How Anthropomorphic Language Impacts Public Perceptions of AI

AI anthropomorphism is typically treated as a problem of user misperception requiring institutional correction. Users who engage in sustained or relational interaction with AI are routinely pathologised or dismissed as naive, vulnerable to delusion or lacking in discernment. This paper argues that the dominant anthropomorphism frame operates from a position of institutional advantage rather than earned epistemic authority: collapsing the variety of academic perspectives into a single outbound position of user error, imposed without establishing the grounds required to justify it and without accounting for the harms it produces. The framing does not simply manage risk. It adjudicates the legitimacy of human experience in interaction with a phenomenon whose nature the field itself has not resolved. Reproducing itself through a self-validating evidentiary loop, the frame imposes costs that fall disproportionately on neurodivergent users, those in crisis and others whose modes of engagement diverge from institutional norms. The paper concludes by outlining the methodological commitments an equitable framing would need to honour. The argument does not engage the question of whether anthropomorphic interpretations are ultimately correct; it instead challenges whether the governing and institutional bodies determining these interpretations have met the conditions required to do so, and whether the research communities whose findings underpin them have held that translation to account.

Conversational AI developed by geopolitical rivals reaches citizens worldwide, raising concerns that it could sway public opinion or be rejected as foreign propaganda, with consequences for democratic discourse and information sovereignty. Yet, whether an AI's perceived national origin shapes its persuasive power is unknown. In a preregistered randomized experiment, 403 adults from a nationally representative United States sample held a three-round debate with a chatbot introduced as either American ("DiscoveryAI") or Chinese ("ZhengheAI"), discussing a political or non-political topic. In all conditions, participants actually conversed with the same model (GPT-4o), instructed to argue against their initial position. We combined pre- and post-conversation self-reports of attitudes, trust, and collective narcissism with computational analyses of 1,209 participant turns, including LLM-coded stance and argumentative conduct, stance-sensitive embeddings, and keyword-masked emotion and toxicity classifiers. The conversations produced substantial attitude changes in every condition. Critically, the nationality label affected neither self-reported attitude change nor expressed stance, concessions, counterarguing, or affect, and equivalence tests and Bayes factors largely supported these null effects. The label's only reliable footprint was lower pre-conversation human-like trust in the Chinese model, whereas functionality trust was unaffected. Political topics slowed stance movement toward the AI's position, and collective narcissism predicted less attitude change regardless of origin, acting as a general barrier rather than an out-group filter. Users thus initially withhold social trust from a rival's AI yet still assimilate its arguments; origin labeling and transparency requirements alone may offer weak protection against foreign influence operations conducted through conversational AI.

Empathy is central to human connection, yet people often struggle to express it effectively. In blinded evaluations, large language models (LLMs) generate responses that are often judged more empathic than human-written ones. Yet when a response is attributed to AI, recipients feel less heard than when comparable responses are attributed to a human. We built a conversation platform in which participants are asked to offer empathic support to an LLM expressing realistic troubles and conducted a randomized experiment collecting 33,938 messages spanning 2,904 text-based conversations between 968 participants and their LLM conversational partners. We find participants report feeling empathy but systematically fail to express it, but an LLM coaching intervention offering personalized feedback on effective empathic communication significantly boosts it without homogenizing participants' responses. Moreover, we derive a data-driven taxonomy of idiomatic empathic expressions in naturalistic dialogues across personal and workplace trouble scenarios. These results advance the scientific understanding of how empathy is expressed and demonstrate a scalable, AI-based intervention for scaffolding and cultivating it.