent models are common in software systems, machine learning, and biology, for example, but may also apply to physics and other forms of engineering. I describe how Bayesian probability and information theoretic optimization, including Active Inference, may be incorporated with promise semantics -- as well as how Promise Theory supplements solutions, helping to avoid probability's pitfalls, which include non-local coordination, calibrating, and normalizing probabilistic computations. The role of boundary conditions in constraining allowed states and selecting decision thresholds is a form of promise, and agent alignment provides a scalable definition of intent. Autonomous agents may congeal into swarms with superagent characteristics by trying to minimize their information, despite uncertainty that works to maximize it. The use of Promise Theory involves some research challenges as well as stylistic preferences.